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Chapter 1: Setting the Scene
In this thesis, we are seeking to examine a relatively narrow aspect of the work of
Donald M. MacKay. In particular, we are seeking to examine his work in relation to
a very specific problem as it presents itself to a relatively specific group of people.
The problem we will seek MacKay's help in working through is what has come to be
known by contemporary Anglo/American philosophers as 'the mind/body problem'.
The group of people we will be attempting to help deal with this problem is the
contemporary evangelical Christian Church.
What we are dealing with is essentially a contemporary problem as it relates to a
contemporary system of belief. Though in this sense, this thesis is decidedly not
historical, it must be acknowledged that the historical roots of both the system of
belief it sets out to preserve and the problem it sets out to work through run very
deeply. In fact, even before God's people were called 'the Christian Church', there
was a mind/body problem—and ever since the Church took up the task of explaining
her beliefs, something like the mind/body problem has been an issue.
In these introductory chapters (chapters 1 and 2), it will be our intention to set the
work of Donald M. MacKay within the history of the Church's struggle to
understand the complex relationships between our physical, mental, and spiritual
lives—a struggle we will henceforth refer to as 'metaphysical anthropology'.
Because we have so much history to cover by way of introducing our main topic,
however, our 'historical' introduction must be both highly selective and very general.
For this reason, we must stress from the outset that these first two chapters are
intended more as an introduction to a problem than the history of a debate. Though it
will be our intention to at least mention the most important historical developments,
volumes could be (and in many cases have been) written on the subjects that we must
cover in only a few pages—or in some cases, only a few words. We will soon find
ourselves enthralled in the intricacies of philosophical and theological debate, but
hopefully not until after we have completed our historical introduction.
In this first chapter, we will attempt to sketch a general timeline of the major
developments in Western metaphysical anthropology up until the beginning of
MacKay's academic career. In chapter 2 we track the major developments in
MacKay's career, paying special attention to the development of the mind/body
problem in Anglo/American philosophical discourse. Then, once we have
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introduced the general historical context in which MacKay first presented his ideas,
we will attempt a systematic exposition of his unique, scientifically, philosophically
and theologically informed, Christian metaphysical anthropology.
Because Plato's writing has been so influential on the way Western thinkers down
through the millennia have understood mind/body relations, we must begin this first
chapter with a brief discussion of his metaphysical anthropology. We will then
discuss how Plato's views (which were deeply engraved in the minds of the early
Christian intellectual establishment) were received by several of the most prominent
thinkers in the early Church. In the third section of this chapter we will offer a
general summary of the way in which these early teachings were solidified into an
'orthodox' position by St. Augustine and other major Church leaders as Christianity
rose to prominence as an intellectual and political force. In section four we will
attempt to portray a few of the ways in this 'orthodox' metaphysical anthropology
came to be questioned during the Protestant Reformation and how this situation was
stabilised by a return to what may generally be regarded as the Platonic tradition. In
our final two sections we will very briefly provide a rough sketch ofRene Descartes'
plan for grounding dualistic metaphysical anthropology in the radical scepticism of
the seventeenth century and how his work eventually became the foundation for
modern psychology. In short, therefore, it will be the goal of this chapter to
introduce the mind/body problem as it presented itself to the Christian Church at the
beginning ofMacKay's career.
I. Plato and the Pre-Church Era
Without a doubt, the one person who has had the most influence on the history of the
mind/body problem, especially as it relates to Christian theology, is Plato. Though
the entire system ofWestern philosophy is dependent in some way or other on his
work, the aspect of his thought that most directly relates to our investigation is his
radical dualism between the soul and body of a human being.
We find the clearest expression of this dualism in the Phaedo—the dialogue in which
Plato describes the death of Socrates.1 In this dialogue, Socrates argues for and
1 This dialogue, generally considered to be representative of Plato's 'early' thought (at least to the
extent that the distinctions between the 'early', 'middle' and Tate' Plato are acknowledged), is of
especial interest to our study not only because it concentrates on the nature of the soul in its relation to
the body, highlighted by the impending crisis of death, but also because it represents one of Plato's
most distinctively 'religious' treatments of the soul (as opposed to the more 'political' and
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exemplifies belief in the immortality of the soul. His example of peace, and even
joy, in the face of death is one that has profoundly influenced Christian thinking—
not only the Christian attitude towards death, but also the Christian understanding of
the relationship between our mental and physical lives. With regard to the Christian
attitude towards death, consider the words of Phaedo as he describes the nobility of
Socrates' attitude in his dying hours:
The master seemed quite happy, Echecrates, both in his manner and in
what he said; he met his death so fearlessly and nobly. I could not
help feeling that even on his way to the other world he would be under
the providence of God, and that when he arrived there all would be
well with him, if it ever has been so with anybody. So I felt no sorrow
at all, as you might have expected on such a solemn occasion ... I felt
an absolutely incomprehensible emotion, a sort of curious blend of
pleasure and pain combined, as my mind took it in that in a little while
my friend was going to die.2
Is this not closely parallel to the sort of things we might expect to hear at a
contemporary Christian funeral?3 Later in the dialogue, Socrates explains that his
fearlessness and nobility in the face of death are fuelled not merely by a happy
resignation in the face of his inevitable fate, but by his impression of the nature of
death. Socrates honestly thinks that for the philosopher, death is preferable to life.4
In explaining the way he thinks death should be understood, Socrates showcases his
radical body/soul dualism. This dualism has profoundly influenced the philosophical
heritage of the Christian Church, inspiring centuries of gnosticism, asceticism, and
general 'high mindedness'.5 Socrates argues that death is to be looked forward to by
'ontological' approaches to be found in those dialogues which are often associated with the 'middle'
and 'late' epochs of Plato's thought). For more on the three epochs of Plato's thought as they relate to
his concept of the soul, see (Partee 1969) pp. 278-285.
2
(Plato 1996) p. 42
3 The degree to which the Christian ethic of dying has been influenced by the example Plato records in
the Phaedo was highlighted by the firestorm of controversy met by Oscar Cullmann when, in 1955, he
published a booklet comparing and contrasting the death of Socrates as portrayed by Plato and the
death of Jesus of Nazareth as portrayed by the Gospel narratives (Cullmann 1958). We will discuss
Cullmann's work in more detail in chapter 6.
4 He does acknowledge, however, that suicide is not to be considered, because it amounts to a
rebellion against the gods that embodied the soul to begin with.
5 This tradition has so profoundly influenced our modern view of history that it may be difficult to
imagine a time when this sort of transcendent longing was not a goal of religion. When reading the
earliest Hebrew Scriptures (e.g. The Pentateuch), however, one cannot help but be struck by the
physicality of the vision of the good life portrayed therein.
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the philosopher because the body hinders our pursuit of life's finer things.6
Naturally, to support of this line of reasoning he must defend the assumption that the
soul survives the death of the body.
The idea of reincarnation, which is one of the least popular ofPlato's views in the
Christian Church, plays a central role in Socrates' argument for the immortality of
the soul, though, as we shall see, the final stage of his reasoning does not depend
entirely on that doctrine. For the sake of brevity, we will break his argument down
into three stages, elaborating only on those stages that have most influenced
Christian theology.
The first stage of Socrates' argument for the immortality of the soul revolves around
the idea that if the soul ceases to exist (at least in its individuated state) with the
death of the body, then it would be impossible for the soul to be reincarnated. This
idea is taken more or less as a premise, the major work of the argument being to
support belief in reincarnation. With regard to reincarnation, Socrates argues that
since nothing can be defined except by its opposite, for there to be living people,
there must also be dead people. Since we regularly observe that people die and are
born, Socrates further argues, we must also acknowledge that the living and the dead
6 For example, Phaedo reports the following conversation between Socrates and Simmias:
Do you think that it is right for a philosopher to concern himself with the so-called pleasures
connected with food and drink? Certainly not, Socrates, said Simmias. And what about
sexual pleasures? No, not at all. And what about the other attentios that we pay to our
bodies? Do you think that a philosopher attaches any importance to them? ... I think the
true philosopher despises them, he said. Then it is your opinion in general that a man of this
kind is not concerned with the body, but keeps his attention directed as much as he can away
from it and toward the soul? Yes, it is. So it is clear first of all in the case ofphysical
pleasures that the philosopher frees his soul from association with the body, so far as it is
possible, to a greater extent than other men? Yes, it is. (Plato 1996) p. 47
Likewise, Socrates is also reported to have said:
So long as we keep to the body and our soul is contaminated with this imperfection, there is
no chance of our ever attaining satisfactorily to our object, which we assert to be truth . . .
We are in fact convinced that ifwe are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get
rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself. It seems, to
judge from the argument, that the wisdom which we desire and upon which we profess to
have set our hearts will be attainable only when we are dead, and not in our lifetime. If no
pure knowledge is possible in the company of the body, then either it is totally impossible to
aquire knowledge, or it is only possible after death, because it is only then that the soul will
be separate and independent of the body. It seems that so long as we are alive, we shall
continue closest to knowledge ifwe avoid as much as we can all contact and association with
the body, except when they are absolutely necessary, and instead of allowing ourselves to
become infected with its nature, purify ourselves from it until God himself gives us
deliverance. (Plato 1996) p. 49
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swap roles from time to time. We may summarise this first stage in Socrates
argument, therefore, as follows: Since the soul must survive death for reincarnation
to be possible, and belief in reincarnation is justified, belief in the immortality of the
soul is also justified.
The Christian Church has not taken this first stage in Socrates' argument very
seriously because reincarnation implies a cyclical understanding of time—which is
antithetical to even the most basic tenets of Christian eschatology. But the second
and especially the third stages of his argument have been taken very seriously by the
Church, because they revolve around a theory regarding the nature of truth which has
not been questioned until fairly recently.8 This theory states that truth is timeless and
unchanging, in direct contrast to the constant change taking place within the spatio-
temporal matrix of the physical world.
The second stage of Socrates' argument (which still depends heavily on his doctrine
of reincarnation) goes like this: 1) If truth is really detached from this changing
world (i.e. if truth is really changeless), and 2) It is possible for people to know truth,
then 3) It can only be the case that when people know truth, they must be
remembering things that they knew during a time in which they were not a part of
this changing, physical world.9 Plato develops this argument in some detail, but,
although it revolves around a theory of truth that has been widely accepted, it also
remains closely tied to the idea of reincarnation. The second stage of Socrates
argument, therefore, has had far less of an influence on Western thought than his
third stage.
The third stage of Socrates' argument is like his second in that it regards the nature
of truth and the possibility of our knowing it, but it goes beyond the assertion of the
pre-existence of the soul to speak to the soul's very nature. It is this third stage of his
argument that has resonated most strongly with thinkers in the Christian tradition. It
climaxes in the following exchange:
So you think that we should assume two classes of things, one visible
and the other invisible?
Yes, we should.
7
(Plato 1996) pp. 52-55
8 See note 10, below.
9
(Plato 1996) pp. 55-61
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The invisible being invariable, and the visible never being the same?
Yes, we should assume that too.
Well, now, said Socrates, are we not part body, part soul?
Certainly.
Then to which class do we say that the body would have the closer
resemblance and relation?
Quite obviously to the visible.
And the soul, is it visible or invisible?
Invisible to men, at any rate, Socrates, he said.
. . . Did we not say some time ago that when the soul uses the
instrumentality of the body for any inquiry, whether through sight or
hearing or any other sense—because using the body implies using the
senses—it is drawn away by the body into the realm of the variable,
and loses its way and becomes confused and dizzy, as though it were
fuddled, through contact with things of a similar nature?
Certainly.
But when it investigates by itself, it passes into the realm of the pure
and everlasting and immortal and changeless, and being of a kindred
nature, when it is once independent and free from interference,
consorts with it always and strays no longer, but remains, in that realm
of the absolute, constant and invariable, through contact with beings
of a similar nature. And this condition of the soul we call wisdom.
An excellent description, and perfectly true, Socrates.
Though a full discussion of all the points raised in this exchange would take us
appreciably off course at this juncture, we should note that Plato is arguing here for
at least two forms of dualism: one epistemological and the other metaphysical. The
epistemological dualism posits a radical distinction between the 'unchangeable'
truths of the intellectual realm on the one hand and the 'changeable' representations
of those facts in our directly observable world on the other. While this kind of
epistemological dualism has been the source of enormous debate within modern
philosophical theology10, it only relates to our present study in that, for Plato, it
grounded his metaphysical dualism, which has plagued metaphysical anthropology
10 This epistemological dualism has been questioned not only by those 'post-modem' thinkers who
have yet to gain wide acceptance by the contemporary Christian Church, but also by those thinkers in
the twentieth century who rejected the theological distinction between 'natural' and 'revealed'
theology. For a concise introduction to a form of 'post-modem' epistemology that may turn out to be
acceptable by the Christian Church, see (Murphy 1997)and (Murphy 1996). For an introduction to the
non-dualist epistemology that grounded twentieth century rejection of natural theology, see (Torrance
1976) (especially his Preface and Introduction).
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ever since. This metaphysical dualism, as it relates to metaphysical anthropology,
posits a radical distinction between our material existence (i.e. 'our bodies') on the
one hand and some immaterial existence (i.e. 'our souls', 'our minds' or 'the real
us') on the other.
Perhaps one of the main reasons that this metaphysical duality was preserved so
readily by Christian theology has to do with the concept of humanity as the image of
God. Christian doctrine regarding the divine image is ostensibly grounded in biblical
narrative. In Genesis 1:26 &27, we read that humanity was created in the image of
God. It is important to note, however, that very little explanation is provided in the
biblical account as to what we are to make of such an important fact of our existence.
The New International Version renders these verses as follows:
Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and
let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the
livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along
the ground.' So God created man in his own image, in the image of
God he created him; male and female he created them.
Though some commentators have developed the idea suggested by these verses that
our being in the image of God relates to our station relative to the other particulars of
God's creation, most have seen fit to draw conclusions of a more distinctly
metaphysical orientation. These metaphysical conclusions have (whether directly or
indirectly) borrowed heavily from Plato's anthropology. After all, Plato gives much
more detail than Genesis regarding what it might mean for human beings to reflect
the divine nature. We come across this detail as we continue to read from the section
quoted immediately above.
Look at it this way too. When a soul and body are both in the same
place, nature teaches the one to serve and be subject, the other to rule
and govern. In this relation which do you think resembles the divine
and which the mortal part? Don't you think that it is the nature of the
divine to rule and direct, and that of the mortal to be subject and
serve?
I do.
Then which does the soul resemble?
Obviously, Socrates, soul resembles the divine, and body the mortal.
Now, Cebes, he said, see whether this is our conclusion from all that
we have said. The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal,
intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and
invariable, whereas body is most like that which is human, mortal,
multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble, and never self-consistent. Can
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we adduce any conflicting argument, my dear Cebes, to show that this
is not so?
We cannot."
This low view of the human body (relative to the soul) is reflected not only in the
grotesque rumours concerning the ancient philosophers' tendencies towards
paedophilia, but also in their attitudes towards dead bodies. Though all legitimate
forms ofChristianity unequivocally reject the sexual exploitation of the bodies of
children, the attitude expressed by Socrates towards his own soon-to-be-dead body
may sound eerily familiar to modern Christians. At the close of the Phaedo, we find
the following exchange between Crito and Socrates:
But how shall we bury you?
Any way you like, replied Socrates, that is, if you can catch me and I
don't slip through your fingers.
He laughed gently as he spoke, and turning to us went on, I can't
persuade Crito that I am this Socrates here who is talking to you now
and marshalling all the arguments. He thinks that I am the one whom
he will see presently lying dead, and he asks how he is to bury me!
As for my long and elaborate explanation that when I have drunk the
poison I shall remain with you no longer, but depart to a state of
heavenly happiness, this attempt to console both you and myself
seems to be wasted on him . . . you must assure him that when I am
dead I shall not stay, but depart and be gone . . . No, you must keep up
your spirits and say that it is only my body that you are burying, and
you can bury it as you please, in whatever way you think is most
proper.12
To sum up Socrates' third and (at least for our purposes) most important argument
for the immortality of the soul, then, we can identify three key points:
1) Because we know that it is possible for human beings to know at least some
truths, we must say that some part of our nature participates in the realm of
truths.
2) Since the realm of truths is unchangeable, that part of the human being that
participates in it cannot ever die.
3) Since our physical bodies clearly change and even die, there must be some
other portion of our being which participates in the world of truths and is
11
(Plato 1996) p. 63
12
(Plato 1996) pp. 95-96
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therefore immortal. This rational and immortal portion of our being is what
we call 'our souls'.
Though it does not necessarily form an essential stage in his argument for the
immortality of the soul, we also identified a fourth, tightly related, point that has had
a profound influence on Christian metaphysical anthropology. This point can be
summarised as follows:
4) A person's soul (as opposed to a person's body) is the portion of a person's
existence that most directly reflects the divine nature. The value of our souls,
therefore, infinitely exceeds the value of our physical bodies. Though we
may have an indefinite succession of physical embodiments, it is only our
selves-as-souls that have any ultimate value.
II. The Biblical Era
Of all the texts we will be mentioning in this brief historical introduction, the Bible
is, without a doubt, the most important. After all, if it were possible to unequivocally
ascertain the position of the Bible with regard to metaphysical anthropology, we
could effectively solve the whole problem (at least for evangelicals) here and now.
Unfortunately, however, the Bible never directly addresses this issue. In fact, even
what little indirect evidence can be found in Scripture is inconclusive.
With regard to our present historical introduction to the mind/body problem,
therefore, we must simply content ourselves with the acknowledgement that highly
competent scholars disagree as to the metaphysical anthropology of the Bible.13
Rather than delve in to Hebrew and Greek word studies or scrutinize a vast
assemblage of obscure 'proof texts' as other scholars have already done, we will
simply acknowledge that the success or failure of the position expressed in
subsequent chapters necessarily depends upon its being the best available
interpretation of the Scriptures—recognizing, of course, that all genuine knowledge,
whether it comes to us from philosophers, scientists, or whomever, helps us to
interpret the Bible, and it is the Bible that is the most authoritative statement of
God's revelation available to the contemporary Christian church. With this at the
13
Although much has been written with regard to biblical anthropology in general, the two thinkers
who have most specifically and competently analysed the biblical data with regard to the modern
debate over metaphysical anthropology are John W. Cooper (Cooper 2001; Cooper 2000) and Joel
Green (Green 1998; Green 2002).
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forefront of our minds, therefore, we will now proceed in our historical introduction
with a brief examination of the positions maintained by the some of the most
prominent thinkers of the patristic era.
III. Patristic Era
The earliest works of the Patristic era that directly relate to our present study were
produced fairly late in the second century A.D. Despite the fact that some 600 years
had passed since Plato wrote the Phaedo, the intellectual world in which these early
Patristic works were composed was deeply influenced by Plato's philosophy. After
all, Aristotle, Plato's most famous student, was the personal tutor ofAlexander the
Great, who conquered the entire Mediterranean world. Not only that, but the
Romans, who controlled the intellectual, military, political, and cultural14 hegemony
in which the life ofChrist and the early Church were situated, were particularly fond
of Greek culture and philosophy.
A. Justin and the Greek Apologists
Though the Greek apologists were, like all the great intellectuals of their time, deeply
influenced by their extensive training in Greek philosophy, their work in defending
the beliefs of persecuted Christians led them to challenge some of the most basic
tenets of the intellectual status quo. Of particular interest to our study are those
challenges to the Greek philosophical hegemony that, whether directly or indirectly,
called the accepted Platonic metaphysical anthropology into question.
For this reason, two tracts on the resurrection of the body reputedly written by Greek
apologists will be of especial interest. Even before we discuss these tracts in any
detail, however, we should note the extent to which their very topic represents a
distinct break from the philosophical status quo. After all, the resurrection is one of
those doctrines that, while central to the hope of the Christian faith15, is deeply
antithetical to the Platonic understanding of the nature of humanity. For, while the
Platonic doctrine of reincarnation has the soul going one direction after death (into a
14 Jesus' Hebrew cultural background was, of course, situated within the wider context of Roman
cultural toleration.
15 See, for example, Paul's reasoning concerning the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15:12ff.
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new, different body), the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection has the soul going
in another (being united to the very same body which had once died).16
It is not as if the bodily resurrection was a new idea to the Greek apologists (they
wrote at least 100 years after the revolutionary event of Jesus' resurrection), but their
works represent the earliest known non-canonical attempts to reconcile the Christian
doctrine of bodily resurrection with the dominant metaphysical anthropology
inherited from Plato.
Athenagoras of Athens, who wrote his most famous work, Plea for the Christians,
around A.D. 177, is also believed to have written the very first Christian treatise on
the resurrection of the body.17 Athenagoras taught that, despite Plato's insistence
that the fate of our bodies is more or less inconsequential to 'the real us', human
beings are neither body nor soul in isolation, but an essentially integrated
psychosomatic unity. We see this aspect of Athenagoras' thought most clearly in
chapter 15 of his 'On the Resurrection', where he says:
But that which has received both understanding and reason is man, not
the soul by itself. Man, therefore, who consists of the two parts, must
continue forever. But it is impossible for him to continue unless he
rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature ofmen
as men would not continue.18
Justin Martyr has also been accredited with an early treatise on the resurrection,
though the authorship of this treatise has been questioned even more intensely than
16 We use this talk of the soul 'going' places here only with extreme reluctance. As our discussion of
MacKay's metaphysical anthropology develops, we will see that this language could be very
deceiving. As we have seen, however, this was the way Plato talked about the soul, so even as they
challenged Plato's understanding of what happens to the soul upon death, early Church theologians
used the word 'soul' in a relatively Platonic way.
While the language used here may be helpful in highlighting the incompatibility of Platonic and
Christian individual eschatology, it may also be misleading in that it suggests univocality between
Christian and Platonic discourse about the soul. While most theologians (especially before Thomas
Aquinas) did think of the soul in this Platonic sort ofway, many theologians, including Donald M.
MacKay, have argued that the soul should have been thought of differently. In contrast to the Platonic
concept of soul, MacKay's system would not allow one to say that a soul could leave its body any
more than one could say that a certain blackness could leave its lump of coal.
17 There is some scholarly debate over the authorship of this tract, though Athenagoras is certainly the
most likely candidate. For scholarship questioning Athenagoras' authorship, see (Athenagoras and
Schoedel 1972; Grant 1954). Both of these writers claim that the tract is most likely written against
Origen in the third century. For scholarship defending Athenagoras' authorship, see (Barnard 1972;
Barnard 1984; Rauch 61).
18
(Athenagoras 2001)
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that of Athenagoras.19 In fact, in one recent study of this work20, Martin Heimgartner
even suggests that Athenagoras may have written it instead of Justin.21 Regardless of
its author, however, this treatise on the resurrection, like the one attributed to
Athenagoras, exhibits a non-Platonic metaphysical anthropology. Though some
portions of his work on the resurrection have been lost, it is still not difficult to find
clear evidence of a metaphysical anthropology emphasising psychosomatic unity. In
chapter 8 of the extant fragments, for example, we read:
But, in truth, He has even called the flesh to the resurrection, and
promises to it everlasting life. For where He promises to save man,
there He gives the promise to the flesh. For what is man but the
reasonable animal composed of body and soul? Is the soul by itself
man? No; but the soul ofman. Would the body be called man? No, but
it is called the body of man. If, then, neither of these is by itself man,
but that which is made up of the two together is called man, and God
has called man to life and resurrection, He has called not a part, but
the whole, which is the soul and the body.22
Although both of these early treatises on bodily resurrection clearly indicate that the
Greek apologists rejected the Platonic idea that the fate of our physical embodiment
is irrelevant to the life of the soul, it would be wrong to assume that such a rejection
resulted in a materialistic metaphysical anthropology. After all, even in the brief
passages we have cited we see that the Greek apologists continued to think of body
and soul as two different things23 which, when united, constitute a human being. The
underlying idea, therefore, would seem to be that although a human being must have
a physical body in order to be a human being, every human being has a non-material
'part' as well. In this sense, the Greek apologists were even more dualistic in their
metaphysical anthropology than was Plato, for whereas Plato taught that when body
and soul separate, the person continues to live as a soul despite the death of his or her
body, the Greek apologists taught that when body and soul separate the person is
destroyed in death. For the Greek apologists, therefore, our only hope for continuing
19
Though he recognises the importance of such defenders of Justinian authorship as Friedrich Loofs
and Pierre Prigent (Prigent 1964; Loofs 1930), Brian Daley (Daley 1991) concludes that their
arguments fall to the criticism of F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock (Hitchcock 1937-1938).
20
(Heimgartner 2001)
21 Another important, recent study (Bynum 1995) concludes that challenges to Justinian and
Athenagorian authorship are not convincing. But because this study treats the two treatises together,
its conclusion would not necessarily conflict with that ofHeimgartner.
22 (Justin 2001)
23 See note 15 above.
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personal existence after death involves the restoration of human duality through
bodily resurrection and re-animation. Where either a soul or a body is absent, we
can have no human existence.
We must also be very careful, however, not to read too many distinctions that may be
clear to modern philosophical minds back into the philosophy of ancient writers.
After all, we also find passages in these treatises contrasting the immortal human
spirit with the (apparently mortal) human soul, despite the fact that we are offered
very little information regarding the metaphysical implications of such an immortal
aspect of human existence. In particular, it is unclear how our immortal spirits relate
to our souls, minds and bodies. Consider, for example, the final chapter of the
treatise traditionally attributed to Justin:
The resurrection is a resurrection of the flesh which died. For the spirit
dies not; the soul is in the body, and without a soul it cannot live. The
body, when the soul forsakes it, is not. For the body is the house of the
soul; and the soul the house of the spirit. These three, in all those who
cherish a sincere hope and unquestioning faith in God, will be saved.
Considering, therefore, even such arguments as are suited to this
world, and finding that, even according to them, it is not impossible
that the flesh be regenerated; and seeing that, besides all these proofs,
the Saviour in the whole Gospel shows that there is salvation for the
flesh, why do we any longer endure those unbelieving and dangerous
arguments, and fail to see that we are retrograding when we listen to
such an argument as this: that the soul is immortal, but the body
mortal, and incapable of being revived? For this we used to hear from
Pythagoras and Plato, even before we learned the truth. If then the
Saviour said this, and proclaimed salvation to the soul alone, what
new thing, beyond what we heard from Pythagoras and Plato and all
their band, did He bring us? But now He has come proclaiming the
glad tidings of a new and strange hope to men. For indeed it was a
strange and new thing for God to promise that He would not keep
incorruption in incorruption, but would make corruption
incorruption.24
B. Tertullian and the Latin Apologists
The Carthaginian lawyer Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullian (c. 160-c. 220) was
another early Church theologian to make a significant contribution to Christian
metaphysical anthropology. The first thing we need to mention regarding
Tertullian's contribution is that his attitude towards Plato is somewhat less than
24(Justin 2001) chapter 10
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congenial. In addition to such widely quoted statements as 'So, then, where is there
any likeness between the Christian and the philosopher? Between the disciple of
9 S
Greece and of heaven?' , Tertullian also makes repeated allusions to Plato's
supposed paedophilia and other gross manifestations ofGreek immorality.26
Tertullian not only rejected the tendency of some early Christian intellectuals to
elevate the authority of the Greek philosophers, but he also criticised Platonic
metaphysical anthropology. In the opening lines of his treatise on the soul, for
example, we find the following comments on Socrates as he is presented in the
Phaedo:
... all the wisdom of Socrates, at that moment, proceeded from the
affectation of an assumed composure, rather than the firm conviction
of ascertained truth. For by whom has truth ever been discovered
without God? By whom has God ever been found without Christ? By
whom has Christ ever been explored without the Holy Spirit? By
whom has the Holy Spirit ever been attained without the mysterious
gift of faith? Socrates, as none can doubt, was actuated by a different
spirit. For they say that a demon clave to him from his boyhood—the
very worst teacher certainly, notwithstanding the high place assigned
to it by poets and philosophers . . . Now if Socrates was pronounced
the wisest ofmen by the oracle of the Pythian demon, which, you may
be sure, neatly managed the business for his friend, of how much
greater dignity and constancy is the assertion of the Christian wisdom,
before the very breath of which the whole host of demons is
scattered!27
Aside from his disdain for Plato, however, Tertullian is not entirely clear on his own
metaphysical anthropology. Perhaps the most striking aspect of his view, however,
is that he believed that our souls as well as our bodies are essentially corporeal.
Though this aspect of his metaphysical anthropology raises all sorts of bizarre and
interesting implications, the most important aspect of Tertullian's thought for our
purposes is that so much of his theoretical speculation was motivated by a problem
that also happens to be the most significant difficulty underlying the modern
mind/body problem—namely, the problem of mental causation.
25
Chapter 46 of (Tertullian 2001a)
26
Though multiple examples of these kinds of accusations can be found in Tertullian's writing, one
example can be found in chapter 55 of his treatise on the resurrection of the flesh, where he says,
'When the world, indeed, shall pass away, then the kingdom of heaven shall be opened. Shall we then
have to sleep high up in ether, with the boy-loving worthies of Plato. ..?' (Tertullian 2001b)
27
(Tertullian 2001c)
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Tertullian makes the problem ofmental causation one of his central arguments for
the corporeality of the soul. Tertullian's reasoning, which we find in his treatise on
the soul, goes like this:
Again, there is nothing in common between things corporeal and
things incorporeal as to their susceptibility. But the soul certainly
sympathizes with the body, and shares in its pain, whenever it is
injured by bruises, and wounds, and sores: the body, too, suffers with
the soul, and is united with it (whenever it is afflicted with anxiety,
distress, or love) in the loss of vigour which its companion sustains,
whose shame and fear it testifies by its own blushes and paleness. The
soul, therefore, is (proved to be) corporeal from this inter-communion
of susceptibility. Chrysippus also joins hands in fellowship with
Cleanthes when he lays it down that it is not at all possible for things
which are endued with body to be separated from things which have
not body; because they have no such relation as mutual contact or
coherence. Accordingly Lucretius says:
'Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res.'
'For nothing but body is capable of touching or of being touched.'
(Such severance, however, is quite natural between the soul and the
body); for when the body is deserted by the soul, it is overcome by
death. The soul, therefore, is endued with a body; for if it were not
corporeal, it could not desert the body.28
While this reasoning may convince Tertullian of the corporeality of the soul, it still
does not entirely solve the mind/body problem—and that by his own admission. For
it is not clear to Tertullian what the body of the soul would be like29, and particularly,
whether or not the body of the soul would be sufficient to individuate and sustain
thoughts as our thoughts are individuated and sustained by the flesh with which the
soul is united throughout life. We see Tertullian struggle with these questions in his
treatise 'On the Resurrection of the Flesh'. There we read:
But if you allow that the faculty which rules the senses, and which
they call Hegemonikon, has its sanctuary in the brain, or in the
interval between the eyebrows, or wheresoever the philosophers are
pleased to locate it, the flesh will still be the thinking place of the soul.
The soul is never without the flesh, as long as it is in the flesh. There
is nothing which the flesh does not transact in company with the soul,
when without it does not exist. Consider carefully, too, whether the
thoughts are not administered by the flesh, since it is through the flesh
28
Chapter 5 (Tertullian 2001c)
29 As Peter Geach argues (Geach 1957) p. 112, positing a subtle body such as Tertullian's corporeal
soul as the seat ofmental awareness solves the mind gross-body problem only at the expense of
having created a mind subtle-body problem. We will have much more to say about this in chapter 6.
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that they are distinguished and known externally. Let the soul only
meditate some design, the face gives the indication—the face being the
mirror of all our intentions. They may deny all combination in acts,
but they cannot gainsay their co-operation in thoughts.30
Though the Greek and Latin apologists (most significantly Athenagoras, Justin, and
Tertullian) made significant contributions to the work of developing a distinctively
Christian metaphysical anthropology, their work is overshadowed to a large extent
by the massive influence of the fourth century theologian Augustine of Hippo.
C. Augustine
The most widely recognised theologian of the fourth and fifth centuries (and the sixth
through twelfth centuries as well, for that matter) is, without question, St. Augustine.
Though several important councils earlier in the fourth century sealed into orthodoxy
the more fundamental tenents of the Christian faith, the tension between the different
metaphysical anthropologies of different early Church theologians31 eased only after
a theologian as important as Augustine began writing on the subject. Unfortunately,
however, even ifwe were to limit our study to this single theologian, we would not
find a single, unified metaphysical anthropology, for Augustine's position developed
substantially throughout his career. Though the complexity of Augustine's position
prevents us from offering much detail regarding the overall influence of this thought,
a few key points demand comment.
First, we should note that the progression in Augustine's position was a progression
away from his neoplatonic origins—particularly with regard to his understanding of
the importance of the body to the life of the soul.32 Roland Teske describes this
progression as follows:
30
Chapter 15 (Tertullian 2001b)
31 In brief surveys such as the one in which we are presently involved, it is always difficult to know
which thinkers are important enough to discuss. One major thinker that we are not discussing here is
Origen (d. 253/254). The main reason we are not discussing his thought is that it has provoked 'more
heat than light' in the history of theology, being the subject of immense controversy, especially in the
sixth century. Because his metaphysical anthropology was so controversial, the process of separating
the real Origen from the Origenist sect of the sixth century would take more space that we can
presently allow. For those who may be especially interested in Origen's metaphysical anthropology,
however, the most complete study is (Cornelis 1959). A helpful, shorter discussion can be found on
pp. 47-64 and 188-190 of (Daley 1991).
32 For a full study on the progression within Augustine's metaphysical anthropology from a staunchly
neo-Platonic view in his early years to a more distinctively Christian view later in life, see (John A.
Mourant 1969).
Setting the Scene 23
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
In his earlier writings, he defines the human soul in Platonic fashion
as "a certain substance partaking in reason and suited to rule the body"
(.De quant. Anim. 13.22) and says that "a human being, as seen by a
human being, is a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body" (De
moribus ecclesiae catholicae 1.27.52). In later writings he places
more emphasis upon the unity of the human being. Though Augustine
says that a human being is "a rational soul which has a body," he also
says that "the soul which has a body does not make two persons, but
one human being" (In Johannis evangelium tractatus 19.15). A
human being can be defined as a single substance with a body and a
soul: "Ifwe should define a human being such that a human being is a
rational substance consisting of soul and body, there is no doubt that a
human being has a soul which is not the body and has a body which is
not the soul" (De Trin. 15.7.17).33
Likewise, Bonnie Kent says:
Having himself believed this during his Manichaean period,
Augustine argues all the more passionately later on against
denigrating the body. Indeed, Christian doctrine on the resurrection of
the body, a source of dismay to the Athenians who heard St. Paul
preach, was one of the main issues dividing early Christianity from all
contemporary pagan schools of philosophy. Far from equating the
human being with the soul, Augustine insists that human beings are by
nature embodied—that God created us this way, so that we should
never regard our bodies as prisons or punishments.34
Furthermore, we must note that Augustine's increasing respect for the human body
was not merely a reaction against neo-Platonism. This shift in his thought was
motivated, rather, by his increasing understanding of the philosophical implications
of the Gospel narratives. As Brian Daley, commenting on Augustine's later works,
remarks,
. . . just as the gospel accounts stress the corporeality of Jesus' risen
body, and its identity with the body in which he preached and
underwent death, so Augustine is at pains to oppose any interpretation
of the Christian hope that would turn to allegory the promise that our
bodies will rise again.35
But this increasing emphasis on the importance of our physical embodiment did not
prompt Augustine to openly reject the relatively Platonic idea of the human soul as a
thing capable of sustaining mental life between the death and resurrection of an
33
(Teske 2001) p. 116
34 (Kent 2001) p. 210
35 (Daley 1991) p. 143
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individual physical embodiment. Though the vagueness of his comments regarding
the state of souls between death and resurrection appears intentional, Augustine also
supported the Latin tradition of praying for the dead, arguing that the souls of the
'dead in Christ' remain (with the Church) in time awaiting the final consummation of
Christ's kingdom rather than departing into eternity individually upon death.36
D. Aquinas
Something very close to Augustine's metaphysical anthropology continued to be
considered the orthodox position for many centuries after his death. Though
challengers did arise from time to time, the need to re-think his relatively dualistic
position never presented itself with enough force to motivate change—at least not
until the writings of Aristotle were re-discovered in the years leading up to the
outstanding intellectual career of St. Thomas Aquinas. While Aquinas' work is
notoriously complex, and a full examination of his views (even ifwe were to narrow
our focus to his views on the body and soul) would be a lengthy thesis on its own,
there are a few things that we must mention concerning the way in which his work
changed the orthodox conception of the metaphysical anthropology. The most
important contribution that Aquinas and his thirteenth century colleagues made to
our subject is that he brought some ofAristotle's understanding to bear on this issue.
Aquinas' tendency to follow Aristotle rather than Plato in his understanding of the
nature of the soul led him to think of a living human being as a body and soul which
are essentially united, rather than a soul which happens to be united with a body
throughout life. This position is perhaps most graphically illustrated by one of
Aquinas' most famous statement related to metaphysical anthropology, made in
reference to 1 Corinthians 15: 'anima mea non est ego'.37
For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the soul is essentially the form of a living body.
Though this way of thinking about humanity was considerably less dualistic than the
Augustinian metaphysical anthropology that had been considered the norm for
centuries, Aquinas' thinking along these lines proved highly influential.38 The extent
36
(Daley 1991) pp. 136-139
37 As quoted in (Bynum 1995) p. 257 n. 114 among other sources.
38 As Caroline Walker Bynum writes in her (Bynum 1995), 'No theologian in the mid-thirteenth
century held, as Hugh of St. Victor and Robert ofMelun had done in the early twelfth, that the person
is a soul using a body. All conceived of person as, by definition, a psychosomatic whole.' (p. 256)
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to which Aquinas' anthropological holism replaced the older, relatively dualistic
Augustinian perspective can be seen in the pronouncement of the council of Vienne,
held in 1311-12, which states,' we reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of
the catholic faith every doctrine or proposition rashly asserting that the substance of
the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human
body, or casting doubt on this matter'.39
Though Aquinas broke from the Aristotelian tradition by positing the immortality of
the individuated soul (Aristotle taught that no form can continue to exist apart from
the matter in which it is instantiated), Aquinas' emphasis on the unity of the body
and soul cannot be denied.40 This understanding of the human person as an essential
unity of material body and formal soul also transformed the way theologians thought
of the continuity pertaining to the corruptible body which dies and the incorruptible,
glorified body which will be raised at the end of the world; for whereas earlier
thinkers tended to struggle almost exclusively with some empirically verifiable form
ofmaterial continuity, theologians after Aquinas tended to rely more heavily on the
'formal' continuity which asserts that sameness ofmatter is dictated not by material
continuity but by sameness of form.41
As we shall soon see, the legacy of Aquinas' metaphysical anthropology has been
somewhat muted by the tremendous impact of the Protestant Reformation, though
contemporary interest in his work in this area appears to be on the rise 42
IV. The Reformation
Though it should not be considered a major cause for the Protestant Reformation, it
is of some interest to our study that metaphysical anthropology, particularly as it
relates to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, did enter into the sixteenth
century theological debate. The reason that this doctrine came up for discussion
39 Decree 1, paragraph 2, quoted from http://www.piar.hu/councils/ecuml5.htm
40 For more on Aquinas' break from the Aristotelian tradition, see pp. 217ff of (Greshake and Kremer
1986) (esp. p. 225).
41 For more on the distinction between material and formal continuity, see (Bynum 1995) especially
pp. 259-264.
42 For an excellent, recent exposition ofAquinas' philosophy ofmind, see (Kretzmann 1993). For
more recent contributions that deal explicitly with Aquinas' metaphysical anthropology, see (Leftow
2001) and especially (Klima 2002).
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during the Reformation can be traced back to the Decree of Leo X, issued in 1513, in
conjunction with the fifth Lateran Council. This bull {Apostolici Regiminis) did little
more than restate the official Church doctrine on the soul as it was received from
Aquinas, stating that 'the soul is not only really and essentially the form of the
human body, but is also immortal; and the number of souls has been and is to be
multiplied according as the number of bodies is multiplied'.43
While this statement may seem quite uncontroversial considering what has just been
said regarding the teachings of Aquinas and his influence, we must remember that
there were also complex ecclesiological issues involved in anything the Church did
at this point in time. Tensions within the Church of 1513 were very near the
breaking point. When questions regarding the authority of the Pope and Church
councils began to be raised (most explicitly by Martin Luther from 1517 onwards),
this doctrine, having been so recently re-stated by papal bull, was one of the many
that came under scrutiny.
A. Martin Luther
When, on 15 June, 1520, Pope Leo X issued the bull Exsurge Domine, calling on
Luther to recant forty-one different points from his writing that the Church found
objectionable, Luther offered his fiery response Defence and Explanation ofAll the
Articles ofDr. Martin Luther Which Were Unjustly Condemned by the Roman Bull.
Though we need not burden ourselves with a detailed examination of this
inflammatory work, we should mention that in his defence of the 27th article, Luther
makes the following remark concerning Apostolici Regiminis:
Hence the experts in Rome have recently pronounced a holy decree
which establishes that the soul ofman is immortal, acting as if we did
not say in our common Creed 'I believe in the life everlasting'. And,
with the assistance of the mastermind Aristotle, they decreed further
that the soul is 'essentially the form of the human body,' and many
other splendid articles of a similar nature. These decrees are, indeed,
most appropriate to the papal church, for they make it possible for
them to hold fast to the human dreams and the doctrines of devils
while they trample upon and destroy faith and the teaching of Christ.44
43
Quoted from 'Man' in the Catholic Encyclopaedia Online
(http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm)
44 See volume 32, pp. 77-78 of (Luther 1958).
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It is important that we realise that Luther is not here calling the main point of the
doctrine into question. His objection seems to be to the language used to assert the
doctrine of spiritual immortality rather than the teaching itself. After all, Luther
reasons, if our creeds and the Scriptures both teach eternal life through universal
bodily resurrection, why should anyone feel the need to supplement this teaching
with the language of the philosophers concerning the immortality of the soul? We
see this attitude, favouring the doctrine of eternal life through resurrection rather than
spiritual immortality, even more clearly in Luther's 1529 treatise On War Against the
Turk. There, arguing that 'Mohammed is a destroyer of our Lord Christ and his
kingdom', he points out one aspect of Islamic theology that may actually be more
biblical than that of official Church teaching. He says:
And the Turks perform the same holy works as some of our monks
and hope for everlasting life at the Judgement Day, for, holy people
that they are, they believe in the resurrection of the dead, though few
of the papists believe in it.45
As if these statements were not enough to cause his followers to question the
orthodox doctrine of the immortality of the soul, Luther's later informal talks with
his students, published as Tabletalk, were even more explicit. For example, in
September of 1540, when asked whether he believed in Plato's doctrine of the
immortality of the soul, Luther responded:
No indeed! . . . How can Plato speak about this matter? I believe that
God made the whole man from the dust of the earth, for the text [Gen.
2:7] says that God made man. 'Man' doesn't mean the body alone but
always means the body and the soul, and accordingly the Scriptures
call the soul 'the breath of life' [Gen. 2:7]. Since the soul was in that
instance made with the body, so when a child is born today the soul is
created together with the body, contrary to Plato. Although all others
disagree, it's my opinion that the soul isn't added from the outside but
is created out of the matter of the semen . . 46
And again, in the winter of 1542-1543, Luther was asked what happens to the soul
immediately after a person dies. After a brief reference to the paradox presented to
Christians by Scriptural references that seem to suggest that Christians, upon death,
go immediately to be with Christ in paradise, Luther said:
Christians, both those who are dead and those who are living, await a
resurrection of the dead. Abraham lives too. God is God of the
45 Volume 46, p. 177 (Luther 1958)
46
(Luther 1958) Volume 54 p. 401
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living. Now, if one should say that Abraham's soul lives with God
but his body is dead, this distinction is rubbish. I will attack it. One
must say, 'The whole Abraham, the whole man, shall live.' The other
way you tear off a part of Abraham and say, 'It lives.' This is the way
the philosophers speak: 'Afterward the soul departed from its
domicile,' etc. That would be a silly soul if it were in heaven and
desired its body!47
Unfortunately for the many common parishioners who were affected by their
teaching, however, there were some whose reaction against the orthodox teaching on
the soul was much stronger than Luther's. Many of the more radical Anabaptists
taught that the Roman 'spiritualising' of the Church had neglected the reality of the
kingdom of God. Some of these radicals began teaching that the kingdom was in
fact a physical kingdom, and that Christ was returning very soon—and so they began
to build physical kingdoms to usher in the reign of Christ. The most notorious
example of how this teaching affected the common people can be found in the story
ofMunster, Germany.
In February of 1534, Jan Matthys, an Anabaptist leader, took over the city of
Munster, baptising every citizen by force and declaring the city 'The New
Jerusalem'. He made the possession of private property illegal and ordered that all
books in the city be burned. When the Catholic bishop whom Matthys had forced
out of the town raised an army and returned to the city, Matthys attacked the army
with only a handful ofmen and was quickly cut down. Unfortunately, however, the
bishop's army was not immediately successful in taking the city, and John of Leiden,
Matthys' Anabaptist successor, was every bit as radical. After stripping naked and
running through the streets declaring that the end of the world was near, John of
Leiden fell into a three-day trance. When he awoke, he declared himself the
'Universal King of Righteousness'—daring anyone to oppose him. He declared
polygamy legal and immediately took fifteen wives for himself (including the
beautiful widow of Jan Matthys). Before the armies besieging the city were able to
overthrow it, countless atrocities had been committed against the people.
B. John Calvin
Because of events such as these, radical Protestant grass-roots movements came to be
associated with sedition, insanity and violence. Naturally, less radical leaders of
47
(Luther 1958) Volume 54 p. 446-7
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Protestant churches were eager to distance themselves from their much too radical
brethren, and a whole series of tracts were written by 'mainstream' reformers against
what they saw as the lunatic fringe of their movement. The most important of these
tracts for our purposes is John Calvin's Psychopannacia—written to refute the
radical physicalist Anabaptist doctrine known as 'soul sleep'. This tract, the first of
Calvin's theological publications, was written in 1534—the very year that Matthys
took over Munster.
As he says in his preface, one of the main motivations for Calvin's work was to put
down some of the divisive teachings that abounded on the outer fringes of the
reformation movement. We see how seriously Calvin took the threat of division in
the following lines:
And do we still wonder at the many sects among those who had at first
given in their adherence to the gospel and the reviving word? I, for
my part, am terrified by the dreadful denunciation, 'The kingdom of
God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the
fruits thereof.' (Matthew 21:43)48
But it is not only Calvin's effort to re-establish some form of orthodoxy that is so
important to us here. After all, as we shall see, Calvin's understanding of the soul
was to introduce yet another major change to the way that the Church—particularly
the evangelical Protestant Church—understands metaphysical anthropology. Most
importantly, we should note that the unorthodox view Calvin set out in
Psychopannacia to refute shows some strong similarities to the view that we have
seen espoused by Luther. Further, the position that Calvin defends as orthodox is
more like the older, Platonic understanding of the soul as exposited in the early
works ofAugustine than the Aristotelian modifications to the ancient view suggested
by Aquinas. We see this right from the beginning of Calvin's work in what appears
to be his thesis paragraph:
Our controversy, then, relapses to The Human Soul. Some, while
admitting it to have a real existence, imagine that it sleeps in a state of
insensibility from Death to The Judgment-day, when it will awake
from its sleep; while others will sooner admit anything than its real
existence, maintaining that it is merely a vital power which is derived
from arterial spirit on the action of the lungs, and being unable to exist
without body, perishes along with the body, and vanishes away and
becomes evanescent till the period when the whole man shall be raised
again. We, on the other hand, maintain both that it is a substance, and
48 (Calvin 1958) p. 418
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after the death of the body truly lives, being endued both with sense
and understanding.49
Not only does Calvin return to a Platonic idea of the soul as a rational substance
which is capable of existence apart from the body, he also follows Plato in his
interpretation of scriptural references to humanity as the image of God. Because he
claims that it is the spirit that reflects the divine nature rather than the body,50 Calvin
also has a comparatively low estimation of the value of our bodily resurrection.51
Calvin's dependence on the Platonic notion of immortality goes so deep that he even
seems to forsake some of his own convictions on the authority of Scripture, as we see
in his commentary on Romans. For while Paul clearly says in Romans 8:23 that our
bodily resurrection is an essential part of our adoption as children of God, Calvin
prefers his own estimation of the spiritual worth of the human body to Paul's. While
Calvin does see our bodily resurrection as part of the promise to which we are heirs
by our union with Christ, he does not see the redemption of our bodies as part of that
adoption process. While a fuller discussion of this point would take us into much
more detail regarding Calvin's deep concern that our justification be seen as an
instantaneous, legal pronouncement rather than an ongoing process, it is more to the
49
(Calvin 1958) pp. 419-20
50 On p. 422 of (Calvin 1958) we read: 'And we will begin with man's creation, wherein we shall see
ofwhat nature he was made at first. The Sacred History tells us (Genesis 1:26) of the purpose of God,
before man was created, to make him "after his own image and likeness." These expressions cannot
possibly be understood of his body, in which, though the wonderful work of God appears more than in
all other creatures, his image nowhere shines forth. For who is it that speaks thus "Let us make man
in our own image and likeness?" God himself, who is a Spirit, and cannot be represented by any
bodily shape. But as a bodily image, which exhibits the external face, ought to express to the life all
the traits and features, that thus the statue or picture may give an idea of all that may be seen in the
original, so this image ofGod must, by its likeness, implant some knowledge of God in our minds...
Here, however, I do not insist, lest it should become a ground of quarrel. All I wish to obtain is, that
the image itself is separate from the flesh.. . let us hold the image ofGod in man to be that which can
only have its seat in the spirit.'
51 The word 'because' here is used rather loosely—for there were obviously many other (possibly
stronger) motivations for Calvin taking the position on the bodily resurrection that he did.
Furthermore, we should also emphasise the importance of the word 'comparatively' here, for Calvin
did assert the bodily resurrection quite strongly, even in the face of opposition. It also appears that he
came to value this doctrine more highly throughout his life, as we see from the fact that one of the few
changes he made to his Institutes between 1545 and 1550 was the addition of three new sections on
the bodily resurrection (see p. 117 of (Wendel 1963)). In relying so heavily on the doctrine of the
immortality of the soul, however, it is indisputable that he placed less emphasis on the body than did
Luther—for, as we have seen, Luther did not consider the idea that a body could die while a soul lives
meaningful.
52 Ross MacKenzie's English translation of Calvin's rendering of this text reads as follows: 'And not
only so, but ourselves also, which have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within
ourselves, waiting for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.' (Calvin 1995)
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point of our present investigation simply to observe Calvin's disagreement with Paul
as to the importance of our bodily resurrection. We see this disagreement in Calvin's
commentary on this verse, which says:
Paul improperly refers here to our adoption as the enjoyment of the
inheritance into which we have been adopted. He has, however, very
good reason for doing so, for he means that the eternal decree of God
would be void unless the promised resurrection, which is the effect of
that decree, were also certain. By this decree God has chosen us as
His sons before the foundation of the world, He bears witness to us
concerning it by the Gospel, and He seals the faith of it on our hearts
by His Spirit . . . The phrase which he presently adds, the redemption
of our body, has the same reference. The price for our redemption
was paid by Christ, but in such a way that death still holds us in its
chains, and indeed, that we shall carry it within us. It follows from
this that the sacrifice of the death of Christ would be unfruitful and
wasted, unless its fruit were to appear in our heavenly renewal.53
C. Philip Melanchthon
Philip Melanchthon, who was so often a moderating voice of unity between the
different mainstream teachings of late sixteenth century Christianity, followed Luther
in calling our attention at important points to the resurrection of the body rather than
the immortality of the soul, but he shared Calvin's concern that the radical teachings
of the Anabaptists be dispelled. Though he does not mention any conviction that the
soul is immortal in his great systematic theology, Loci Communes,54 neither does he
leave the spiritual nature of the kingdom of God implicit. In his section on the
resurrection of the body we read:
Because these sentences clearly attest that before the resurrection and
the Last Day the Church is to suffer tribulation and persecution, and
after the resurrection, in the renewal of all creation, heaven and earth,
is to be glorified, the prophets obviously testify that the kingdom of
Christ on earth will not be a physical kingdom, as the Jews and
Anabaptists fictitiously imagine. 5
But Melanchthon also does not fail to recognise the fact that the Bible is much more
concerned with our physical bodies than Plato was. As Melanchthon interpreted the
Bible, it teaches that our bodies, far from temporary prisons, will be an integral part
53
(Calvin 1995) For an excellent example of the more moderate way in which modern Calvinists
have treated this passage, c.f. (Murray 1967) pp. 305-308.
54 The first systematic theology of the Protestant Reformation
55
(Melanchthon 1965) p. 282
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of our life as part of the fully realised kingdom ofGod. We see Melanchthon's
positive attitude towards the body most explicitly in his interpretation of Job
19:25ff,56 also included in his Loci Communes comments on the resurrection of the
body:
This is a very beautiful passage announcing that we in this flesh and in
this body, which we now have, will be resurrected, and that our body
and entire nature will be renewed, as St. Paul teaches. The same
passage says that the nature of eternal life will be knowledge, bright
and clear, of God and all creatures.57
Indeed, though Melanchthon emphasises the bodily resurrection as the Christian
hope for eternal life more strongly than Calvin, at the end of the day, he seems to
have believed, like Calvin, that the soul is an independent substance, capable of
conscious existence without the body. We see this opinion ofMelanchthon most
clearly expressed in his treatise titled On the Soul,5* where he says:
And the pagan writers expressly say that they are convinced that the
souls of men survive after death, since it is most certain that many
ghosts wander about everywhere, and are often heard and seen, and
often even talk with men. And examples need not be taken just from
books. I have seen some myself, and known many trustworthy men
who affirmed that they had not only seen ghosts but have even spoken
with them at length. However they thought that most of them were
the souls of the ancients.59
56 'For I know that my Redeemer lives, and at last he will stand upon the earth; and after my skin has
been thus destroyed, then from my flesh I shall see God, whom I shall see on my side, and my eyes
shall behold, and not another.'
57
(Melanchthon 1965) p. 283
58 It may also be of some interest to our study that in this work, Melanchthon also works out a system
of interaction between mind and body that is very similar to what has come to be known as
'Occasionalism', having God or some spirits mediate between our minds and our bodies. We see how
closely Melanchthon came to this view, as well as his emphasis on the brain as the organ of
understanding, in the following passage:
'The common sense perceives the images offered by the external senses, and discerns the
objects of the individual senses. Then another force, that of composing and dividing, draws
one thing from another as it thinks and judges. The third retains the memory of objects and
records them. These now are their organs. The anterior part of the twin cavity, or the
ventricles, of the brain, is the organ of common sense. Because just as mirrors, so in the
organs of the outer senses do images flash, shaken spirits assume their likeness and transport
them to the brain. As the tongue forms an articulated voice, so does the brain, impelled by
the spirits, form with its own amazing sort of motion, as if arranging the spirits, more and
more images.' (Melanchthon 1988) p. 240
59
(Melanchthon 1988) p. 286-7
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Though the resurrection of the body has always been a central teaching of
mainstream Christianity, we have seen that Church doctrine with regard to
metaphysical anthropology was one of the many features of orthodoxy which came
under scrutiny during the Protestant Reformation. In the years following the initial
controversy, however, a general consensus emerged in the Reformed Church with
regard to metaphysical anthropology. As we see in The Westminster Confession of
Faith (one of the most important doctrinal statements for the contemporary
evangelical reformed church), by the mid-seventeenth century the Reformed
consensus had returned to a Pre-Thomistic substance view of the soul.60 In chapter
32, section one of that confession, we read:
The bodies of men, after death, return to dust, and see corruption; but
their souls (which neither die nor sleep), having an immortal
subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them. The souls of
the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into
the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and
glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies; and the souls of
the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter
darkness, reserved to the judgement of the great day. Besides these
two places for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture
acknowledgeth none.61
Though this position still represents the majority opinion with regard to metaphysical
anthropology in most contemporary evangelical Protestant churches, we must also
note that considerable change has taken place over the past four and a half centuries
with regard to the majority opinion among the intellectual status quo. In our next
two sections, we will therefore move away from the spiritually focused metaphysical
anthropologies of the great theologians and summarise some of the most important
60 The Scots Confession, written almost a century earlier (1560), is one of the earliest indications of a
large-scale return to the pre-Thomistic view in Britain. Its explanation of the doctrine of the
immortality of souls (chapter 17) suggests at least some form of conscious existence between death
and resurrection. This section of the confession reads as follows:
The chosen departed are in peace, and rest from their labours; not that they sleep and are lost
in oblivion as some fanatics hold, for they are delivered from all fear and torment, and all the
temptations to which we and all God's chosen are subject in this life, and because of which
we are called the Kirk militant. On the other hand, the reprobate and unfaithful departed have
anguish, torment, and pain which cannot be expressed. Neither the one nor the other is in
such sleep that they feel no joy or torment, as is testified by Christ's parable in St. Luke XVI,
his words to the thief, and the words of the souls crying under the altar, 'O Lord, thou that art
righteous and just, how long shalt thou not revenge our blood upon those that dwell in the
earth?' (quoted from http://www.creeds.net/Scots/scots.htm#Immortality).
61
Quoted from http://www.creeds.net/Westminster/c32.htm
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shifts in modern metaphysical anthropology—which, as we shall soon see, tended to
be more interested in the life of the mind than the life of the soul; and more interested
in theoretical reasoning than textual evidence.
V. The Philosophical Foundation for Modern Psychology
Though Rene Descartes is commonly thought of in modern philosophy of mind as
the chief defender of radical anthropological dualism, it should be clear from our
historical study that this kind of dualism did not originate with him. After all, he and
the Westminster Divines were contemporaries.
What Descartes does add to our discussion, however, is the recognition of a new
epistemic authority. Whereas Plato's dualism is grounded on the supposition that
human beings can know some unchanging truths, Descartes attempted to justify the
very same kind of dualism in the face of radical seventeenth century scepticism. In
his famous 'Meditations', he makes it his goal to doubt everything that can possibly
be doubted in search of some solid, indubitable foundation upon which to build his
thinking. He finds this indubitable foundation in the axiom, made almost cliche by
its fame, 'I think, therefore I am.' From this indubitable foundation—which is
essentially the assertion of the existence of the doubter's own mental life—Descartes
argues for the existence of God, the physical world, and (eventually) the existence of
the doubter's body as part of that physical world.
The most important thing for us to recognise here is that while the existence of our
mental lives (and the requisite logical realm in which transcendental rationalisations
are trustworthy) is indubitable for Descartes, the sensible world of physical objects
comes only at the end of a comparatively tenuous line of reasoning. And so we see
that while their starting points represent radically different levels of epistemic
optimism, Plato and Descartes both present us with a radically dualistic metaphysical
anthropology grounded in a wider epistemological dualism. Viewed in its historical
context, therefore, we see that Descartes' contribution to metaphysical anthropology
is relatively slight, though he is commonly given most of the credit (or blame!) for
the kind of dualistic thinking that (as we will see) so swiftly fell out of fashion
around the middle of the twentieth century.
But Descartes' new epistemic foundation, so different from the doctrinal
presuppositions of the Christian hegemony (many of which were left over from its
notoriously logocentric Greek predecessor) opened the door for an entirely new way
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of looking at metaphysical anthropology, even if it did not directly challenge the
orthodox ontological presuppositions themselves.
It was not long, however, before the new perspective Descartes introduced evolved
into some fairly radical deviations from his new form of epistemological dualism. In
his seminal essay 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'62 for example, John
Locke turned the Cartesian epistemic structure on its head, arguing that all of our
ideas come, whether directly or indirectly, from our senses. This way of thinking
made our minds inextricably dependent on our bodies. Bishop Berkeley tried to
reverse this trend of increasing attention to the physical world relative to the higher,
mental realm, arguing that since being is dependent on perception,63 the only aspect
of reality that we can justifiably believe in (according to the strictest logical
requirements) is the realm of mental activity (where perception takes place). David
Hume, on the other hand, used almost the same reasoning to show that all our
ordinary hypothesising—particularly in the realm of metaphysical anthropology
(whether treating our selves as minds or as bodies)—is only very tenuously
grounded. Belief in minds or souls, as well as belief in unified human bodies turns
out, by Hume's advances on the non-dogmatic Cartesian system, to be questionable.
Hume argued that the only rationally justified post-Cartesian metaphysical
anthropology understands a human being as nothing more than a 'bundle of
percepts'.
While Immanuel Kant struggled nobly to awaken the continental philosophical world
from the dogmatic slumber of Cartesian rationalism without falling into the radical
empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, the alternative he presented still left
epistemological questions with regard to metaphysical anthropology. He
acknowledged the strength of Hume's reasoning, yet saw a glimmer of hope
provided by a new epistemological method.
Kant's new epistemological method grew out of his appreciation for both of the two
streams that had, by his time, developed within the Cartesian tradition. Those two
streams consisted of the British empiricists who had followed Locke on the one hand
62 First published in 1690
63 In his treatise 'The Principles ofHuman Knowledge' (1710), Berkeley famously argued that to be is
to perceive or to be perceived—a thesis which flows naturally from Locke's development of
Descartes' ideas.
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and rationalists from the European continent who had been maintaining Descartes'
original emphasis on the primacy of the abstract 'thinking thing' on the other.
Kant said, on the one hand, that the empiricists had rightly recognised that concepts
without percepts were empty. Our minds come to us as 'blank slates', so we can
only have ideas after we have experience. On the other hand, however, Kant taught
that the continental rationalists had rightly recognised that percepts without concepts
were blind. After all, without a mind to make sense of it all, life would be nothing
but a stream of absolutely meaningless perceptions, so we can have ideas only ifwe
first have rational minds.
Building on these two overarching morals of post-Cartesian philosophy, Kant
suggested a new epistemological foundation. He proposed that the best way to do
metaphysical anthropology (and metaphysics more broadly as well, for that matter) is
to think about the kind of knowledge that we all have and then extrapolate from that
back to what must have been the case for us to have got that kind of knowledge. At
least to this extent, we can see that Kant was a thoroughly Cartesian rationalist. But
Kant went further than Descartes in discussing the necessity of input from the outside
world, arguing that all our ideas about the world must be the result of interaction
between that world and the extremely complex structure by which we exercise the art
of sensory interpretation.
Though we could go on for pages discussing how Kant's new epistemological
methodology worked and where it got him, the most important thing for our present
purpose is to evaluate what impact his work left on the intellectual establishment—
particularly as it relates to Christian metaphysical anthropology. To do this, we must
say a few words as to how Kant's epistemology changed the way we think about the
relative authority of sensation and reason, and, by extension, our bodies and our
minds.
At the end of the day, Kant, like Plato and Descartes64 before him, presents us with
an extensive epistemological dualism. The only large-scale difference is that Kant
thought much more highly of empirical evidence. While Plato and Descartes both
said that our belief in the external world is founded only on our more certain belief in
ourselves as rational beings independently of any supposed 'world of appearances',
64 The Christian Church should not be listed here with Plato, Descartes, and Kant. Christians have
always recognised Scripture as an epistemic authority in addition to pure reason.
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Kant argued that the only objects of pure reason are those concepts that have been
'filled' with data from our senses. So while Plato and Descartes taught that we could
be absolutely sure of our selves-as-minds and only deduce the existence of our
selves-as-bodies, Kant taught that it is the external world, and consequently, our
selves-as-bodies, that has epistemic priority. For Kant, the epistemic priority of
belief in our bodies is as close to objective truth as we can get. Our selves-as-minds,
like all things-in-themselves, cannot make it into our noetic structures without the
threat of being distorted in the process, so they can never be objects ofpure reason.
For Kant, therefore, our knowledge of our selves-as-minds can be known only
through transcendental deduction—and as it turns out, the results of that
transcendental deduction are much less substantial than Kant's predecessors had
imagined.
The reason that Kant's epistemological dualism, grounded upon the thinking of
Descartes and the Empiricists, is so important for our study is that in saying that we
can never know our selves-as-minds as clearly as we can know our selves-as-bodies,
he was calling for a revolution in the way that metaphysical anthropology is done.
And in doing so, he gave new hope for the project of diffusing the mystery of
interaction between mind and body.65
VI. The Rise of Modern Psychology
While some would argue that modern, scientific psychology began in 1879 when
Wilhelm Wundt established the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany, the
idea of studying the mind through empirical observations of the body, as we have
just seen, goes back at least as far as Immanuel Kant. But there can be no doubt that
taking the mind seriously as a subject ofmodern scientific study became much more
intellectually fashionable as the nineteenth century drew to a close.
For centuries, the scientific method had been yielding astonishing results in the
continuing effort to understand the natural world. Could it be that the same scientific
method could be used in the effort to understand the mind? Could it be that Kant's
transcendental method was not the only way to extrapolate knowledge of our selves-
65 We have, of course, treated the philosophical foundations of modem psychology only very
schematically. If space allowed, we would need to spend much more time justifying the present
interpretation of this phase in intellectual history. To even begin that project, however, would
drastically alter the focus of this volume.
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as-minds? At the close of the nineteenth century, it was becoming increasingly
popular to offer positive answers to these questions. One thing that was not agreed
upon, however, was how these increasingly popular ideas were to be put into
practice.
For our present purposes, William James is the most important of the early empirical
psychologists. Not only was James firmly rooted in the Anglo/American
philosophical tradition, but he also recognised the importance ofmetaphysical
anthropology—particularly as it sheds light on the relationship between the body,
which could be observed from the third-person perspective, and the mind, to which
the individual has exclusive access.
In contrast to the early psychologists who were concerned almost entirely with the
attempt to break the conscious mind down into its supposed constituent parts (i.e. the
so-called 'synthetic method'), James focused on the idea that experience comes to us
as an essential unity.66 Interestingly enough, James says that one of the illusions to
which the synthetic method exposes us is a kind of dualism with regard to
metaphysical anthropology. The synthetic method, according to James, supposes
that experience is composed of both content and consciousness. We saw an early
form of this synthetic method in our brief evaluation ofKant's epistemology. After
all, if concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind,
we must admit that our experience is a compound of both percepts (the content) and
concepts (our consciousness). James' radical suggestion, however, is that to attempt
to divide our experience into two parts is not, as the neo-Kantians believe, to
simplify our study, but to confuse it. He says, 'Experience, I believe, has no such
inner duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, not by
66 As he explains in his 1892 work, Psychology: A Briefer Course:
The order of our study must be analytic. We are now prepared to begin the introspective
study of the adult consciousness itself. Most books adopt the so-called synthetic method.
Starting with 'simple ideas of sensation', and regarding these as so many atoms, they proceed
to build up the higher states of mind out of their 'association', 'integration', or 'fusion', as
houses are built by the agglutination of bricks. This has the didactic advantages which the
synthetic method usually has. But it commits one beforehand to the very questionable theory
that our higher states of consciousness are compounds of units; and instead of starting with
what the reader directly knows, namely his total concrete states of mind, it starts with a set of
supposed 'simple ideas' with which he has no immediate acquaintance at all, and concerning
whose alleged interaction he is much at the mercy of any plausible phrase. On every ground,
then, the method of advancing from the simple to the compound exposes us to illusion.
(James 1892) p. 151
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way of subtraction, but by way of addition . . . ',67 He further reasons that because of
the impact of Kant's epistemology on the history of philosophy, it no longer makes
sense to posit any quasi-substantial ego or 'consciousness' that is the subject of
experience. It would make more sense, James argues, to give up the idea of mental
substance altogether and recognise the subject as afunction rather than a thing.
It is important, however, that we not oversimplify James' position. In calling for us
to give up the idea ofmental substance, he was not commending any form of simple
materialism. In fact, James was not a materialist at all, for he did not take matter as
the basic building block of all intelligible reality, but experience. In 'Does
"Consciousness" Exist?', he says:
My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one
primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is
composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing
can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one
another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The
relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes
the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower,68 the other
becomes the object known.69
While talking in terms of'portions' of'primal stuff may seem paradoxical, James
does not leave his readers to sort out the madness for themselves. Indeed, the very
next sentence in the passage just quoted reads, 'This will need much explanation
before it can be understood.' Whether or not James was successful in putting
together a complete, non-dualist post-Kantian metaphysical anthropology, however,
will have to be discussed elsewhere, for the depth of James' historical influence was
severely limited by the changing mores of the early twentieth century intellectual
establishment. After all, in the early 1900's science, not philosophy, was thought to
be the way to truth—and science is conducted in the laboratory, not the armchair.
The behaviourists who immediately succeeded James in the young field of empirical
psychology shared James' disdain for the synthetic method. They did not, however,
share James' appetite for trying to choke down human consciousness as a whole.
What the young science of psychology needed, they thought, were bite-sized pieces.
67
(James 1904) p. 480 (italics his)
68 James' footnote: 'In my Psychology I have tried to show that we need no knower other than the
"passing thought".' [See (James 1890), vol. 1, pp. 38ff]
69
(James 1904) p. 478
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They knew that the synthetic method was flawed, and they admired the seemingly
objective third-person perspective of the natural sciences, so it was quite natural for
the behaviourists to judge the bite-sized conscious activity uncovered by Pavlov in
lesser animals to be the perfect nourishment for their rapidly growing body of
knowledge.70 The behaviourists, therefore, began to study these more manageable
subjects almost exclusively. This new approach to psychology gave the added
benefit of allowing the psychologists to reject James' 'subjective' method of
philosophical speculation.
In fact, there were so many perceived benefits associated with the new method
introduced by the behaviourists that it staged a sweeping revolution in the way
psychologists and philosophers alike thought about metaphysical anthropology.
Evolutionary theory, the rise of experimental science, and even the philosophical
fashion of logical positivism all seemed to be lending their support to the idea that
the only way to make sense of human beings is to limit inquiry to observable human
behaviour. As it turned out, the only feature of human existence that proved
impossible for the behaviourists to explain was that portion ofmental activity that is
not discernibly portrayed through behaviour. But in mentioning this shortcoming,
we are already anticipating behaviourism's philosophical successor with regard to
metaphysical anthropology.71 We will discuss this successor, which has come to be
known as either 'identity theory' or 'central state materialism', in our next chapter.
For now, however, it would be most appropriate to sum up our brief investigation of
the rise of modern psychology.
In this section, we have seen that at least by the close of the nineteenth century,
intellectual appetite for dualism with regard to metaphysical anthropology was
rapidly waning. The history of twentieth century philosophy shows us that this
appetite for dualism continued to wane for at least the next several decades—so that
when, in 1949, Gilbert Ryle described 'the official doctrine' as 'Descartes' Myth',
79
and even 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine', his book was instantly regarded
70
According to William Lyons's timeline ofmental philosophy, Pavlov first published the results of
his famous dog experiments in 1906 (Lyons 1995).
71
By 'successor' here, we do not mean 'the next idea to be as universally accepted in Anglo/American
mental philosophy', because, as we shall see, there has yet to be any such successor. By 'successor',
we mean the position that maintained the closest ties to the central aims ofbehaviourism even as
behaviourism itself became less and less popular.
72
(Ryle 1949)
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as a philosophical classic. But ifDescartes' metaphysical anthropology is indeed
mythological—if our physical bodies are not inhabited by a non-material mind or
soul—does that mean that we are justified in saying that we are nothing but our
minds or nothing but our physical bodies? Is there any suitable replacement for the
doctrine of the 'ghost in the machine'?
As we shall see in our next chapter, debates over these questions raged throughout
the career ofDonald M. MacKay. Though to this day, the evangelical, Protestant
church has yet to fully recognise any advance in our understanding ofmetaphysical
anthropology since the completion of the Westminster Confession of faith (just three
years before the death ofRene Descartes), it is our hope that here in the opening
decade of the twenty-first century, as an increasing number of Christian philosophers
and systematic theologians are recognising the need for advancement in this area, the
scientific and philosophical work of Donald M. MacKay will receive due attention.
It is for this reason that we have set out to exposit his position on this issue. But
before we get into the details of his empirical, philosophical, and theological
metaphysical anthropology, it may be helpful to provide some biographical
background.
Setting the Scene 42
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology of Donald M. MacKay
Chapter 2: The Life and Times of Donald M. MacKay
Donald M. MacKay, Son ofHenry and Janet McArty MacKay, was born in 1922 in
Lybster, Scotland. He was raised, along with his three younger sisters,73 in Wick,
Scotland—a small town on the Eastern Scottish coast, just North of the Morray Firth.
From a very early age, he had a keen interest in electronics.74 Doubtless it was little
surprise, therefore, when, in the early 1940's, he was selected from among the
undergraduate physics students at the University of St. Andrews to contribute to the
war effort by helping the British Admiralty develop the capabilities of its ship-based
radar.
I. Early Civilian Career (1946-1951)
Though, for obvious reasons, relatively little is known about MacKay's work for the
British Admiralty, he did publish several unclassified reports during those years, all
ofwhich deal with the fine points of electronic engineering. This detailed interest in
electronics led to his appointment, in 1946, to a position as lecturer in physics at
King's College, University of Fondon. Also in 1946, MacKay produced the first of
many papers for civilian academic publication.75
Between 1947 and 1949, MacKay published five technical papers, all dealing with
various theoretical limitations of the potentials of high-speed computing.76 Though it
is quite possible that MacKay's academic interest might have remained narrowly
focused on electrical engineering if he had lived in any other time, as it happened,
British and American philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century were too
interested in the metaphysical implications of his work to leave him to his own
devices.
A. The Slow Move Towards Philosophy Begins
We saw in our last chapter that philosophers and theologians have struggled to
understand the relationship between our minds and our bodies for millennia, and in
73 See picture #1.




(MacKay 1947; MacKay 1948; MacKay 1949b; MacKay 1949a; MacKay and Deeley 1949)
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the late 1940's and early 1950's, this struggle greatly intensified. After all, the
common assumption, from Plato on through to modern times was that, while our
bodies may be thought of as physical mechanisms, mental activity must always be
recognised as qualitatively different from the activity of any merely physical entity.
While we have seen that this common assumption had been challenged several times
before MacKay's day, (especially by the intellectual tradition of the British
empiricists), the challengers had only sophisticated philosophical arguments to back
up their theories, whereas the establishment had the strong intuitive attraction of
historical tradition. Towards the middle of the twentieth century, however, all this
changed. For just as behaviourism was reaching its peak—pushing the idea that
there was no radical, qualitative difference between the mental lives of animals and
those of human beings, the first fully automated calculating machines were built77.
Could it be that there was likewise no radical, qualitative difference between human
mental lives and those of some machine to be built as soon as our technical know-
how was suitably advanced? Could it be that philosophers and theologians who had
been saying for millennia that thinking required an immaterial mind were just
wrong?
Quite naturally, given his research interests, philosophers, Church leaders, and the
general public began to look to technical physicists like MacKay for answers—and
in 1950 MacKay began to produce the answers they were looking for. In 1950 he
made his first ofmany appearances on television, explaining what the emerging field
of information theory was all about.78 Also in 1950, MacKay presented three papers
7Q
to the first international information theory conference in London and published
80 • 81
two more technical papers—one for philosophers and one for electrical engineers.
77 In 1944, with the help of the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), Harvard
University built the 'Automatic Sequence Controlled Calculator'. The first electronic computer
(named 'ENIAC' or 'the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator') was then built in 1946 by
the University ofPennsylvania.
78
(MacKay 1950c) This talk was reprinted as chapter 2 of (MacKay 1968a).
79 All of these papers were lithoprinted in 1953 under the title 'Proceedings of Information Theory
Symposium, London, September 1950'. Two were subsequently reprinted in revised form, one as
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But even before 1950, MacKay had become active in seeking out answers to some of
the philosophical questions raised by the technological advances he was involved in.
In the late 1940's, he began meeting with a small group of scientists and
philosophers who called themselves 'The Ratio Club'.82 As we shall see in chapter
5, it was in one of his presentations to this small group of thinkers that he first began
to recognise the importance of the thought experiment upon which his 'logical
relativity' principle is founded.
We should also note that 1950 was the year in which A. M. Turing (a fellow member
of The Ratio Club) published the paper in which he introduced the now famous (or
infamous) 'Turing test'. 3 This 'test' was built on the premise that if a computer
could be built which was good enough at answering general questions to fool people
into thinking that there must be a human mind giving the answers, then we must call
the computer 'intelligent'. As the short-lived history of the 'artificial intelligence'
debate reveals, this paper is far and away the most important work of that movement.
Because of its suggestion that we base our decision of whether or not a mind exists
entirely on the behaviour of the object in question, it could be argued that Turing's
paper represents the high point of behaviourism with regard to the mind/body
o4
problem. Although Gilbert Ryle's book, published one year before, provides a far
greaterphilosophical defence of behaviourism, Turing's paper is more radical
precisely because of its greater simplicity. According to Turing, it doesn't matter
whether a thing looks like a mind, smells like a mind, or feels like a mind. If it
behaves like a mind, it is a mind.
In 1951 MacKay not only completed his PhD thesis85 (in which he developed the
design of some new analogue computing techniques) and published two papers for
technical readers,86 but he also was the recipient of a Rockefeller fellowship which
enabled him to tour the United States, learning from and building contacts with some
of the world's leading brain scientists. As if this were not enough for one year, in
1951 MacKay also produced his first paper that explicitly relates to the mind/body








(MacKay 1951c; MacKay 1951b)
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problem. He titled this paper 'Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts'.87 Because this
paper demonstrates so clearly just how early MacKay was able to articulate the ideas
that were to form his intellectual career, we will look at it a little more closely before
we move on.
B. 'Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts'
In at least two ways, MacKay's early paper, 'Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts', can
be thought of as a microcosm of his philosophical career. First, we see in this paper,
as well as in his life as a whole, his distaste for unfounded speculation. In both this
paper and in MacKay's life, philosophical questions were addressed when (and only
oo
when) his work provided him with relevant empirical contributions. Secondly, in
both the philosophical section of this paper and the philosophical aspect of his career,
his doctrine of complementary descriptions (which we will discuss in more detail in
chapter 3) is of central importance.
1. Distastefor Speculation
The chief value ofMacKay's distaste for speculation is that it gave him a fresh
perspective—particularly as he entered into the ancient debate surrounding
metaphysical anthropology. As the title 'Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts' would
suggest, the central problem dealt with in the bulk of this paper is how to build an
artefact that displays mindlike behaviour. It is worth noting that right from the
beginning, in defining his problem, MacKay was careful to avoid getting into
problems on which he could not bring empirical evidence to bear. Whereas the
Aristotelian Society symposium in which he was invited to take part the following
year was titled 'Mentality in Machines',89 this earlier paper, which discussed
essentially the same subject, did so with the terms 'mindlike' and 'artefact' rather
than 'mentality' and 'machines'—thus forcing the discussion into the realm of
empirical evidence as opposed to metaphysical speculation.
87
(MacKay 195Id)
88 With regard to this paper, note the fact that the philosophical section is his last. With regard to his
life as a whole, note his motto, 'When short of data, keep mind open, and mouth shut.' ((MacKay
1980a), p. 64).
89
(MacKay 1952a) To further highlight the contrast between MacKay's empirical optimism and the
sceptical metaphysics of so many of his colleagues, compare MacKay's paper for this symposium
with those of the two other distinguished participants: (Wisdom 1952).(Spilsbury 1952)
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In developing an answer to the question ofwhether or not it will ever be possible to
build anything that behaves in a way that resembles the behaviour of conscious
agents, MacKay first singles out the behaviour patterns which, when exhibited by
conscious agents, we would call 'goal pursuit'. In discussing the possibility of this
type of behaviour being exhibited by artefacts, MacKay refers his readers to
examples of mechanisms set up to respond to the flow of information, such as those
we have become quite familiar with in thermostats, toilet water-level regulators and
auto pilots. All of these examples, MacKay concludes, exhibit some form of goal-
directed activity—and if any of these examples were suitably modified, they could
easily exhibit other kinds of mindlike behaviour as well.
There are, MacKay argues, only two essential components required for such goal-
directed activity—an evaluator (such as the thermometer in the thermostat example)
and an effector (such as the heater's on/off switch to which the thermostat must be
attached). If these components are properly linked, the system thus produced can be
legitimately called 'goal-directed'. When we set the thermostat to a certain
temperature, we are giving the system a 'goal' to direct it. If the temperature drops
below the goal, the evaluator triggers the effector, which then raises the temperature
back towards its goal. MacKay goes on to explain that even 'spontaneous' or
'creative' activity can be induced in these simple artefacts with the mere introduction
of some random element into the system.
While the effects of this spontaneous or random element will be discussed in more
detail in chapter 5, what is more important for our present purposes is the ease with
which goal-directed activity can be induced. In addition to providing us with a
particularly elegant answer to the question ofwhether or not it would be possible to
build an artefact capable of exhibiting goal-oriented behaviour, the non-speculative
approach taken by MacKay in this paper provides us with different, further reaching
lessons as well. MacKay introduces these deeper lessons with the following
comment:
The interesting aspects of the behaviour of our artefact arise
principally from the combination of two features—its goal-directed
activity and its 'reasonable indeterminacy'. It has already been
suggested that the first of these raises no new philosophical issue. It
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does, however, have some purgative influence on our thinking about
the concept ofmind.'90
Though we will be discussing MacKay's metaphysical anthropology in much more
detail in the chapters that follow, two of these 'purgative influences' in particular are
so central to his philosophical system that they deserve further comment.
2. Centrality ofComplementarity
The first 'purgative influence' derives its strength from the fact that to exhibit goal-
directed behaviour, more than one component is required. This means that mindlike
activity can take place only at the level of systems rather than substances. While this
may seem like a merely academic point at first, upon further reflection it becomes
apparent from this distinction that the efforts of so many materialists and dualists
alike have been motivated by a common fallacy. MacKay makes this point in the
following way:
It now becomes easy to see the fallacy inherent equally in the
analytical approach of the classical mechanist and in the Cartesian
compromise. To claim that analysis of the nervous system into parts
reveals 'no sign of the soul' is as indicative of a false approach as to
suggest that any one organ might be the seat thereof. In terms of the
information-diagram, the position is directly analogous to that of a
man seeking the 'residence of triangularity' among the individual dots
of a triangular dot-pattern.91
Ironically enough, MacKay uses the term 'analytic' here in a way that is very similar
to the way in which we saw William James use the word 'synthetic' in the section
quoted in our last chapter. James was criticising the method of starting with
supposed elements of consciousness and attempting to understand the whole as the
synthesis of its parts. Similarly, MacKay is criticising the same understanding of
consciousness, albeit investigated from the other direction (i.e. analysing the whole
into its parts rather than synthesising the whole from its parts). All this is just to say
that both MacKay and James are criticising those thinkers who would treat mental
life as nothing but the sum of its parts. Their use of antithetical terms to refer to the
same thinkers is ironic, though otherwise insignificant for our purposes.
90(MacKay 195Id) p. 177
91
(MacKay 1951d) p. 117
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Though we will come back to MacKay's constant refusal to give in to reductionism
(which MacKay called 'The Fallacy ofNothing Buttery'), the most important
implication ofMacKay's anti-reductionism for our present purposes is that it led
him, from his earliest days to his last, to acknowledge a concept he called 'logical
complementarity'. As we will see in our next chapter, this notion of logical
complementarity purges our concept of mind not only from the destructive influence
of reductionism, which had already been criticised by James and others, but it also
relieves us from the strong sceptical bias which so often accompanies anti-
reductionistic thinking (c.f. Hume's radical empiricism and James' pragmatism).
The important thing for us to recognise here in our brief biographical sketch,
however, is that his understanding of the way complementary descriptions work was
a central part of his thinking from his very earliest days as a philosopher.
In the following paragraph we see evidence that MacKay not only had a sufficiently
developed understanding of logical complementarity from this early stage in his
career, but he also understood the potential of this concept to free philosophers from
the lure of reductionism:
The false dualism which used to be expressed in the question 'how
can matter produce mind' would now seem to have its origin in a
genuine dualism of conceptual frames of reference, defined
respectively for the viewpoint of actor and spectator. The situation is
not a symmetrical one, but the concept of complementarity whose
value we have been let to recognise in physics appears to have an
analogue here that would repay development. The dualism of wave
and particle in physics is resolved neither by arbitrary denials of
'reality' nor by 'explanations' of one as 'nothing but' an aspect of the
other. The process of description is seen as a selective or projective
operation; and it is not so much the validity but the appropriateness of
a description which requires to be discussed in any given situation.
Paradoxes arise when concepts defined for one logical background are
mixed carelessly with those defined for another. Descriptions in terms
only of one group or the other may both be valid. It is not the
descriptions which are exclusive, but the logical backgrounds in terms
of which they have meaning. The moral is obvious, and seems to
admit of large-scale transfer to other fields of thought.9
Though the mind/body problem is not among the central topics of this paper,93 one
thing that is clear from this early stage in his career is that he believed that only a
92
(MacKay 195Id) p. 118
93 We must remember that he was interested in thinking and the brain as a physicist, not (at least in the
beginning) as a philosopher.
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proper understanding of the way descriptions relate to the events they describe will
allow us to understand the difference between complementary and contradictory
descriptions. Stated more positively, we see that MacKay believed that a proper
understanding of what it means for a set of descriptions to be complementary allows
us as scientists and philosophers to make sense of data we might otherwise be
inclined to dismiss. We see MacKay make this point as we continue to read from the
section quoted immediately above:
Along such lines it seems possible that a consistent probabilistic
theory of personality might be developed which could find a
complementary place for some of the psychological dicta currently
debated as antagonistic ...94
II. The Rise of Neurology (1952-1960)
After his tour of the United States as a Rockefeller fellow in 1951, MacKay returned
to the University of London, where he was made a reader in physics. Though he
undoubtedly made notable attempts to treat all of his students equally, it seems that
one particular student managed to secure an inordinate amount of his attention. He
met this exceptional student, Miss Valerie Wood, in October of 1952.95 But much
else was happening in 1952 as well.
Very early in 1952, in February, MacKay was challenged to move one step closer to
mental philosophy by M. H. Pirenne, who published a critique of 'Mindlike
Behaviour in Artefacts', comparing it with Gilbert Ryle's milestone work The
Concept ofMind. Though he did not seem at all concerned with the speculative side
of mental philosophy before Pirenne's paper was published, ten pages of notes on
Ryle's work can now be found among MacKay's papers (which were preserved by
his family96). These notes are dated 15/01/52.
In addition to meeting his future bride and cultivating at least the beginnings of an
interest in philosophy, in 1952 MacKay also published (with W. S. McCulloch) some
of the ideas he had been working on for years, drawing upon his expertise in the
theoretical limits of electrical engineering as well as his more recently honed skills in
94
(MacKay 195Id) p. 119
95 See Picture # 4.
96 These papers, held by Valerie MacKay, were made available to the present author during a visit in
September, 2003.
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brain science and information theory.97 In addition, he built upon the work published
in 'Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts' with his contribution for the Aristotelian
Society symposium titled 'Mentality in Machines'.98
A. Roger Sperry's 'Neurology and the Mind-Brain Problem'
1952 also saw the publication of a milestone paper in the ancient debate over the
mind/body problem. Nobel Laureate Roger Sperry, with whom MacKay would later
develop a close working relationship (despite profound disagreements), published his
paper 'Neurology and the Mind-Brain Problem'.99 This paper anticipated later
developments in mental philosophy100 by urging brain scientists to look at the neural
correlates for motor activity as well as sensory input. While this paper can be read as
an attack against those neuroscientists with strong Gestalt ties, it also presented a
serious challenge to traditional behaviourism. After all, while John B. Watson
notoriously claimed that to control a child's environment was to control a child's
destiny, Sperry claimed that a person's behaviour is directly dictated by his or her
neurological processes. While these claims are not necessarily contradictory they do
represent a shift in emphasis as to where the answers to behavioural questions are to
be sought. Whereas the old school of behaviourism (both Watson's psychological
version and Ryle's logical version) said that any supposed 'mental events' or 'inner
activity' was completely irrelevant compared to the large-scale phenomena of human
behaviour, Sperry calls attention to the fact that the gap between stimulus and
response is filled by an organ we are only beginning to understand. He calls upon
scientifically minded psychologists and philosophers to put more of their time and
effort into the emerging science of neurology, saying:
The struggles of philosophy with psychological problems, although
carried on over centuries and by some of the greatest thinkers in
history, have as yet failed to produce anything of much satisfaction to
the tough-minded scientist. Further progress from philosophical
synthesis can be expected only after science has succeeded in
furnishing philosophy additional data with which to work. For
example, we shall be in a much better position to study mind-brain
97






Compare the theory put forward by Sperry in this paper with the so-called 'causal theory' put
forward much later by D. M. Armstrong and David Lewis.
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relations after we have attained some conception of the neural
patterning involved even in such simple mental activities as the
perception of color, time, pattern, size and the like. Eventually it
should be possible to list the special features which distinguish those
brain excitations that are accompanied by consciousness from those
that are not. Once this latter objective is achieved, it may be feasible,
at least, to attack the mind-body problem with some effectiveness.101
Sperry was clearly not intending to directly attack the status quo of reductionist
behaviourism, however. He states his allegiance to this majority view most
explicitly when he writes:
To the neurologist, regarding the brain from an objective, analytical
standpoint, it is readily apparent that the sole product of brain function
is motor coordination. To repeat: the entire output of our thinking
machine consists ofnothing butpatterns ofmotor coordination.102
But despite these strong ties with reductionist behaviourism, the damage done by his
repeated appeal to the search for the neural correlates of such activities as perception
and judgement could not be undone. The efforts of the early behaviourists to rid
themselves of all vestiges of dualism—even to the extent that any talk of relevant
'inner activity' became unfashionable—had been effectively challenged. And as we
shall see, this challenge anticipated the provocative attempt on the part ofmind/brain
identity theorists to overthrow logical behaviourism as the majority position among
mental philosophers.
But a lot happened in D. M. MacKay's life before that philosophical challenge took
place. In 1953, the year that Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations103 was first
published, MacKay not only published a response to two papers criticising his
'Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts', but he also published three papers for technical
readers104 and three for scientifically minded Christians.105 The most important of
these papers for our present purposes is 'From Mechanism to Mind'.106 This paper is
interesting for our purposes not only because it is more directly related to mental
101
(Sperry 1952) p. 291
102




(MacKay 1953d; MacKay 1953b; MacKay 1953g)
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(MacKay 1953a; MacKay 1953c) and (MacKay 1988c) (MacKay 1953e) (portions of which were
reprinted as chapter 3 of (MacKay 1988c))
106
(MacKay 1953c)
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philosophy than anything MacKay wrote before 1953, but also because he published
it in a historically Christian journal and addresses specifically religious issues.
Though we will discuss his ideas in much more detail in the chapters that follow, one
statement from this paper that clearly demonstrates MacKay's growing interest in
helping Christians to understand the relationship between the mental, spiritual, and
bodily lives is worth at least mentioning before we move on. In response to a
question concerning the real existence of the soul, MacKay responds:
I agree with what I think Dr. Aitken means when he says 'Man
possesses also spirit', but the sentence is easily misunderstood. To
'possess spirit' is not I think the same kind of possessing as to
'possess a body' or to 'possess a watch'. The verb 'possess' means
something different in the two cases .. . There is a serious need, if it is
not a duty, for Christians to analyse their use of language on many
topics in these terms, without any consequent obligation to take the
Gadarene plunge of some contemporary language analysts.107
In 1954 MacKay presented a short paper to the 14th International Congress of
108
Psychology as well as publishing two more papers at the intersection ofmental
philosophy and electrical engineering,109 and one for a more general, Christian
audience.110 All in all, however, it seems safe to say that 1955 was a more exciting
year. After all, it was in 1955 that Valerie Wood graduated from the University of
London and became Mrs. Valerie Wood MacKay111—not to mention the fact Donald
published three more papers112 and one more book chapter.113
1956 was not only the year Donald and Valerie had their first son, Robert,114 but it
was also a very important year in the history of the mind/body problem. Donald
produced another five publications115—all ofwhich were written for scientists—and
the first full-length criticism ofMacKay's philosophical reasoning appeared in the
journal Mind. We will be discussing this criticism (and MacKay's response,
107




(MacKay 1954b; MacKay 1954c)
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(MacKay 1954a)
111 See Picture # 5.
112
(MacKay 1955a; MacKay and Bergman 1955; MacKay 1955b)
113
(MacKay 1955c)
114 Born on 4 July, 1956
115
(MacKay 1956a; MacKay 1956e; MacKay 1956d; MacKay 1956c; MacKay 1956b)
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published in 1957) in chapter 3. The reason that 1956 was such a big year for mental
philosophy, however, is not directly related to any of these publications—though
there is one ironic, indirect relation. The paper immediately following MacKay's
'Towards an Information Flow Model ofHuman Behaviour' in the British Journal of
Psychology was none other than U. T. Place's momentous work 'Is Consciousness a
Brain Process?'.116 This paper of Place's rocked the philosophical establishment.
While Sperry merely alluded to a possible future time in which the neurological
correlates of conscious experience would be fully known, Place openly and quite
convincingly argued that the much stronger thesis 'consciousness is a brain process'
could not be dismissed upon philosophical grounds alone. This paper is so important
in the history of the mind/body debate in Anglo/American philosophy that we must
discuss it in a little more detail before we move on.
B. Identity Theory
Though significant groundwork for Place's thesis was laid by Carnap and the
positivists as well as Roger Sperry, U. T. Place is generally acknowledged as the
thinker who first introduced the philosophical position that has come to be known as
'identity theory'. His work, perhaps more than any other in the history of
philosophy, set the agenda for debate over the mind/body problem from 1956.
1. U.T. Place's 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?'
As we mentioned at the close of our last chapter, in many respects, identity theory
can be seen as the philosophical successor to behaviourism. The relationship
between behaviourism and identity theory is traced out rather explicitly in Place's
introduction. He begins his introduction with the following observation:
The view that there exists a separate class of events, mental events,
which cannot be described in terms of the concepts employed by the
physical sciences no longer commands the universal and
unquestioning acceptance among philosophers and psychologists
which it once did. Modern physicalism, however, unlike the
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The natural question that arises out of this observation is whether physicalism could
survive the demise of behaviourism. Specifically, Place asks whether or not
physicalism will have to be rejected if behaviourism turns out to be unable to
adequately account for 'statements about pains and twinges, about how things look,
sound, and feel', etc. As his work proceeds, it becomes obvious that his chief hope
for an affirmative answer lies in a re-description of consciousness. For while the old
behaviouristic model described consciousness as nothing but either 'a special type of
behaviour ... or a disposition to behave in a certain way', Place asks us to consider
describing consciousness as a brain process.118 It is therefore with the stated goal of
finding a suitable successor to behaviourism that he sets out to prove that the thesis
'Consciousness is a brain process' cannot be dismissed on logical grounds alone.
In arguing for the logical cogency of the thesis, Place begins by distinguishing
between what he calls 'the "is" of definition' and 'the "is" of composition'. The 'is'
of definition, he argues, implies an analytic statement (meaning that the truth value
of the statement is a merely a factor of the definitions of the terms involved),
whereas the 'is' of composition implies a synthetic statement (meaning that the truth
value of the statement depends on something more than mere definitions). Once this
distinction is clear, Place argues, we will see that at least one of the most profound
worries we may have had concerning the identity thesis goes away. To this effect,
Place says:
Those who contend that the statement 'Consciousness is a brain
process' is logically untenable base their claim, I suspect, on the
mistaken assumption that if the meanings of two statements or
expressions are quite unconnected, they cannot both provide an
adequate characterisation of the same object or state of affairs: if
something is a state of consciousness, it cannot be a brain process,
since there is nothing self-contradictory in supposing that someone
feels a pain when there is nothing happening inside his skull. By the
same token we might be led to conclude that a table cannot be an old
packing case, since there is nothing self-contradictory in supposing
that someone has a table, but is not in possession of an old packing
case.119
Even though the expressions on either side of the 'is' in the statement
'Consciousness is a brain process' have senses that are quite different from one
118 All quotations in this paragraph have been taken from p. 44 of (Place 1956).
119
(Place 1956) p. 45-46
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another, Place argues, it is still logically possible for them to refer to the same object
or state of affairs. Put more precisely, it is Place's contention that the logical
independence of expressions does not entail the ontological independence of the
entities referred to by those expressions.
Place goes on to explain the conditions under which he thinks it would be
appropriate to say that two logically independent expressions refer to the same
ontological entity. He gives the example statements 'A cloud is a mass of tiny
particles in suspension' and 'Lightning is a motion of electric charges'. He says that
in these cases, the 'technical scientific observations set in the context of the
appropriate body of scientific theory provide an immediate explanation of the
observations made by the man in the street'.120 This is the kind of situation Place has
in mind when he proposes the hypothesis 'Consciousness is a brain process'.
Though MacKay was not one of the many thinkers to directly respond to Place's
paper, he had already published an account of the relationship between
consciousness and brain processes that was similar in many ways to the thesis Place
put forward. As we shall see in detail in chapters 3 and 4, however there were also
important differences between Place's identity theory and MacKay's doctrine of
complementary descriptions.
In 1957, MacKay spelled out his doctrine of complementary descriptions in much
more detail—primarily in response to Peter Alexander's criticism of his view the
year before121. He also significantly clarified how his understanding of the
mind/brain relationship accorded with traditional concepts of freedom and personal
responsibility with his paper 'Brain and Will',122 which was originally written for a
non-technical audience. It is also worth noting that of the five non-philosophical
papers MacKay published in 1957, three deal with the neural correlates of visual
experience, indicating the growth of an interest in that area that would stay with him
for the rest of his life. Another interest ofMacKay's that began in 1957 came to him
in the form ofbaby girl. Eleanor MacKay was born on the 13th ofNovember.
120
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In 1958, MacKay published another three papers on technical aspects of visual
perception124 in addition to a popular scientific report125 and two philosophical
works. Of his two philosophical papers, one was part of a symposium on
philosophical uses of the concept of complementarity126 and the other127 developed
the argument for freedom that he had employed in a section of his 'Brain and Will',
published the year before. He further developed this argument in another paper
published by Mind in I960.128 This argument for freedom, which he called 'logical
relativity', will be discussed in chapter 5.
2. Wilder Penfield's 'The Excitable Cortex in Conscious Man '
Another work published in 1958 that has had a profound influence on the mind/body
1 9Q
problem is Wilder Penfield's 'The Excitable Cortex in Conscious Man'. In this
work, Penfield reported some of the results of his experiments in which conscious
patients had mild electrical shocks applied to parts of their exposed brains. He
described these results as follows:
Finally, conduction of current from the interpretive cortex which lies
on the superior and lateral surfaces of the temporal lobes (and possibly
also the inferior and menial surface) may have two different effects.
First, a signal is caused to appear in consciousness, one signal from a
small group of possible signals. The signals are interpretations of
present experience such as feelings of familiarity, strangeness, fear,
position, direction of movement, etc. Under normal conditions such
signals are familiar to everyone but they can only be accurate if
preceded by subconscious comparison of present experience with past
experiences.
The second effect of temporal stimulation is the recall of experience
from the past. This seems to be a sequential reactivation of those
things of which the patient was aware during a previous period of
124
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Needless to say, these findings greatly increased the empirical evidence in support of
some kind of identity thesis.
3. Herbert Feigl's 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"'
Also in 1958, Herbert Feigl published the first major philosophical elaboration on the
identity thesis. In this paper,131 titled 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"', Feigl
presented a very technical version of the identity thesis set within the complex
framework of American analytic philosophy. Though he mentioned 'Is
Consciousness a Brain Process?' in his bibliography, no mention of Place or his
work can be found in the text of Feigl's work. In the following year, however, J. J.
C. Smart produced a paper further elaborating on the identity thesis in which Place's
work received much greater recognition.
4. J. J. C. Smart's 'Sensations and Brain Processes'
At the very end of his 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', Place acknowledged the
fact that J. J. C. Smart had been a strong influence on his position. In 1959, however,
Smart broke from Place in several important ways with the publication of his
'Sensations and Brain Processes'.132 The main difference between Smart's position
and Place's is that Smart was not nearly as timid with regard to the prospect of
reduction. Whereas Place was very careful to limit the scope of his 'is' in the
hypothesis 'Consciousness is a brain process', so that it was never quite clear to what
extent he would be comfortable with the prospect of reducing consciousness to a
brain process, Smart stated overtly, 'When I say that a sensation is a brain process or
that lightning is an electric discharge, I am using "is" in the sense of strict
identity'.133 Inspired by Occam's razor and an extremely behaviouristic reading of
Wittgenstein, Smart openly embraces the prospect of reduction, saying:
The suggestion I wish if possible to avoid is a different one, namely
that 'I am in pain' is a genuine report, and that what it reports is an
irreducibly psychical something. And similarly the suggestion I wish
to resist is also that to say 'I have a yellowish-orange after-image' is
to report something irreducibly psychical.134
131 (Feigl 1958)
132 (Smart 1959)
133 (Smart 1959) p. 145
134 (Smart 1959) p. 142
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This openly reductionistic system produces a metaphysical anthropology in which all
vestiges ofmental activity are explained away by physical descriptions. Smart
summarises his metaphysical anthropology as follows:
A man is a vast arrangement of physical particles, but there are not,
over and above this, sensations or states of consciousness. There are
just behavioural facts about this vast mechanism, such as that it
expresses a temptation (behaviour disposition) to say 'there is a
yellowish-red patch on the wall' or that it goes through a sophisticated
sort ofwince, that is, says 'I am in pain'.13
Smart concludes his essay by taking leave from Place's position in one more respect.
Whereas Place put forward the statement 'Consciousness is a brain process' as an
empirical hypothesis, Smart believes that the hypothesis is not contingent on further
empirical evidence. Smart believes that we already have all the data we need. The
only thing we need to do is choose which theory makes the best sense of the data we
already have. Smart argues that both reductionistic and non-reductionistic theories
make use of all the empirical data—they just do it in different ways. Smart suggests
that non-reductive theories are in the same epistemological boat as Gosse's theory
that the world was created in 4004 bc with all the fossils and all already in place.
Neither non-reductive theories nor Gosse's ideas go against the empirical evidence,
though Smart argues that they both go against the values of 'parsimony and
simplicity', making them untenable for philosophical rather than purely empirical
reasons.136
Though Smart was clearly interested in MacKay's work (as evidenced not only by a
footnote to MacKay in 'Sensations and Brain Processes'137 but also letters138 from
Smart among MacKay's papers), MacKay, having already put forward a general
account of his understanding of the mind/brain relationship, did not directly respond
to any of the growing number of identity theorists. He did demonstrate a rising
interest in psychology, however, publishing three short papers for psychologists in
195 9139 and attending the 15th International Congress of Psychology in Brussels in
135
(Smart 1959) p. 143
136 (Smart 1959) pp. 155-156
137 Smart refers to MacKay's (MacKay 1956e)
138
Though an exhaustive search of letters among MacKay's papers has not been performed, a letter
from Smart dated 1962 indicated prior correspondence.
139
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addition to producing his two scientific works,140 one philosophical paper,141 and one
work on information theory.142
III. Finding the Right Physicalist Course of Action (1960-1977)
From 1960 onwards, mental philosophy has struggled to sort out the implications of
the rise of neuroscience. The years between 1960 and 1977 were especially
characterised by an explosion of new theories seeking to modify the identity theory
put forward by Place, Feigl and Smart. Since MacKay had already published
accounts of how his complementary account of the mental and the physical worked,
these years for him were comparatively stable. Instead of interacting with all the
new ideological camps that sprang up in the philosophical community with the
proposal of each new theory ofmind/body relation, MacKay was content to pursue
his empirical research, defend his view against challengers (particularly challengers
who claimed that his view did not leave room for a sufficient understanding of
human freedom), and contribute to the rising level of understanding and co-operation
between popular Christianity and science.
Because MacKay's concerns and the concerns of the majority of mental philosophers
took such disparate paths between 1960 and 1977, in this section of our historical
account we will discuss them separately.
A. Philosophical Responses to Identity Theory
Between 1960 and 1977, the field ofmental philosophy was littered with prominent
responses, objections, and modifications to identity theory. Because this was such a
turbulent time in the history ofphilosophy, it is necessary for any straightforward
historical account to gloss over some otherwise important distinctions, as well as
overlook some very important theorists. It will also be necessary for our present
purposes to avoid getting involved in the level of detail that might otherwise be
expected as to the development of each new idea. Perhaps the simplest way to avoid
the minor twists and turns of debate over the mind/body problem will be to
summarise the positions of key thinkers, particularly as they presented them in what
140
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would appear to be their most influential works. Adopting this method will not allow
us to discuss the development of each thinker's ideas. Nor will it allow us to present
an accurate account of the intricate ways in which each thinker interacted with and
responded to the ideas of others. But given the constraints of our present
investigation, the benefits of this method would seem to outweigh these costs.
1. Hilary Putnam's 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life'
The first key figure in the mind/body debate between 1960 and 1977 that we need to
discuss is Hilary Putnam. His name is generally associated with the philosophical
camp known as 'functionalism', which he founded as an alternative to identity
theory. He first introduced this alternative in his 1960 paper 'Minds and
Machines'.143 As more alternatives to identity theory began to spring up, however,
and he came to recognise certain weaknesses in his early formulations of this
alternative, Putnam made several modifications to his theory. For this reason,
instead of focusing on his 1960 paper, we will look at one of his most widely
reprinted papers, 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life',144 originally presented as part of
a symposium on 'Computers and the Mind' at The University of California at
Berkeley in 1973, which represents a mature formulation of his position.
The main problem Putnam had with identity theory was that it made people worry
about the philosophical integrity of mental life. As he so eloquently put this concern:
People are worried that we may be debunked, that our behaviour may
be exposed as really explained by something mechanical. Not, to be
sure, mechanical in the old sense of cogs and pulleys, but in the newer
sense of electricity and magnetism and quantum chemistry and so
forth. In this paper I want to argue that this can't happen. Mentality
is a real and autonomous feature of our world.145
Putnam departed from identity theory by arguing that the question of substances (i.e.
materialism v. immaterialism) with regard to the mind/body problem is completely
irrelevant. What matters, he said, is not what we are made of, but what we do. The
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ifwe are completely material then there is a physical explanation for our behaviour.
Putnam thouht this was a mistake.
With regard to neuroscience (i.e. the study of the physical correlates of our mental
lives) Putnam said that it was really important that we not get so bogged down in
detail that we miss the point. In particular, he argued that any time we want to
understand a complex phenomenon (like an intelligent human being) what matters is
not detail but relevance. After all, even if a super-scientist could explain all the
physical forces of each molecule involved in, say, an argument between husband and
wife, that massive amount of information would most likely distract us from
understanding what is going on, not lead us on to any deeper understanding. And
that is true whether we are talking about human brains or air travel, or even
mechanical clock making. The way to understand phenomena, he argued, is not just
to know what things are happening, but to know which of the things that are
happening are important.
Armed by this argument for the importance of relevance over detail, Putnam was
able to defend the following comments (which seem to represent his central thesis):
Now, imagine two possible universes, perhaps 'parallel worlds', in the
science fiction sense, in one of which people have good old fashioned
soul, operating through pineal glands, perhaps, and in the other of
which they have complicated brains. And suppose that the souls in
the soul world are functionally isomorphic to the brains in the brain
world. Is there any more sense to attaching importance to this
difference than to the difference between copper wires and some other
wires in the computer? Does it matter that the soul people have, so to
speak, immaterial brains, and that the brain people have material
souls? What matters is the common structure, the theory T of which
we are, alas, in deep ignorance, and not the hardware, be it ever so
ethereal.146
Though Putnam's work was clearly a rival to identity theory, it is also clear that these
rival theories shared a common goal. Whereas Place, seeing the inevitable demise of
behaviourism, argued for the logical possibility of the identity hypothesis so that we
would still be able to do empirical psychology without having to resort back to
substance dualism, Putnam argued that we could (and, indeed, should) do
psychology without regard to our views on either dualism or identity theory. The
146
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final effect ofPutnam's work, therefore, is that even in the aftermath of
behaviourism, a denial of dualism does not entail a commitment to identity theory.
2. Paul Feyerabend's 'Mental Events and the Brain '
Paul Feyerabend, who had, in 1958, participated with MacKay in a symposium titled
'Complementarity' for the Aristotelian Society,147 published two papers in 1963 that
offered another alternative to identity theory.148 Whereas Putnam had argued that
identity theory was too radical, however, Feyerabend argued that it was not radical
enough.
Feyerabend argued that the problem identity theorists kept running into was that
identity statements cut both ways. Thus, in saying that mental processes are identical
with some physical processes, they were also saying that some physical processes are
mental processes. Since mental features have always been understood to be non-
physical, the identity theorist was thereby committed to something like the thesis
'Some physical processes are non-physical processes'. Needless to say, this thesis
was problematic.
According to Feyerabend, the only way to avoid being stuck with this untenable
thesis is to drop the traditional language of mental processes altogether. In his
'Mental Events and the Brain', he makes this point in the following way:
The proper procedure for him to adopt is to develop his theory without
any recourse to existent terminology. If he wants to use H [the
identity thesis] at all, he ought to use it for redefining 'mental process'
(if he intends to perpetuate ancient terminology, that is). The
empirical nature of his theory is not endangered thereby. After all, a
physiological theory of epilepsy does not become an empty tautology
on account of the fact that it does not make use of the phrase—or of
the notion—'possessed by the devil', 'devil' here occurring in its
theological sense. There are enough independent predictions
available, many more predictions in fact than the mentalist could ever
provide—or would even be willing to provide (think only of the
tremendous field of the physiology of perception).14
While Feyerabend's approach, which came to be known as 'eliminative
materialism' or simply 'eliminativism', may have been a bit too radical for
many of his contemporaries, it was at least carefully considered by most in the
147
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field. And, as we shall see later, Feyerabend's theory was also revived and
elaborated upon by Paul and Patricia Churchland in the 1980's.
3. Donald Davidson's 'Psychology as Philosophy'
Donald Davidson sided with Hilary Putnam in saying that the identity theory went
too far. In some sense, one could even say that Davidson took Putnam's criticism of
strict identity theory one step further. For whereas Putnam argued that strict identity
didn't matter, Davidson argued that it didn't work. His argument was not against the
physical monism demanded by identity theory, however, but what the strict identity
theorists were suggesting we could do with that monism—particularly their effort to
pave the way for a physics of psychology. Like Feyerabend, Davidson pointed to the
identity theorist's problematic understanding of the relationship between some kinds
ofmental processes and some kinds of physical processes. But whereas Feyerabend
had argued that since mental language could not be consistently related to physical
language, mental language should be dropped, Davidson argued that since mental
language cannot be consistently related to physical language, it is a mistake to try to
reduce mental descriptions to physical descriptions.
Though MacKay was not very active in the debate over identity theory at this point
in his career, it is ironic enough to note that when Davidson first presented what is
arguably his most important paper, 'Psychology as Philosophy',150 MacKay was in
another room chairing a discussion on 'Computer Models in Psychology' for the
very same conference.151
In this paper, Davidson argued that even ifwe take physical monism as a given, we
will never be able to reason from physical statements (however detailed) to
psychological statements in the law-like way that would be demanded by a science of
psychological physics.
Though most ofDavidson's current followers would prefer the broader term 'token
identity theory' (meaning that every individual mental something is identical to some
physical something, though we cannot necessary identify any type ofmental thing
with any type of physical thing), Davidson himself calls his position 'anomalous
150 (Davidson 1974). See also (Davidson 1980) and countless other re-prints.
151 This conference, titled 'Philosophy ofPsychology' was sponsored by the Royal Institute of
Philosophy and held at the University ofKent in 1971. For more information, as well as the first
publication of this often reprinted paper of Davidson's, see (Brown 1974).
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monism: monism, because it holds that psychological events are physical events;
anomalous, because it insists that events do not fall under strict laws when described
in psychological terms'.152 Davidson explains why it is that psychological events
(i.e. events described in psychological terms) cannot accurately be explained by
reference to a set of strict laws similar to the ones that govern physical events (i.e.
events described in physical terms) in this way:
When the world impinges on a person, or he moves to modify his
environment, the interaction can be recorded and codified in ways that
have been refined by the social sciences and common sense. But what
emerge are not the strict quantitative laws embedded in sophisticated
theory that we confidently expect in physics, but irreducibly statistical
correlations that resist, and resist in principle, improvement without
limit. What lies behind our inability to discover deterministic psycho¬
physical laws is this. When we attribute a belief, a desire, a goal, an
intention or a meaning to an agent, we necessarily operate within a
system of concepts in part determined by the structure of beliefs and
desires of the agent himself. Short of changing the subject, we cannot
escape this feature of the psychological; but this feature has no
counterpart in the world of physics.153
What Davidson is saying here is that physiological descriptions and psychological
descriptions pick out radically different features of any given state of affairs. While
these different features are not necessarily features of different substances (as
dualism would claim) they are, nonetheless, very importantly different.154 The
difference lies not in the substance referred to, but in the set of facts we look to for
truth conditions. The truth conditions of physical descriptions are features of an
object in the world to which we all have more or less equal access. The truth
conditions of psychological descriptions, on the other hand, are features of the
subject to which those psychological descriptions apply. We can come to know a
subject of description on a personal level—giving us access to the truth conditions of
psychological statements concerning that subject, and we can also come to know a
subject of description on an objective level (i.e. as an object)—giving us access to
the truth conditions of physiological statements concerning that subject. But the
really important bit, according to Davidson, is that we remember that psychological
152 (Davidson 1974) p. 43
153
(Davidson 1974) p. 42
154 For lack of a better word, we could say that the difference is 'logical' rather than 'ontological'.
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statements have meaning only against a personal background and physiological
statements have meaning only against an objective background.
This difference has at least this importance: it rules out apriori any hope we might
otherwise have had of discovering a science of objective laws either to bridge the gap
between psychological and physical descriptions or to predict future mental states
based on present ones. This means that physical laws, which are, by virtue of their
essentially objective nature, the proper goal of only the objective sciences, are not the
proper goal of psychology. Here Davidson provides us with one of his rare and
extremely helpful examples:
It is an error to compare a truism like 'If a man wants to eat an acorn
omelette, then he generally will if the opportunity exists and no other
desire overrides' with a law that says how fast a body will fall in a
vacuum. It is an error, because in the latter case, but not the former,
we can tell in advance whether the condition holds, and we know what
allowance to make if it doesn't. What is needed in the case of action,
ifwe are to predict on the basis of desires and beliefs, is a quantitative
calculus that brings all relevant beliefs and desires into the picture.
There is no hope of refining the simple pattern of explanation on the
basis of reasons into such a calculus.1 5
What Davidson does not say, however, is that there is no hope for the future of
psychology. There is hope for psychology; it is just that psychologists are going to
have to get over the fascination with objective law that was the demise of
behaviourism. The future of psychology, Davidson suggests, lies in generalisations
made by getting to know the subject rather than laws based on detached observation.
Perhaps this point will be clarified by one more sentence from Davidson's
'Psychology as Philosophy':
The simplest way of trying to improve matters is to substitute for
desires and beliefs more directly observable events that may be
assumed to cause them . . . But perhaps it is now obvious to almost
everyone that a theory of action inspired by this idea has no chance of
explaining complex behaviour unless it succeeds in inferring or
constructing the pattern of thoughts and emotions of the agent.156
What Davidson has done, in developing this position he calls 'anomalous monism',
is to take a little of the excitement out of the debate. After all, substance dualism
offers us the very exciting prospect of vast worlds interacting with ours in mysterious
155
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ways. On the other hand, strict identity theory is the stuff that other dreams are made
of. It offers us the possibility of learning to control our brains (and the brains of
others) in fantastic and reality-bending ways. Davidson, on the other hand, offers us
a sober look at the mind/body problem without taking any such fascinating flights
into the world of fantasy. According to Davidson, no matter how fond we may be of
our microscopes and laboratories, ifwe really want to get to know someone, we are
just going to have to sit down and talk to them.
4. Thomas Nagel's What is it Like to be a Bat?'
One more position that has profoundly affected the philosophical landscape
surrounding the mind/body problem was put forward by Thomas Nagel in 1974. In
his seminal paper, 'What is it Like to be a Bat?',157 Nagel argued against any attempt
to explain even a single, isolated instance of conscious activity in physical terms.
While Putnam and Davidson both argue (against Feyerabend) that even a complete
understanding of the physiological correlates of mental experience would not
threaten our common-sense impression of consciousness, Nagel takes yet another
step away from any strict identity thesis. His argument is fairly simple. Nagel
argues that since we cannot fully explain subjective experience in objective
language, and since physical events are essentially objective, bold faced physicalism
will always be an inadequate model for understanding the essentially subjective
experience of mental activity. He summarises this point with the following
paragraph:
This bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if the facts of
experience—facts about what it is like for the experiencing
organism—are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a
mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the
physical operation of that organism. The latter is a domain of
objective facts par excellence—the kind that can be observed and
understood from many points of view and by individuals with
differing perceptual systems. There are no comparable imaginative
obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge about bat neurophysiology
by human scientists, and intelligent bats or Martians might learn more
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B. MacKay Strengthens His Position
As we have already mentioned several times, MacKay was not particularly active in
philosophical debates surrounding the identity thesis between 1960 and 1977. But
that is not to say that he was not active. On the 24th ofMay, 1960, Donald and
Valerie had their second daughter, Janet. Very soon afterwards, they moved to
Staffordshire, where MacKay took up the newly formed Granada chair of
communication at the University of Keele.
As the list of works published by MacKay in 1960 demonstrates, however, he was
not only building his family and new research department. He was also building a
broader base for his position on the mind/body problem. In a paper written as a
broadcast talk for the BBC Third Programme, he explained how the science of
information theory was coming to recognise the fact that many simple types of
human language can be understood not only psychologically, but also in the
complementary mechanical descriptions employed by systems engineers.159
In one of his empirical papers published in 1960, he explored the relative benefits of
various methods for modelling brain activity.160 He argues in this paper that
different models are needed to understand nervous activity at different levels of
magnification. Each of these different models would, of course, offer us
complementary descriptions of the same complex events.
Of his four papers published that year for Christian audiences, all dealt with the
implications of a proper understanding of complementary descriptions: two
developed the relationship between complementary descriptions and divine action,161
one explained to a popular audience how science and theology as whole disciplines
can be understood as complementary descriptions of the same world,162 and another
explained in greater detail how physical and psychological descriptions of human




(MacKay 1960e), his other two empirical papers that year were (MacKay 1960a) and (MacKay
1960f). Though it is not quite an empirical paper, we should also mention that MacKay also
published two papers for electronic engineers that year (MacKay 1960i) and (MacKay and Jeffreys
1960).
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His most philosophical paper of the year was a further development of his argument
(which we will discuss in chapter 5) against the idea that if the human brain can be
understood on a mechanistic level, then our intuition of freedom is illusory.164
On the 8th ofMay, 1961, Margaret MacKay was born—the fourth of five children.
The fifth, David, was born 22 April, 1967. But as we said before, MacKay was
building more than just a family between 1960 and 1977. In addition to his 1960
publications discussed above, during these years he published two mathematical
works,165 fourty-three papers relating to mechanical aspects of information theory,166
fifty-seven empirical reports on his research into neurological aspects of vision,167
four other papers exploring the relationship between neurology and
communication,168 and fourty-two papers exploring the philosophical and theological
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But of these fourty-two papers exploring the philosophical and theological
implications of his empirical work, most dealt with the implications of his solution to
the mind/body problem rather than stating explicitly in philosophical and theological
terms what his position on the problem was. It is because he was comparatively
implicit regarding his metaphysical anthropology up until 1977 that we must treat
that year as a milestone in his academic career as it relates to our topic. For in 1977
two works were published on the mind/body problem that drew MacKay deeper into
the philosophical discussion than he had ever been willing previously to go.
IV. Exploring the Mystery of Consciousness (1977-1986)
The most important work regarding the mind/body problem published in 1977 is the
rather lengthy volume, 'The Mind and its Brain', written by Sir Karl Popper and Sir
John Eccles.170 This book is important for several reasons. First, and most
obviously, it is important because ofwho wrote it. As MacKay has said of them,
Popper and Eccles 'are deeply and justly respected for their contributions to the
philosophy and practice of science, and show an impressive grasp of both the ancient
literature and the modern discoveries most relevant to their theme.'171 Secondly, and
perhaps most surprisingly, this book is important because it attempts to revive a
thesis that philosophers and scientists had been working hard to distance themselves
from for nearly a century—dualist interactionism. Admittedly reminiscent ofRene
Descartes' work three and a half centuries earlier, Popper says, 'I think that the self
in a sense plays on the brain, as a pianist plays on a piano or as a driver plays on the
controls of a car.' Eccles agrees, adding, 'The self-conscious mind acts upon . ..
neural centres, modifying the dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of the neural events.'
172
Though their interactionist thesis was too radical to gain much of a following in
analytic philosophical circles, their thesis is important for our study if for no other
reason than that it drew MacKay into the debate.
MacKay 1967a; MacKay 1968j; MacKay 196If; MacKay 1963h; MacKay 1963f; MacKay 1964e;
MacKay 1964b; MacKay 1968d)
170
(Popper and Eccles 1977)
171
(MacKay 1978h)p. 599
l72Both of these selections, as quoted on p. 600 of (MacKay 1978h), are from (Popper and Eccles
1977) p. 495.
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A. The Bunge Debate
Whether MacKay would have developed his interest in mental philosophy to the
degree that he did without having the exchange with Mario Bunge that he did can
never be known. We can say, however, that this exchange provided MacKay with a
lively entry as an active participant173 to the mind/body debate.
In 1978, MacKay wrote a paper in response to Popper and Eccles' work for the
journal Neuroscience.174 Because Mario Bunge had just published a paper on the
mind/body problem in the previous volume of that journal,175 MacKay also took the
opportunity to offer some critical comments on Bunge's work. In this paper,
MacKay presented his own understanding of the mind/body relationship as a 'third
option' between the two extreme views presented by Popper and Eccles on the one
hand and Bunge on the other.
To put it mildly, Bunge did not seem to approve ofMacKay's use of his position as
an extreme view. Lest anyone should be left in any doubt as to Bunge's attitude
towards MacKay, the journal Neuroscience, in the very next issue, published a




The paper that Bunge originally wrote for Neuroscience was titled 'Emergence
and the Mind'. In that paper, he first attempts to define some of the important
terminology used so frequently in mental philosophy such as 'thing', 'property',
'state', 'process', 'resultant', 'emergent', and 'level'. He then uses all these terms to
carve the ideological landscape into ten districts—five ofwhich he terms versions of
psychoneural monism, and the other five of which he terms versions of psychoneural
173 As we saw earlier, MacKay's work had been used in the mind/body debate at least since (Smart
1959), and he had addressed the mind/body problem in several of his previous works. His position on
the mind/body problem was even compared with Ryle's as early as 1952 (Pirenne 1952), though
MacKay himself never commented on such comparisons (though he had studied Ryle's position by
then, he did not mention Ryle in his reply (MacKay 1953f)). It is only with the publication of
(MacKay 1978h), in response to both the work ofPopper and Eccles and that of Bunge, that MacKay
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dualism. He then dismisses, one by one, nine of the positions, leaving only the
version of psychoneural monism he calls 'emergentist materialism'.
What sparked MacKay's sharpest criticism was not so much Bunge's position, but
the way in which he argued for it. After pointing out some helpful aspects of
Bunge's paper, MacKay comments:
But in arguing for his own preferred option of 'emergentist
materialism' I fear that Bunge displays at least as much hasty
dogmatism as the dualist interactionists whom he dismisses.
'Idealism', for example, he is happy to 'write off without more ado' in
a couple of lines, as 'incompatible with physics, chemistry, molecular
biology and social science'. The widely held view that the organic
and mental are diverse aspects or manifestations of a single entity 'has
yet to be formulated clearly and in agreement with the natural sciences
. . . We may therefore dismiss [it]'. By contrast with this kind of high¬
handedness, even the most exuberant of Eccles' apologies for
interactionism seems positively undogmatic; and the austerely calm
and scholarly discussion of the same issues by Popper is doubly
impressive.1
It was this charge of dogmatism that seems to have upset Bunge. After all, MacKay
had written several overtly Christian books, and that, to Bunge, appeared to be
dogmatism of the purest form.
Though we will discuss the position that MacKay puts forward in much more detail
in chapter 4, for now, it will be sufficient to say that this rather intense exchange with
Bunge seems to have motivated MacKay to participate a little more enthusiastically
in the philosophical discussion—particularly as it directly related to the discipline of
neuroscience.
B. The Sperry Exchange
The year after Bunge published his scathing letter, Roger Sperry decided that the
time had come to publish a record of the changes he had made to his position on the
180
mind/body problem since his important 1952 paper we discussed earlier. In
particular, Sperry seems to have had it in mind that the record needed to be set
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expressed by Popper and Eccles) depended upon his own (Sperry's) theories. The
result was a not-particularly-clear defence of a position he called 'mentalism'.
It would be quite safe to say that Sperry's mentalism did not have nearly as important
an effect on the broader discipline of mental philosophy as his 1952 work did. In his
response to the whole series of papers on the mind/body problem published between
1977 and 1981 in Neuroscience, J. J. C. Smart offers a concise analysis of Sperry's
work to which any who are interested in mentalism would be advised to refer.181 For
our purposes, it will be sufficient to note that Sperry's paper, as Bunge's before it,
served the purpose of prompting MacKay to publish a clarification of his own
view—showing how it contrasted with other positions being considered.
Somewhat ironically, in 1980 MacKay published not only his response to Sperry's
mentalism paper, but also (with his wife, Valerie—who had completed her PhD
several years earlier) the findings of his research as Fairchild scholar at Sperry's lab
in California. Evidently, Sperry and MacKay had developed a working relationship
182
at a Vatican brain science conference organised by Sir John Eccles in 1965 and
1
had worked together sporadically ever since.
In addition to his exchanges with Bunge and Sperry, MacKay was to publish eleven
more works in which he spelled out his position on the mind/body problem in
philosophical and theological terms184—not least of which was his set ofGifford
Lectures presented only months before his death.185 A brief examination of his list of
publications, however, underlines the fact that even in this final phase of his life,
MacKay saw himselfmore as a scientist than a philosopher. After all, while he did
write twenty works186 explicitly for Christian readers in addition to his eleven works
181
(Smart 1981)
182 See (Eccles 1966)
183 For more detail on the relationship between Sperry and MacKay, as well as a fuller comparison of
their respective positions, see (McDonald 1994).
184
(MacKay 1991b; MacKay 1987e; MacKay 1983e; MacKay 1982b; MacKay 1981a; MacKay




(MacKay 1989; MacKay 1978f; MacKay 1978b; MacKay 1987a; MacKay 1987h; MacKay 1987i;
MacKay 1986a; MacKay 1986d; MacKay 1984g; MacKay 1984a; MacKay 1982e; MacKay 1980i;
MacKay 1978a; MacKay 1978e; MacKay 1985c; MacKay 1979c; MacKay 1978g; MacKay 1984e;
MacKay 1984f; MacKay 1988a)
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on the mind/body problem, he also wrote thirty-nine works during the same time
188
period which were of a strictly empirical nature as well as thirteen scientific papers
of a more theoretical nature.189
Between 1977 and 1986, as MacKay became more directly involved in the debate
over the mind/body problem than he was at any other time in his career, other
philosophers took up positions similar to those we saw presented by the identity
theorists and their early critics. D. M. Armstrong and David Lewis took up a
position that is more or less a cross between the identity thesis of Place, Feigl and
Smart and the neurological behaviourism presented in Sperry's 1952 paper. They
call their theory 'The Causal Theory'.190 While Hilary Putnam's functionalism has
been taken up by a wide variety of thinkers from Jerry Fodor to Daniel Dennett,191
Paul and Patricia Churchland have become far and away the most notorious
defenders of a slightly more sophisticated version of Feyerabend's eliminative
materialism.192
Since MacKay's untimely death in 1987, just months after he received honorary
degrees from St. Andrews University in Scotland193 and Gordon College in the
United States and presented his Gifford Lectures at the University of Glasgow,
187
(MacKay 1986c; Hammond and MacKay 1985; MacKay, MacKay, and Rulon 1986a; MacKay and
Hammond 1981a; MacKay 1983f; MacKay and MacKay 1982b; MacKay 1981b; MacKay 198Id;
MacKay 1980d; MacKay 1980h; MacKay 1981c; MacKay 1978i; MacKay 1978d; MacKay 1986e;
MacKay, MacKay, and Rulon 1985; MacKay 1985f; MacKay 1984d; MacKay 1979b; MacKay 1978j;
MacKay, Gerrits, and Stassen 1978; MacKay and Hanly 1979; MacKay and Hammond 1978;
MacKay 1980c; MacKay 1980e; MacKay and MacKay 1980; MacKay and Hammond 1981b;
MacKay and MacKay 1982a; MacKay and Lund 1983; MacKay and Hammond 1983a; MacKay and
Hammond 1983b; MacKay 1982a; MacKay 1983d; MacKay 1984j; MacKay 1984k; MacKay 1984c;
MacKay 19841; MacKay and MacKay 1985; MacKay, MacKay, and Rulon 1986b; MacKay and
Ludwig 1986)
188
(MacKay 1988b; MacKay 1978k; MacKay 1987g; MacKay 1983g; MacKay 1982d; MacKay
1980b; MacKay 1980g; MacKay 1978c; MacKay 1984h; MacKay and MacKay 1992; MacKay
1987c; MacKay 1987j; MacKay, Skinner, and Buckley 1989)
189 It should also be mentioned that MacKay wrote quite a few important review articles and
encyclopaedia entries during this period of his career as well, among which are the following:
(MacKay 19871) (MacKay 1986b; MacKay 1983a; MacKay 1983b; MacKay 1983h; MacKay 1982c;
MacKay 1985e; MacKay 1985g; MacKay 1984b; MacKay 1984i; MacKay 1984m; MacKay 1979e;
MacKay 1987k; MacKay 1987b; MacKay 1987d; MacKay 1987f; MacKay 1987m)
190 For a short, readable introduction to the causal theory, see pp. 81-91 of (Armstrong 1999).
191 See pp. 101-110 of (Armstrong 1999) and the collection ofpapers on pp. 47-147 of (Lycan 1990).
192
See, for example, (Churchland and Churchland 1998) and (McCauley, Churchland, and
Churchland 1996) as well as section 4 of (Lycan 1990).
193 See picture # 6.
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confusion and disagreement over the mind/body problem has shown little sign of
reducing. If anything, the field has broadened somewhat, as more religiously
inclined philosophers have entered the discussion with an overt interest in preserving
the credibility of life after death. As Kevin Corcoran remarked in his introduction to
a recent collection of essays on the mind/body problem:
Is there a convergence of answers on the horizon? It would appear
not. For there are at present many answers and not all fall neatly into
the two mutually exclusive views commonly discussed: Cartesian
dualism and reductionistic physicalism. Nor is it obvious, despite
what we may have been inclined to think, that physicalism with
respect to human persons is incompatible with the doctrine of post¬
mortem survival. If anything is clear after reading the essays in this
volume, it is this: the mind-body problem remains wide open.194
As we move into the next section of our study, in which we will attempt a reasonably
systematic exposition ofMacKay's understanding of the relationship between the
mind and body, it will be important for us to remember that our goal will not be to
solve the mind/body problem once and for all. The best we can hope to do in the
pages that follow is to present a clear account of a view that has not previously
received the level of scholarly attention that it deserves.
194
(Corcoran 2001) p. 11
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Chapter 3: Complementary Descriptions
Of all the many roles played by Donald MacKay during his fourty-four years as an
academic, the role of detached, abstract theoretician was one for which he never
seemed to have time. As should soon become clear, this was not because he never
engaged in abstract theorising; it was just that his theories were always anything but
detached. After all, MacKay remained a devout Christian throughout his life, despite
being professionally involved in the three academic fields thought at that time to be
the most hostile to traditional Christianity—theoretical physics, brain science, and
analytic philosophy. His ability to learn from and apply knowledge from such
seemingly disparate bodies of knowledge was no accident. On the contrary, his
extraordinary interdisciplinary success was the direct result of his elegant though
somewhat controversial understanding of complementary descriptions.
Though the idea underlying MacKay's complementarity is at least as old as the
philosophical theology of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), not all of its proponents have
been as clear or as disciplined as MacKay in the final presentation of their theories.
Ironically enough, MacKay's generation of scholars appears to have been
particularly prone to misunderstanding the concept of complementary descriptions.
The provocative work ofNils Bohr (1885-1964) no doubt, was the primary cause for
this confusion. Bohr's demonstration that the particle and wave models of sub¬
atomic activity enjoy a complementary relationship provided a clear example of how
seemingly disparate descriptions can increase our understanding of a single event.
Unfortunately, this example may have been so clear that it was unhelpful beyond the
narrow field of theoretical physics. Just as a massive physical object (like a dense
planet) curves its region of physical space, it appears that the intellectual importance
of Bohr's theory may have bent the logical space surrounding the idea of
complementarity. We would be wise to keep this warning fresh in our minds as we
proceed into our investigation ofMacKay's logical notion of complementary
descriptions.195
After a preliminary study ofMacKay's understanding of complementary descriptions
and a brief look at some prominent misunderstandings, we will discuss MacKay's
195 We will address the complications arising from too closely associating MacKay and Bohr in much
more detail below in our discussion of Bedau's objection to MacKay.
Complementary Descriptions 76
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology of Donald M. MacKay
equally controversial application of this theory to the mind/body problem on the one
hand and the freedom/determinism problem on the other. Because these topics are so
controversial, we must be constantly on our guard against misinterpretations. We
will benefit from MacKay's long and faithful labour towards the production of a
theological anthropology—informed not only by the Bible and Church tradition, but
also the recent dramatic discoveries made by modern physicists, brain scientists and
philosophers— only ifwe consistently resist the urge to jump to conclusions, and
trace his arguments slowly, thoughtfully, and faithfully. We are assisted in this
endeavour to remain sober in our assessments ofMacKay's work by others, who
have succumbed to the controversy and published criticisms before the view they
were critiquing was fully understood. We will make use of these prominent
misunderstandings and D. M. MacKay's responses to them to the greatest extent
practical.
I. MacKay's Complementarity Stated
Though the most widely published statements ofMacKay's complementarity were
set in a debate context,196 we will delay our discussion of these debates until after we
have seen what MacKay has to say about complementarity when he is not being
questioned on any specific detail. We will start with his 1955 paper 'Man As
Observer-Predictor', then proceed to his 'What Makes a Contradiction', written in
1968. After we have discussed these two foundational works, we will seek to answer
a few remaining questions, referring to a range of papers written between 1968 and
MacKay's death in 1987.
A. 'Man As Observer-Predictor'197
MacKay's paper 'Man As Observer-Predictor' was presented to the Tenth Present
Question Conference, held in July 1954, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford. In this paper,
MacKay introduces his understanding of complementary descriptions as he describes
196 We will treat the three papers that MacKay himself refers his readers to most often for a more
detailed treatment of complementarity ((MacKay 1957b; MacKay 1958a); and (MacKay 1974c)) in
the latter half of this chapter. The main reason we will delay our discussion of them is that they are all
three set in a debate context. Additionally, it is worth noting that one cannot infer from the fact that
MacKay referred to these papers most often that he necessarily thought they were the most clear or
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the peculiar role that scientists must play with respect to the situations they study.
He first defines this role in opposition to the two other broad types of roles that
people often play in their relationships with the rest of the world, namely 1) subject-
in-dialogue, and 2) observer-participant.
In dialogue, there is little difference between the roles played by different types of
participant, and detachment is seen more as an obstacle than an aid to the purity of
the relationship. The observer-participant role, perhaps exemplified most beautifully
by the parent teaching a child how to walk or ride a bike, is different from the role of
a subject-in-dialogue in that some degree of detachment is required to sustain the
observer aspect of the relationship. It is only in playing out the role of observer-
1QR
predictor, however, that complete and utter detachment is required. Though this
role has proven extremely profitable with the rise ofmodern science, it is a
challenging role to play in at least two respects: 'The first problem ... is that of
withdrawal, of reducing participation to a minimum. The second problem is the
problem of defining a language, a connected set of ideas suitable for the detached
viewpoint he has chosen.'199
Both of these problems are aggravated not only by our normal desire to participate in
the situations we observe, but also by the degree to which such participation is
explicitly unavoidable. As MacKay rightly points out:
The scientist requires something to happen (visibly, or detectably in
some other way) in order that he can say anything about the system he
is observing; and for something to happen in his observing equipment,
energy must pass to it from the system he is observing. So he must
interact with the situation; but his problem is to interact with it as little
as possible, so as to be able to make a description of what it would
have been like if he had not interacted.200
198 For more on the technical reasons for the necessity of this detachment, MacKay points us to Karl
Popper's 1950 paper 'Indeterminism in classical and quantum physics' (British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 1, pp.117-133 & 173-195). MacKay gives us the gist of this article with the
following statement:
The point is this, that if you have a predicting, calculating mechanism or human being, such a
predicting mechanism cannot possibly predict exactly the future of any system which
includes itself. The reason is that if you try to make it allow for the effect of its predictions
on the system, it needs to know the prediction before it can calculate what effect this will
have, and you simply set it chasing its own tail (p. 16).
199 Ibid., p. 17
200 Ibid., p. 17
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The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is one notorious reminder of the fact that
observation is physically impossible without some degree of participation, and that
901 ....
that participation is not always negligible. As a result of this limitation in our
ability to reduce the affects of our observation, it is necessary for us to take extreme
care that our language accommodates these difficulties to the extent that such
difficulties arise. In the case ofHeisenberg-uncertain events, the very low threshold
of negligible participation has made the complementarity language ofNils Bohr and
his followers unavoidable.
But quantum physics is not the only field in which this normally negligible degree of
unavoidable participation demands abnormal linguistic rigor. Because every
conscious human being who participates in critical thought 'amplifies the effects of
observations',202 we must also be very careful to take the effects of our observations
into account when we study human beings. Thus, philosophical anthropology needs
a correlate to Bohr's complementarity. Before we begin jumping to conclusions,
however, we should take care to acknowledge the differences between the effects of
observation in quantum physics and the effects of observation in philosophical
anthropology. MacKay introduces his section titled 'The Scientific Study ofMan'
with the following observation:
In the case of the atom, you remember, the trouble was that the system
was so small that the least disturbance we could give to it in observing
it knocked it appreciably out of course. Now man of course is a large
animal, a good deal larger than a billiard ball, and certainly we do not
expect the same kind of unpredictability to apply in the case ofman as
applies in the case of the atom. In fact, I would like to say in passing
that I think we ought to beware of stressing the implications of
201 For those of us not formally trained in theoretical physics, MacKay offers the following non-
mathematical explanation of how this works:
Ifwe are observing a billiard ball, then you might think that in a sense we do not disturb it at
all, unless you remember that in order to see it we have to bounce light off it; and bouncing
light off something gives it a tiny but definite impact, knocking it in a direction in which it
would not have moved if we had not shone light on it. So although a billiard ball, being large
enough, takes the impact of the light pretty well in its stride, when we try to observe an atom
by shining light or X-rays on it, we may in fact disturb it to an enormous extent, and this
results in the famous 'Uncertainty Principle' of Heisenberg (Ibid., p. 18).
Though this explanation would be a gross oversimplification ifwe were wanting to study quantum
physics (it seems, for example, that it is really the observation of the particle, rather than the mere
bouncing of light off it, that results in the collapse of the wave function), it is sufficient to make the
epistemological point that his paper highlights.
202 Ibid., p. 20
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Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in the case of human beings; above
all I do not think it provides the true answer to the old problem of free
will and determinism.203
Lest one think that the dissimilarities between the events described by quantum
physics and the events described in the scientific study of humanity make analogies
of the sort we made above invalid, however, we should remember that there are
important similarities as well. We simply need to be very cautious to remember that
our analogy holds only so long as the similarity holds—and the similarity between
quantum physics and philosophical anthropology resides precisely in the fact that in
both situations the effects of observation cannot always be reduced to a negligible
level. MacKay makes this point in his own words as we continue reading from the
passage quoted immediately above:
But the trouble with man as a scientific subject is that he is himself, of
course, an observer: that the system being observed is itself an
observer. The scientist studying man, then, is dealing with a sensitive
system, in the sense of a system which amplifies the effects of his
observations. However little you disturb a man by observing him, if
the man knows that he is being observed this may have a large-scale
effect, so that the man magnifies the effect of your disturbance on
him. In engineering jargon, there is 'feedback' in the situation.204
The effects of our observation of human beings may manifest itself in any number of
ways, but the most important for our purpose (and the most closely analogous to the
situation in quantum physics) is that a difference in approach to the subject matter
90S
directly leads to a difference in the kinds of valid observations that can be made.
203 Ibid., p. 20
204 Ibid., p. 20 (italics his)
205 This point was made by MacKay much earlier (though its tangential relation to his thesis did not
allow a full treatment) in one of his first philosophical papers ((MacKay 195 Id)). In this paper, he
said:
The situation is not a symmetrical one, but the concept of complementarity whose value we
have been led to recognise in physics appears to have an analogue here that would repay
development. The dualism of wave and particle in physics is resolved neither by arbitrary
denials of 'reality' nor by 'explanations' of one as 'nothing but' an aspect of the other. The
process of description is seen as a selective or projective operation; and it is not so much the
validity but the appropriateness of a description which requires to be discussed in any given
situation. Paradoxes arise when concepts defined for one logical background are mixed
carelessly with those defined for another. Descriptions in terms only of one group or the
other may both be valid. It is not the descriptions which are exclusive, but the logical
backgrounds in terms ofwhich they have meaning. The moral is obvious, and seems to
admit of large-scale transfer to other fields of thought (p.l 18).
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In particular, there are some types of anthropological observation that necessitate the
role of observer-predictor and others that expressly preclude it.206
With regard to the problem of appropriate language, we said earlier that
philosophical anthropology needs a correlate to Bohr's complementarity. Now we
must acknowledge that to some extent, such a correlate already exists. Instead of the
physical duality between particle and wave, however, the study of humanity has
required us to acknowledge a duality between people-as-objects and people-as-
subjects. This distinction has traditionally been made in the language of physical
properties versus mental properties. Just as utter confusion results from failing to
acknowledge the fact that 'situations in which light behaves like waves are different
from those in which light behaves like particles' in quantum physics,207 the hapless
blurring of mental and physical categories in philosophical anthropology results in
utter meaninglessness.208
While we will discuss the relationship between mental properties and physical
properties in much more detail when we discuss MacKay's views on the mind/body
problem, for now it should suffice to say that according to MacKay, the source of the
mind/body problem is essentially grammatical. After all, the admission of a need for
both mental and physical language to adequately describe human beings is not
enough. We also need to know when one language as opposed to the other is
justified. This, according to MacKay, is the source of the problem. Traditionally,
mental language was thought to be justified only when it was needed to fill 'holes' or
'gaps' in physical explanations. MacKay believes this to be a fallacy—a fallacy that
'arises from a mistaken view of the relationship between the two languages'.209 The
206 The point for philosophical anthropology is importantly different from its quantum physical
analogue in that the quantum physical events observed are actually different depending on how you
observe them. While this is also true to some extent for philosophical anthropology (here MacKay
reminds us that studies on worker productivity have actually altered worker productivity and Gallop
Polls have seemed to change the outcome of Presidential elections) the most important aspect of
complementarity for philosophical anthropology is logical rather than physical, resulting not in a
difference in the events observed, but what valid descriptions of those events can be formed from
different observer approaches. This distinction should become clearer as our discussion continues.
The analogy with quantum physics is simply that in both cases the approach of the observer
determines what modes of description are valid (i.e. the explanans must be suited to the mode of
observation as well as the explanandum).
207 Ibid., p. 19




Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology of Donald M. MacKay
essence ofMacKay's logical complementarity is that the validity of one type of
210
description does not imply that no equally valid description exists of another type.
To illustrate this kind of complementary relationship, MacKay asks us to think of a
marquis sign on which a scrolling message is displayed by means of the ordered
flashing ofmany individual lights. He explains this illustration in the following way:
Roughly, the point I want to stress is that the terms in which a
question is posed determine the language in which an answer can be
sought. If we want to know why lamp number 57 is out, then by
asking the question in those terms we invite an answer in electrical
language. Conversely, if somebody is ill-advised enough to put up an
erroneous statement in electric lamps, it is no good accusing the
electrician of incompetence. It is not an electrical defect. The
question—what is wrong with this advertisement?—is not answered in
electrical terms.211
Though he leaves many of the implications of this analogy unsaid, the moral should
be plain. Ifwe approach the sign as a thing displaying language-like-ours, that is
what we find, and we participate with it in a linguistic event. If, on the other hand,
we approach it as nothing but a mechanically related system of glass and wires, all
we observe is a complex of randomly flashing lights. Clearly, these differences in
approach lead to vastly different understandings of the event that takes place as the
marquis sign carries out its normal function.
Furthermore, when moving from the electrical to the linguistic descriptions of the
event, what is needed is not more data from the event being described (as if there
were some 'gap' in the electrical description into which the linguistic description
fits) but a new approach to the data already available. The fact that we as human
beings can play a variety of roles in our approach to any given situation (dialogue,
observer-participant, and observer-predictor, for example) requires us to develop a
language that is sufficient to keep information gained from these various approaches
appropriately indexed. As we have already pointed out, without such indexes even
common-sense observations are muddled into meaninglessness.
We should also note here that this discussion of complementarity within
philosophical anthropology shows promise not only for the mind/body problem, but
210
MacKay believes that the interactionist on the one hand and the eliminativist on the other are both
guilty of'confusing exclusiveness with exhaustiveness' (p.27).
211 Ibid. p. 24
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also for the age-old problem of free will versus determinism. MacKay foreshadows
the work we will discuss later (in chapter 3) with the following comment:
There is not space here to discuss the bearing of this on the ancient
problem of free will and determinism, beyond suggesting that if we
take the typical questions which have been posed in relation to free
will and physical determinism and sift them for language systems,
asking to what language system each term belongs, I think we shall
find a good many instances of mixing of terms from different
language systems in the posing of these traditional questions.212
With regard to MacKay's statement of his understanding of complementary
descriptions, however, we will conclude our discussion of this paper by quoting
MacKay's own conclusion, in which he says that:
... in any one scientific description of man, as of other systems, we
commit ourselves to a choice of standpoint and of abstractive level
which is only one among many, and that the validity of descriptions in
different language systems must be judged within each language
system itself and cannot safely be judged by reference to any
description in another language system. This does not mean that the
two are totally independent (something must be true in the one
language in order that something may be true in the other, and we
have come across relationships of necessity between statements in the
one language and statements in the other); but the proper criteria of
their truth and falsehood are expressed, and can only be applied, in
terms of their own language systems. In particular, the validity of any
questions of decision, choice and responsibility can be judged, and
these questions can be properly answered, only in the language
systems of decision, choice and responsibility.213
B. 'What Makes a Contradiction?'214
Thirteen years after the publication of'Man As Observer-Predictor', MacKay
published another important explanation of his understanding of complementary
descriptions. In 1968 the now somewhat difficult to obtain journal Faith and
Thought215 published MacKay's short but important paper 'What Makes a
9 1 ft






215 This journal, run by the Victoria Institute, joined with the RSCF (Research Scientists Christian
Fellowship) journal in 1989 to form Science and Christian Belief.
216 This paper was re-published posthumously in (MacKay 1988c).
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years, however. After all, ifwe failed to mention the fact that MacKay published at
least seventy-five works (including the 21st Eddington Memorial Lecture) during the
interval between 'Man As Observer-Predictor and 'What Makes a Contradiction?', it
might appear that we merely skipped over a period of relative inactivity. On the
contrary, it is only with the fact in mind that considerable debate and helpful
application ofMacKay's complementarity has been skipped over that we pass to the
next major milestone of our discussion. Once again, we must labour the point that
this paper was chosen not because it is one ofMacKay's most widely published, but
because it is one of the few papers in which his theory of logical complementarity is
discussed without reference to any specific misunderstanding.
As the title suggests, the main purpose of this essay is to explore what we mean when
we say that two statements are contradictory. In particular, it offers an explanation
of how we are to know the difference between a set of contradictory statements and a
set of complementary statements. While we have seen that 'Man As Observer-
Predictor' focuses primarily on the relationship between descriptive statements and
the perspective from which they are valid, 'What Makes a Contradiction?' focuses on
the relationship between the logical status of various descriptions and the ontological
status of the subject of those descriptions. More specifically, MacKay's thesis in
'What Makes a Contradiction?' is that the distinction between complementarity and
contradiction depends primarily on the truth value of additional premises (often
implicit) concerning the dimensionality of the thing described. He argues that to
properly understand this distinction we must attend to the nature of the thing
described as well as the nature of the descriptions.
He begins his analysis with the following analogy from mathematics:
Suppose that in coordinate geometry we define two points P and Q,
and give both of them the same coordinates (x,y). . . Does this
definition of P and Q contradict (i.e. rule out, as impossible) the
statement 'P and Q are not at the same place'? The answer is of
course Yes, if P and Q are defined as points in the same plane; but
otherwise, No. Once we admit the possibility of a third dimension, the
contradiction vanishes. 217 (p.7-8)
We see in this example that if the two statements in question were not properly
indexed for dimension, we would have an apparent contradiction. On the other hand,
217 'What Makes a Contradiction?', pp.7-8
Complementary Descriptions 84
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
when the two statements are properly indexed for dimension, the complementary
nature of the relationship is unproblematic. This point may be further clarified by
thinking about the following two sets of statements—both ofwhich describe
MacKay's example, though one neglects the dimensional index while the other
makes it explicit:
1. P and Q share spatial coordinates.
2. P and Q are not in the same place.
1*. P and Q have the same coordinates in plane X.
2*. P and Q have different coordinates in plane Y.
It is obvious that statements 1* and 2* are complementary, while 1 and 2 may give
the impression of contradiction. But could the careful reader of 1 and 2 not also
avoid the temptation to allege contradiction by recognizing the implicit premise that
more coordinates than are mentioned in 1 are available, and that it is in fact these
extra coordinates that are being considered in 2?
MacKay thinks that this kind of careful reading is not only possible, but also what it
means to treat the statements judiciously. He says, 'Readiness to expand our
descriptive frame in obedience to fresh data is in fact what is meant by the essential
humility of science'.218 Once this point is accepted, we are in a better position to
understand the difference between contradiction and complement. MacKay states
this difference in the following words:
An apparent contradiction, both of whose terms are supported by
experience, is the logical indicator of an unsuspected dimension.
Conversely, it is impossible conclusively to settle the question
whether two statements about the real world are contradictory by
appeal to logic alone. Proofs of contradiction are always relative to
some assumption about the 'dimensionality' of the descriptive
framework, in a generalized sense.219
While this idea may sound radical in the face of traditional logocentrism with its
wide claims as to the univocality of statements about the 'same things',
multidimensionality is a fact that we reckon with non-linguistically in literally every
normal perceptual event. After all, when slightly different information is gathered by
each of our ears, we do not say that we have a contradiction to deal with, but that we
218 Ibid., p. 11
219 Ibid., pp. 8-9. Italics his.
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are hearing in stereo. Likewise, when one eye senses the finger held out in front the
nose as being 'to the right of some object in the distance while the other eye senses
the same finger as being 'to the left of the distant object, we do not ask ourselves
which eye is trustworthy and which is mistaken. We simply recognize that we are
seeing 'in depth'.220
When it comes to the project of summarising data in linguistic descriptions, we can
eliminate much potential confusion by explicitly indexing each statement, wherever
possible, for the dimension or perspective from which the data was derived. This
brings us, once again, to the special use of complementarity in quantum physics.
While quantum physics may give the impression of being radically unlike any body
of data we have had to deal with before, upon closer observation we find that it is not
the fact ofcomplementarity that causes us problems, but the extent to which
complementarity in quantum physics resists our attempts to provide simple indexes
for the dimensionality of data collected in that field. MacKay reminds us that while
we must be careful not to over-generalise the discoveries made in quantum physics,
we would also do well to heed the lessons learned in that field with regard to how we
can most constructively deal with complementary sets of data. In particular, physics
has taught us that 'hard evidence' comes to us in the form of events rather than
221 222
entities. , In contexts where we suspect that confusion between complementarity
and contradiction may be difficult to avoid, we may find it helpful to record our data
in event language (using names like 'electron-impact', 'photon-impact', 'obeying-
God', 'being-forgiven-by-God', 'being-guided-by-God', and 'being-rebuked-by-
220 This illustration from visual perception is repeated many times in MacKay's works from this early
work all the way up to his Gifford Lectures, delivered just a few short months before his death, (for
this example in MacKay's Giffords, see p. 251 of (MacKay 1991b))
221
MacKay words this point in the following way:
'It is in fact by tracing our data back to events, and patterns and probabilities of events, that we have
discovered how to express the facts of atomic physics without any trace of self-contradiction. This is
not, (as some positivists would have it) a matter of denying the reality of the entities confronting us,
but only a principle of 'conceptual hygiene' to allow our limited experimental knowledge enough
room to grow without breeding spurious contradictions' (Ibid., pp. 11-12)
222 H. H. Oliver ((Oliver 1978)) offers an extension of this idea into a full-blown metaphysic that some
readers may find interesting, though he candidly admits that his own project is much more ambitious
than MacKay's logic requires.
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God') rather than entity language (using names like 'particle' 'God', 'obedience',
'forgiveness', 'guidance', and 'rebuke').223
Though this bit of advice may seem somewhat obscure at first, it is important to
realise that it is neither new nor intended to solve all our difficulties. That this idea
did not originate with MacKay is simple to demonstrate. In fact, before MacKay was
even born, Ludwig Wittgenstein proclaimed that 'The world is the totality of facts,
not things.'224 That this bit of advice was not intended to solve all our difficulties is
less explicit, though it is suggested by the fact that his appeal to event language is
relatively general. He does not, for example, declare all object language pernicious,
or argue for the metaphysical position that relationships are ontologically prior to
entities. Just as a picture is worth a thousand words, however, MacKay saw value in
the fact that an event is typically understood to be more complex than any given set
of entities—and in contexts where oversimplification leads quickly to assumptions of
contradiction, it is often less misleading to use words that remind us of the
complexities involved.
Thus, MacKay sums up the moral of this paper with the following four suggestions:
(i) In any field of discourse, logic can be used to detect contradiction
only when the dimensionality of the descriptive frame has been fixed.
Otherwise, every apparent contradiction must be qualified as
'conditional on the non-existence of yet another (logical) dimension in
addition to those which we have assumed'.
(ii) In discourse that purports to describe reality, the number of
dimensions necessary to do justice to the data of experience must be
absolutely open to revision by those data. No event can be held a
priori to be logically impossible, 'contradictory to fact' or the like.
Such claims are strictly nonsensical.
(iii) Where complementary descriptions turn out to be required by the
data of experience, it is essential to identify the logical standpoint
from which each is defined, as careless mixing of elements valid for
different standpoints can lead to confusion.
(iv) It is easiest to see the logical relationship between different data
and to avoid spurious conflict if they are expressed in terms of
experienced events rather than abstract entities.22
223 These event-language and entity-language names are MacKay's, taken from pages 11 and 13.
224See section 1.1 of (Wittgenstein 1922).
225 Ibid., p. 12
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C. A Few Remaining Questions
After MacKay published 'What Makes a Contradiction?', his work in publishing the
226
content of his understanding of logical complementarity was essentially complete.
Most of his writing on this subject from that point on focused mainly on the defence
and application of those views. In the next section of this chapter, we will look at
various papers MacKay wrote in response to specific criticisms of his
complementarity. In chapters 4 and 5 we will look at the specific applications of this
idea to the mind/body and free will/determinism problems. Before we move into our
discussion of these broader issues, however, it may be wise to look at a few of the
more immediate implications of his view. The goal of evaluating these 'immediate
implications' will be to answer the question, 'How does a proper understanding of
logical complementarity affect the way we approach the world?'. We will seek to
narrow our discussion by focusing exclusively on the way in which logical
complementarity informs our response to the following three questions, all of which
figure very heavily in current debates surrounding the issues of religious
epistemology: 1) Is the 'methodological naturalism' of natural science a legitimate
perspective for a believer to take up? 2) Is it possible to 'translate' information
gained from one perspective into the language of another? And 3) Is objectivity a
legitimate goal?
The first of these questions goes to the heart of the relationship between science and
theology. On the one hand, most would agree that methodological naturalism is a
defining feature of natural science. On the other hand, there are many well
997
intentioned Christian philosophers of science who argue that to assume
226
Though, as we shall see shortly, there was one very important aspect of complementary
descriptions that he allowed to remain rather implicit until his final paper wholly devoted to the
subject, which he published in 1974 ((MacKay 1974c)) as a response to the objections ofHugo Bedau
((Bedau 1974)). It should be noted, however, that this paper (originally presented at a conference on
"Science and religion: The complementarity hypothesis," Birmingham, England, 1969; originally the
proceedings were to have been published with J. Hick as editor) was probably written at about the
same time 'What Makes a Contradiction?' was published.
227 The following quotation from J. P. Moreland's (Moreland 1993) gives a concise introduction to
what these thinkers have in mind, as well a clear example of their good intentions and characteristic
Aristotelian presuppositions:
Theistic science is rooted in the idea that Christians ought to consult all they know—
including theological beliefs—in forming and testing hypotheses, in explaining things in
science, and in evaluating the plausibility of scientific theories.
More specifically, theistic science expresses a commitment to the belief that God, conceived
of as a personal agent with great power and intelligence, has through direct, primary
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methodological naturalism is nothing less than immoral—epistemologically
dishonest at best and at worst a public denial of the faith. While we will deal with
this objection in much more detail in chapter 6, for now we will stick to our purpose
of explaining the fundamentals of Comprehensive Realism, simply acknowledging
the fact that many of our brothers and sisters in Christ have already expressed great
interest in the validity ofmethodological naturalism, coming to a conclusion vastly
different from that of the Comprehensive Realist.
The first thing that must be said about the Comprehensive Realist position on this
question is that MacKay's doctrine of complementary descriptions at the very least
removes some of the steam pressure by admitting that even the most complete
description from any given perspective would not necessarily be exclusive. After all,
while it must be admitted that if it were impossible to maintain the truth ofmore than
one perspective at once, then to assume the perspective ofmethodological naturalism
would be to deny belief in any form of divine action; once we understand the basics
of logical complementarity, we can recognise that the perspective of natural science
does not have to be exclusive to be informative 22S Further, as a result of MacKay's
causation and indirect, secondary causation created and designed the world for a purpose. He
has directly intervened in the course of its development at various points (e.g., in directly
creating the universe, first life, the basic kinds of life, and humans). And these kinds of ideas
can enter into the very fabric of scientific practice.
To clarify this further, let me highlight three ways theological beliefs can enter into science.
First, theological propositions can provide background beliefs used to evaluate a scientific
hypothesis. The theological beliefs that the universe had a beginning and that adultery is
sinful and immature can be used to evaluate hypotheses that claim the universe has an
infinite past or adultery can be a sign of psychological maturity.
Second, theological beliefs can guide research and yield predictions that can be tested. For
example, theological assertions that the basic kinds of life were directly created, that humans
arose in the Mideast, and that Noah's flood had certain properties can yield testable
predictions: that is, gaps will exist in the fossil record; the earliest human remains will be
found in the Mideast; and there will be limits to breeding.
Furthermore, the idea of a direct, creative act ofGod can be used to explain things that are
scientifically discoverable. Science can discover information in DNA, that the universe had a
beginning, that human language is unique—and theology can provide explanations for these
discoveries.
228And the plan of action should always be suited to the task at hand, as MacKay so aptly argues in the
following selection:
... to integrate honestly our Christian and our scientific thinking does not mean that we
should adopt the same method in both. An atomic physicist isn't likely to solve his physical
problems by thinking theologically about them; and the method of natural science isn't
going to help me very much to understand the method of the New Testament. The man who
Complementary Descriptions 89
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
doctrine of complementary descriptions, the Comprehensive Realist recognises that
the theological perspective does not require that 'room' be made for it in the midst of
the reoccurring cycles upon which natural law is founded. This allows us to affirm a
dimensional 'depth' to our theological perspective that under girds without
99Q
necessarily conflicting with any given naturalistic explanation.
MacKay makes this point clearly in his 1977 Riddell Memorial Lectures delivered at
the University ofNewcastle upon Tyne.230 In these lectures, MacKay deals with
many provocative issues, including the misleading nature of the natural/supernatural
distinction, the absence of legitimate teleology in the world described by objective
science, and the role of prayer and miracle in the same world which is so profitably
described as a closed system. While his doctrine of complementary descriptions
plays heavily in all of these discussions, MacKay's most direct response to the
question of whether or not the 'methodological naturalism' of natural science is a
legitimate perspective for a believer to take up comes to us in the form of the
following comments:
If the biblical theistic picture is correct, the scientific game of linking
events into 'causal chains' can (and indeed should) proceed without
bringing in 'God' as one of the links in the chain. For the theist, God
comes in as the Giver of all events, not just as a special kind of link
between some of them. It is therefore technically possible to practise
science in complete forgetfulness of the One who, according to the
in the name of intellectual integrity tries to win a wife in the way in which he'd tackle a
problem in thermodynamics, has the wrong idea ofwhat intellectual integrity means, and is
very likely to remain a bachelor! (MacKay 1953e) (quoted from p. 34 of the re-print in
(MacKay 1988c).
229 Lest one should think that this language implies (as it often does with other writers) that MacKay
would be in favour of treating theology as a fully transcendent 'depth language' or something of the
sort, it may be wise to mention the following comments, which MacKay makes at the conclusion to
his (MacKay 1972c):
We must thus firmly reject (as both logically and linguistically mistaken) any suggestion that
what is meant by biblical doctrines is reducible to bare recommendations of policy or the
like; but it must still be emphasised that the way to make clear that they have meaning and
relevance may be to focus attention, more than is sometimes done, upon the jobs they are
designed to do in those who humbly receive them. If I may put it in personal terms, the aim
of those of us who claim to be Christians, in line with the Bible's own insistent emphasis,
must be to become much more operational in our thinking and talking about its central
doctrines: to see its every statement about God as a tool designed ultimately to make some
practical contribution to the shaping of our total state of conditional readiness for what
happens to be there to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. Thus seen, its
meaningfulness and relevance will be in no doubt, and the lines along which its truth is
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Bible, alone gives being to the data, and grounds for the expectations
based on them. There is a 'proper secularisation' of science, as R.
Hooykaas has put it,231 even from a biblical standpoint.232
So, the simple answer to this first question seems to be a resounding 'yes'. As long
as we remember that one valid perspective does not exclude the possibility of others,
we can wholeheartedly work towards the goal of completing a description of the
world from the perspective of scientific naturalism without fear that in doing so we
will 'explain away God'. MacKay reassures us of this point as we continue the
section quoted immediately above:
What is completely unjustified ... is the suggestion that successful
scientific explanation rationally warrants disbelief in the Creator . . .
Explanations in terms of links within a created world are logically not
in contradiction with, but complementary to, explanations in terms of
the power and purpose of the Creator of that world.233
But isn't there at least some evidence gained from the scientific perspective that
could count against the legitimacy of Christian theology? Well that depends on how
we answer our second question: 'Is it possible to "translate" information gained
from one perspective into the language of another?'
The answer to this question will have to be a little more complex than our answer to
the first. Rather than a simple 'yes' or 'no', it would seem wise to admit some level
of degrees. First of all, we must admit that there is a great deal of difference between
saying that something must be true from one perspective for something else to be
true from another and saying that descriptions formulated from one perspective can
be translated without loss ofcontent into the language of another perspective. While,
as we saw in MacKay's conclusion to 'Man As Observer-Predictor' (quoted above),
the latter statement is clearly incompatible with a proper understanding of logical
complementarity, the former statement cannot be dealt with so simply. There are
some aspects of events that necessarily imply the existence of another aspect and
others that do not.234 MacKay made this point implicitly as early as 1951, when he
231 Here MacKay refers to (Hooykaas 1960).
232
(MacKay 1978g), p. 15
233 Ibid., p. 15
234 We know, for example, that in the case of our marquis sign, for any linguistic story about the event
to be valid, there must be at least some valid electrical story. But, on the other hand, the mere
existence of some valid electrical story does not imply that there must be at least some valid linguistic
description.
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said that the relationship between the I-story and the O-story was not a 'symmetrical'
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one. This feature of complementary descriptions was not fully developed in
published form, however, until 1974,236 where, under the heading 'hierarchical
complementarity' he elaborates on this asymmetry with a discussion of several
examples.
As we shall see in Chapter 4, this hierarchical nature of complementary descriptions
is very important for the Comprehensive Realist understanding of the mind/body
problem. There we will argue that this feature of complementary descriptions
elegantly and efficiently serves the same function as the confusing and cumbersome
'supervenience' model that is discussed so frequently in modern philosophy of mind.
Our purpose here, however, is simply to investigate what it was that MacKay was
saying.
We have seen that while no description can be 'translated' from one complementary
perspective to another without any loss of meaning, there are at least some
descriptions that necessarily imply the truth of some rather specific complement. But
how are we to know when the kind of'rough translations' we seem to be suggesting
are valid—and what they might look like in the first place?
With regard to this first question, MacKay tells us that the question ofwhether or not
a descriptions from one perspective necessarily implies some other description from
another perspective is essentially an empirical one.237 Just as when we see a heavy
object suspended in the air, the regularity of our experience has led us to infer that
there must be some force holding it there (i.e. the law of gravity is empirically
justified), so, when we look at our digital watches and read the correct time, we
correctly infer that our watch batteries have not yet run down (i.e. the hierarchical
relationship such that if some linguistic story is true in this kind of event, some
electrical story must also be true is likewise empirically justified).
235
(MacKay 195Id) p. 118
236 See footnote 31 above.
237 On page 230 of (MacKay 1974c), we read:
. .. cumulative experience that it makes sense in practice may sometimes offer the best
evidence for the validity of a perceptual standpoint—as, for example, in our recognition of
other people's activity as personal and conscious.
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But, moving on to the second part of this question, we must also warn against
expecting too much out of these kinds of 'rough translation'. Rather than talking in
terms of translation, it would seem more appropriate to demand that all data be
perspectivally indexed with the general understanding that we can expect some
varying degree of reciprocity between perspectives. This seems to be the point
MacKay is getting at with the following helpful extension of his binocular vision
analogy presented in his Riddell Memorial Lectures:
The example of binocular vision suggests that our best hope of
achieving some integration will be to absorb what we can of each
projection when we ourselves are in the appropriate situation for that
projection, and to avoid the mistake of trying to absorb a projection
'from the wrong angle'—i.e. in a situation for which that projection
does not apply ... If we want to see-in-depth, it is essential to ensure
that each eye sees only the view appropriate to its situation, and not
the other. To rig up a system of mirrors so that both left- and right-
eye views were projected into the same eye would be senseless. It
would simply generate a perceptual pseudo-conflict and frustrate the
integration we say we want to achieve. The basic point is that with a
multidimensional situation the projection from one standpoint is not
valid information from another (exclusive) standpoint.238
But then, some will ask, where does all this leave us with respect to our ancient
pursuit of 'the God's-eye view' of reality? Is it not our duty as intellectuals to seek
to 'think God's thoughts after him'? In light ofMacKay's understanding of logical
complementarity, is objectivity even a legitimate goal? The simple answer to this
last question is a resounding 'yes!' On this point, MacKay is very clear. Not only
does he devote an entire section of his 1977 Riddell Memorial lectures to




Perhaps the statements in this section that are most relevant to our question here are as follows:
Let it be admitted, at least for the sake of argument, that what I would be correct to believe
about the world must differ in some particulars from what you would be correct to believe.
Still if the flood of experienced events that you and I each encounter day by day owe their
being to one and the same Creator, he at least is in a position to know what each of us would
be correct to believe, and mistaken to disbelieve, about our world. This, for the Creator, is a
matter of objective fact. If he has placed you and me in different relationship to a particular
situation, the differences between what each of us would be correct to believe about it will be
equally for him a question of objective fact. True, our scientist in God's world may have no
access to the Creator's eye view of his situation; but because he knows that he is under
judgement by that criterion, he is saved from the trap of confusing relativity with a denial of
objectivity, (p. 19).
240
(MacKay 1987h; MacKay 1987i)
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year he died). In the conclusion to one of those 1987 essays, he makes his point
elegantly and precisely. He says:
Relativity theory may suggest that the aspects of this reality
encountered by different observers can differ in detail, but this in no
sense implies that 'there are as many realities as there are observers'.
It means only that there are as many aspects of objective reality as
there are different observer-standpoints from which to reckon with it .
. . the ultimate standard of objective reality, however inaccessible to
us, is the way its Author sees his creation. His view embraces all
dimensions of reality—more than any one observer can perceive. To
him, any differences in the aspects that face each observer are no
threat to objectivity, but merely part of what happens to be the case,
objectively, about the world he holds in being.241
By way of summary, it may be wise to try to generalise what we have learned. We
find MacKay's most general answer to the question 'How does a proper
understanding of logical complementarity affect the way we approach the world?' in
the conclusion to the first of his Riddell Memorial Lectures. Though he uses the
word 'scientist', his advice is helpful for anyone who desires to make sense of the
bustling booming web ofmultiple reciprocities we call life:
In summary, then, a scientist in God's world, who knows and loves
the Author of it, can rejoice equally in the growth of the explanatory
structure of science, and in any surprises that may shake it. For both
he returns thanks to the same Giver, recognising his obligation to do
justice both to the normal coherence of the flux of created events, and
to its moment-by-moment contingency on the divine fiat. His mind
will be open but critical, rational but not rationalistic, realising that the
God of truth is even more concerned than he is that he should not
swallow falsehood—but also that he should not disbelieve what is
true, however unexpected . . . His one desire must be to do the fullest
justice to all the data given him by God, to whom he will be
accountable for keeping the record straight.242
II. MacKay's Complementarity Debated
As we mentioned at the beginning of our discussion, the apparent simplicity of
MacKay's ideas can be deceiving. The temptation to jump to conclusions with
regard to these issues has caused even some of the finest thinkers to publish
criticisms before they fully understood what MacKay was suggesting. In the
discussion that follows, we will discuss the two most instructive of these
241 'Objectivity in Science', p. 56
242 Ibid., p.20
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misinterpretations, in the hopes that in getting clear about what MacKay did not
mean, we will better understand what he did mean.
A. Alexander Exchange (1956-1957)
The earliest and perhaps most important critical misunderstanding of MacKay's
logical complementarity was written by Peter Alexander in 195 6.243 This very
sophisticated misunderstanding of MacKay's philosophy was published in the
journal Mind, edited by Prof. Gilbert Ryle with the help of Sir F. C. Bartlett and Prof.
C. D. Broad (all early heroes in mental philosophy). MacKay helpfully but briefly
responded with his 'Complementary Descriptions (reply to Alexander)'.244
1. Alexander's Criticism
At the heart of Alexander's critique is his distinction between alternative and
complementary descriptions. As we shall see, Alexander uses the narrowly defined
terms 'feature' and 'situation' (among others) to get himself and probably most of
his readers in a very sophisticated confusion from which MacKay appears guilty of
equivocation.245 But perhaps we would do better to treat Alexander's case one step





245 To Alexander's credit, it seems that his misunderstanding is largely the result of his attempting the
very difficult task of developing a complete theory from but a few ofMacKay's briefest suggestions.
Alexander's paper was published in April of 1956, which means that there was probably no way for
him to have seen any of the papers we have just discussed (remember that the earliest, 'Man As
Observer-Predictor' was only published in 1955—when Alexander had probably already finished
writing his critique). Alexander explains that his interest in this matter was sparked by 'some almost
incidental remarks made by Dr. D. M. MacKay at the end of his contribution to a symposium,
'Mentality in Machines', at a Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society' (p.
146). The comments that he seems to be referring to can be found in the final three paragraphs of that
paper:
'Let us equally explicitly recognize, however, that this kind of demonstration cannot prove
such an artifact to possess mentality in the full human sense. It shows only that asfar as we
can find wordsfor tests we can expect these to be met. It would show more appropriate
humility to leave open the question whether now or at any time, or even in principle, we shall
be able to exhaust or even to become aware of all features of our experience from which we
abstract the concept ofmind.
The situation has a parallel in theological history, where those who saw God only through
what loop-holes were left by our ignorance of physics (a "God of the gaps") were I think
equally at fault in their underlying assumptions with those who smothered the gaps with faith
in Science (with a capital S) and declared God non-existent. We shall not "save" the concept
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Alexander summarises the view that he wishes to investigate with the following
statement:
Stated briefly the theory is that it is sometimes necessary to give two
apparently inconsistent descriptions of a thing or situation, but that the
appearance of inconsistency is removed when we see that the two
descriptions are complementary and both needed for a full
understanding of the thing or situation, and that it is a logical mistake
either to mix the language of the two descriptions or to suppose that
either will refute the other.246
Alexander proceeds to spell out the only two kinds of circumstance in which he
thinks different descriptions can refer to the same 'thing or situation'. In the first
kind of circumstance, the descriptions are said to be alternatives, and only in the
second can they be called 'complementary'. This distinction is important to
Alexander's criticism because the force of his argument is derived from it. His main
complaint is that for MacKay's doctrine of complementarity to do all that he says it
does, MacKay's 'complementary descriptions' must at some times act like
alternatives while at other times acting like complements (i.e. the doctrine of
complementary descriptions only achieves its desired ends by disguising
equivocation).247 For this reason, we will first explore the way in which Alexander
differentiates between 'complementary' and 'alternative' descriptions, then we will
seek to understand why he thinks MacKay must vacillate between the two, and
finally discuss Alexander's proposed remedy to the situation.
of Mind by hunting restlessly for "something you won't be able to explain in terms of
mechanism"—for a false assumption is implicit in the use of the word "explain."
As in the parallel case of 'science and religion', the activity is not one of exhaustive
explanation, but of complementary description. Each description one should expect to be
exhaustive in terms of its own categories; but to apprehend the whole requires a discipline in
the perception of complementarity which we have scarcely begun to acquire (MacKay
1952a) p.86
The only other work Alexander refers to in his discussion ofMacKay is a popular talk
produced by the BBC (Alexander refers us to The Listener, 11th September, 1952).
246 Ibid., p. 145.
247 This complaint is expressed by Alexander in the following paragraph:
Now the words 'alternative' and 'complementary', as I am using them, are mutually
exclusive, since two descriptions either are or are not transferable. For a given pair of
descriptions we must decide between the two words. MacKay and Coulson do not appear to
have done this and oscillate between the two conceptions. Their use of the word
'complementary' seems confused. It may turn out that the reconciliation of religion and
science along these lines, to obtain the advantages sought requires both conceptions so that
one inconsistency would be removed only at the cost of introducing another (p. 150-151).
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a) Alexander's 'complementary'/'alternative' distinction
With regard to alternative descriptions, Alexander says:
. . . one description can, in principle, deal with all the features of the
thing or situation with which another description can deal, but one is
more appropriate or more useful or less misleading in certain contexts.
Both descriptions deal with the same features. In this case, one
description is, or should be, an exact translation of the other and only
one of them is theoretically necessary.
Complementary descriptions, on the other hand, require a different kind of
circumstance. The type of circumstance to which complementary descriptions might
apply Alexander describes in the following way:
The thing or situation is complex in such a way that certain of its
features cannot, in principle, be dealt with by one sort of description,
while certain other features cannot be dealt with by another sort of
description, so that both descriptions are needed to deal with all its
features and no single description can be found to replace them. Here
one description can truly be said to complement the other to give the
full description and they can properly be called 'complementary'.
From these definitions, it would seem that the clearest way to differentiate between
complementary and alternative descriptions of any given situation is that
complementary descriptions must (and alternative descriptions must not) introduce at
least one novel feature. With regard to our interest in MacKay's thinking,
Alexander's distinction would not initially seem overly problematic. At least, for our
present purposes, it would seem wise to bracket any initial worries we may have
regarding the wording of Alexander's definitions. After all, the part of Alexander's
argument that requires the strongest proof is his claim that MacKay must
illegitimately vacillate between calling the same set of descriptions 'complements'
and 'alternatives'.
b) That MacKay's 'complements' must also be 'alternatives'
The source ofAlexander's belief that MacKay's complementary descriptions must
also be treated as alternative descriptions seems to be MacKay's insistence that
scientific and religious descriptions refer 'to the very same data'. The only way
different observers can refer to 'the very same data', as Alexander understands it, is
248 Alexander quotes these words from MacKay's appearance in the broadcast series Science and
Faith, The Listener, 11 September, 1952 on Alexander's p. 147 and again on p. 151. The italics are
added by Alexander.
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for them to refer to all and only the same features—i.e. for them to provide
alternative rather than complementary descriptions.249
Without treating 'complementary' statements as alternatives in this respect,
Alexander argues that MacKay cannot say all he wants to say about the relationship
between science and religion. Specifically, without treating scientific and religious
statements as alternatives, Alexander argues that MacKay cannot say that science
and theology describe the same things. While questioning the need for science and
theology to share a common referent in this sense, Alexander presents what he
understands to be MacKay's motivation with the following statements:
If we held that the two descriptions were about different situations,
this would involve holding that there were some situations with which
science cannot deal and that the religious description deals with these.
This is regarded as dangerous because the history of science shows the
progressive extension of its boundaries, one generation thinking that
science cannot deal with x and the next generation showing how it
can. Thus there is a danger that science will squeeze religion out by
leaving nothing for it to describe. So it is tempting to say that science
and religion deal with the same things but use different concepts or
different languages, that is give alternative descriptions. This also has
the advantage of suggesting that we all start from agreement upon 'the
facts'.
The ambiguity introduced by using 'x' and 'things' here instead of either 'situation'
or 'feature' is perhaps misleading. It would almost certainly be MacKay's claim (at
least to the extent that he accepted Alexander's distinction) that 'x' would mean
'situation' rather than 'feature'—thus maintaining the language used in the first half
of the paragraph, and avoiding the slip Alexander fears into alternative descriptions.
Alexander, however, appears to have neglected his own distinction—beginning this
paragraph in 'situation' language, then proceeding to the ambiguity of 'x' and
onward in his use of the word 'things' in a way which requires us to infer that
'feature' is intended. After all, if Alexander had remained consistent in his
'situation' language, instead of concluding 'it is tempting to say that science and
religion deal with the same things but use different concepts or different languages,
that is give alternative descriptions', he would have had to conclude 'science and
249
Obviously, this assumption may prove to be debatable, though we must suspend judgement just a
little longer. It is worth noting at this point, however, the importance of keeping our terminology
(especially 'feature' and 'situation') in very rigorous order. We will soon see the confusion that can
result from failing in this endeavour.
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religion deal with the same situations but are concerned with different features, that
is give consistently complementary descriptions.'
Oddly enough, Alexander does not even seem to admit this seemingly more
consistent understanding as an interesting option. Later in the paper he stumbles
upon what seems to be almost exactly what MacKay would want to say here and
promptly dismisses it without analysis. On p. 155 we read:
If to say that that scientific and religious descriptions are of the same
situation is to say that the first is of the physical features and the
second is of the occult features, or the physical plus the occult
features, of a situation physically defined, then the original difficulty
appears in another place. We avoid saying that there are situations
with which science cannot deal only at the expense of saying that
there are features of certain, or all, situations with which science
cannot deal. We can now correctly say that science can deal with
every situation and that the two descriptions deal with the very same
situation, but we have to add that they deal with different features of
these situations and that some of these features are of a kind upon
which we cannot get agreement. It is obvious that we lose more than
we gain by this procedure.250
But is it 'obvious that we lose more than we gain'? We have gained much in staying
consistently with the language of complementarity (as MacKay, in fact, does) rather
than slipping into alternative descriptions (which seems to be Alexander's chief
objection to MacKay's view). As to what there is to lose, that is not nearly as clear.
Perhaps we should seek the answer to this question by comparing MacKay's view
with the complement251 proposed by Alexander.
c) Alexander's Complement to MacKay
A brief discussion of the view that Alexander proposes as a replacement for
MacKay's complementarity will help us to see the source of Alexander's confusion
more clearly. He says on p. 160,
... the shorter and less misleading and obviously correct answer is
that science cannot deal with everything. If the religious description is
250 Italics his
251 Convention might have had me use the word 'alternative' here, but we must be ever vigilant to
preserve what Alexander calls the 'natural' use of these words. After all, if Alexander presented us
with an alternative rather than a complement, we could not hope to leave behind the less desirable
features ofMacKay's understanding of the logical situation. Ifwe are to resist the urge to beg the
question ofwhether or not Alexander's version is importantly different, therefore, we must refer to
Alexander's complement to MacKay's understanding—not his alternative.
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correct, it is surely by definition about what science cannot deal with,
for it deals in part at least, with what is by definition non-physical
while science, by definition, deals with what is physical in the wide
sense of being directly or indirectly verifiable in sense experience.
The two descriptions are, as MacKay seems to have seen, about things
in different logical categories, there cannot be, and never could be, a
conflict, and so no purpose in introducing the idea of complementarity
[sic]. More than this, they could not sensibly be called
'complementary' if this is admitted since this is to admit that they are
about different situations.
The source ofAlexander's misunderstanding should become clear as we look closely
at this paragraph. He obviously wants to say 'that science cannot deal with
everything.' So far, so good. Clearly, MacKay would agree with that much—at
least as long as by 'everything' he means 'feature'. But the last sentence indicates
that Alexander doesn't mean 'feature' by 'everything'—he means 'situation'. Is it
'obviously correct' to say that science cannot deal with every situation? At the very
least, it must be admitted that this is a much stronger claim; but it is also not a claim
that goes without precedent. In fact, it should be recognised that what we are calling
'Alexander's complement' is not a new idea at all, however well it may be disguised
in ambiguous terminology. Alexander is merely suggesting that we return to the
horribly problematic system in which we look for God only in 'the gaps', defined as
those mythological events (i.e. situations) about which we have absolutely no
physical story to tell.
2. MacKay's Response252
Though there are several very important aspects ofAlexander's paper that MacKay
finds very troubling, he is also quick to point out that their conclusions are not nearly
as far apart as Alexander seems to think. To demonstrate this similarity, MacKay
begins his response by citing the following statement from Alexander's paper:
The way out of the alleged conflict seems to be through the
recognition that scientific and religious statements are in different
logical categories and so could not possibly conflict.
MacKay then quotes one of his own papers, published some six years prior to
Alexander's:
Are these rival accounts or are they complementary? My own view is
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belong, I think, to two quite separate logical groups. . . (so that) to
represent the two accounts as antithetical is fallacious.253
In his conclusion we find MacKay reiterating the fact that 'there is much in what
Alexander has said with which I agree', but in the intervening pages several points of
disagreement are highlighted.
The first of these disagreements concerns Alexander's analysis ofMacKay's use of
the concept of complementarity. Briefly acknowledging the same sort of trouble we
detailed in our analysis of Alexander's paper, MacKay says 'I think the key [to
Alexander's misunderstanding] lies in his notion of a "situation" as uniquely
decomposable into, and defined by, a number of "features".'
Rather than detail the confusion Alexander gets himself into by the use of these
terms, MacKay defends his own view by simply claiming that Alexander's criticisms
do not apply.254 Alexander's misunderstanding, argues MacKay, can be cleared up
by 'a more realistic explication of the "common reference'".255
The 'more realistic' explication MacKay suggests would not involve 'situations'
composed of and defined by 'features', but a 'dynamic spatio-temporal distribution
of events' ofwhich complementary descriptions describe aspects 'which may find
themselves mentioned in one statement, and omitted in a complementary statement,
even though both statements might validly claim to comprehend the whole situation.'
MacKay then goes into a short discussion of when complementary descriptions are
necessary. In this discussion, we are, of course, reminded of the fuller treatment he
gave these matters in the papers discussed above. In his response to Alexander he
says with terse precision, 'Whenever the concepts available have a logical
dimensionality lower than that of the subject, complementary statements are in
principle required to do it justice.' Graciously, he also provides us with an example:
253
(MacKay 1950c)
254 On p. 393 we read: 'Alexander's analysis shows usefully how inconsistency could arise if different
definitions of terms were given. But these definitions are not mine, and those which I use do not I
think "do violence to language" in any of the respects he mentions.'
255
Though MacKay does not mention it, Alexander himself half-way acknowledged that his view of
the 'situation' was too narrow to be useful when, in his discussion of Bohr's complementarity,
Alexander concluded, 'Thus, if it does not stretch language too much to call the total behaviour of P-
particles "the situation", this use fits my definition of "complementary descriptions'"(Alexander's p.
158).
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The projection of a three-dimensional geometrical figure on a
horizontal plane (point by point) leaves out none of the component
points; yet it omits all mention of the vertical aspect which could be
revealed in an (equally exhaustive) projection of the same points on a
vertical plane.
In an attempt to head offmany possible misuses of this concept, MacKay quickly
reminds us of two further points: first, that descriptions must share a common
referent to properly be classified 'complementary'; and second, that even the tightest
9
proof of complementarity does not guarantee a description's validity. He also
notes that complementary statements provide mutually exclusive logical standpoints
such that each description must include at least some information that cannot be
directly imported into the vocabulary of its complement without contradiction. Thus,
to modify an example MacKay gives elsewhere, the statements 'this envelope
contains only a piece of paper with some patches of black ink on it' and 'this
envelope contains the name of this year's winner' do not imply 'the name of this
year's winner is a piece of paper with some patches of black ink on it'.
While Alexander's lack of rigour caused him to revert back to an undesirable
substitute for MacKay's epistemology, a proper understanding of logically
complementary descriptions allows us to walk the straight and narrow path between
the confusion resulting from inappropriate mixing of religious and scientific
statements (scientism) on the one hand and the hopeless religious scepticism of
utterly transcendent mystic supernaturalism (the end result of god-of-the-gaps
theology) on the other.
3. Taking Stock of the Alexander Exchange
Perhaps it would be helpful by way of summary to apply what we learned from this
exchange to a specific example. We will attempt to rigorously maintain Alexander's
'feature' and 'situation' language throughout. Let us imagine that two young
brothers become interested in chemistry. They acquire a small lump of sodium metal
and experiment by dropping it into the toilet and closing the lid. The ensuing
explosion breaks the toilet to pieces, leaving the boys asking themselves several
questions concerning the situation.
256
Complementarity, being a purely logical concept, says nothing about the implications of other
forms of evidence.
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What is to be lost in this situation by saying that science can speak to some of its
features while leaving other features to be described by other disciplines? After all,
while science may be well equipped to answer questions like 'How many different
types of chemical reaction took place?', 'What reaction most immediately led up to
the explosion?' and possibly even more technological questions like 'How could we
make this explosion bigger?' and 'Would the explosion have happened ifwe had
dropped the metal into the bathtub instead?', there are other questions (e.g. 'What is
Dad going to say?' and 'Was that a sin?') to which science would seem all but
irrelevant.257
Furthermore, it would seem highly unrealistic to fear that science will continue its
progress in answering more and more questions once thought to be beyond its scope
to the point that there will be an ever decreasing number of these features beyond its
powers to describe. While it may be the case that science is learning to describe
more and more situations that were once sheer mystery (cf. above example), to
assume that the continuing development of scientific understanding could result in
the description of all possible kinds of feature would involve, among other problems,
a textbook example of the naturalistic fallacy. Even if the boys come to
understand every stage in the chemical and structural process of the exploding toilet
(a feat that would not have been possible in the not-so-distant past), they would have
gained no information concerning what Alexander would call the 'psychological' or
'occult' features of the situation. As Donald Davidson has said (describing the
relationship between science and psychology), 'Short of changing the subject, we
cannot escape this feature of the psychological; but this feature has no counterpart in
the world of physics'.259
B. The Bedau Exchange
The only other misunderstanding of MacKay's complementarity published by his
contemporaries that we will discuss involves the association ofMacKay's ideas and
257 To be fair to Alexander, we must note that Alexander would probably have wanted to say that the
psychological, moral, and spiritual implications of this event form a different situation from the
situation that the scientific statements described. The justification for calling different implications of
the very same event 'different situations', however, is not entirely clear.
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those ofNils Bohr. The careful reader will undoubtedly remember the warning
concerning Bohr's theory given in the introduction to this chapter. The most serious
criticism along these lines, however, involves not the simple forgetfulness of this
warning, but the fortified denial that such a warning is valid.
Perhaps the most important such denial was published by Zygon in 1974 as part of a
• ... 960
symposium on the proposed complementarity of science and religion. The
published version of this symposium consists of only two papers: The first by Hugo
A. Bedau261 and the second by Donald M. MacKay.262
1. Bedau's Objection
In his paper, 'Complementarity and the Relation Between Science and Religion',
Bedau attempts to explain what he thinks a complementary relationship between
science and theology would look like. Bedau starts this article by admitting that
Bohr intended his theory to have implications for a wide range of academic
disciplines, including the relationship between science and theology. He goes on to
claim, however, that Baillie, Coulson, Alexander, and MacKay, all of whom had
written fairly extensively on the complementarity of science and religion, were
somewhat less than clear on the issue.263 As we shall see, the essence of Bedau's
criticism ofMacKay's work is his assertion that MacKay is being less than judicious
in his use of the word 'complementarity'.
The part of his paper that most interests us here is his assertion that in order to say
that science and theology are complementary, we must be saying that they bear a
260 The conference at which early versions of the papers in this symposium were presented, "Science
and religion: The complementarity hypothesis," Birmingham, England, 1969, was organised by J.






Though this is not the place for a discussion ofBaillie's work (Bedau refers to (Baillie 1953)) the
other works Bedau refers us to here relate much more closely to our present topic. While we have
already discussed Alexander's work on this issue at some length, it should be noted that Coulson's
work was also criticised by Alexander in the article we discussed. Coulson, also a physicist and an
outspoken Christian, was MacKay's colleague at the University of London in the 1950's. While
Coulson (twelve years MacKay's senior) did rely fairly heavily on complementarity thinking in all
three of his best known attempts to explain the relationship between science and theology (Coulson
1960; Coulson 1953; Coulson 1955), it does not appear that Coulson developed the idea as extensively
as MacKay did. It should also be noted that all three of these lectures were presented and published
by Coulson before MacKay left London.
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very similar relationship to the relationship Bohr described. He begins this portion
of his argument with the assertion, clearly to be taken in the strongest possible sense,
that 'Bohr introduced the concept of complementarity as a new theoretical principle
... during the 1920's'.264 He then explains that while the concept of
complementarity in the meta-analysis of science and theology is not inextricably tied
to Bohr's theory for its truth (i.e. the truth or falsity of the meta-analytical concept
does not depend on whether Bohr's theory stands or falls in physics), it is
inextricably tied to Bohr's theory for its meaning (i.e. unless we mean something
closely analogous to what Bohr meant, our use of the word is meaningless). He
supports this claim with the following argument:
After all, by what other route are we to make sense of any claim that
two things, x and y, are 'complementary'? Is the would-be
complementarist to be allowed to mean by complementarity whatever
he pleases? Obviously not, since the term is not his neologism . . .
What is left, then, but a tacit reliance upon the concept of
complementarity (with its aura of prestigious origin) as employed by
Bohr, minus whatever is peculiar to its application in quantum
mechanics? But if tacit reliance, why not explicit?265
Bedau's most direct attack on MacKay can be found in his footnote to the argument
just quoted. In this rather lengthy footnote, Bedau directly attacks MacKay's
assertion (made in several places) that logical complementarity and physical
complementarity are importantly different concepts. Bedau summarises MacKay's
argument as follows:
(i) complementarity is a "logical" relation,
(ii) it antedates Bohr's adoption of the term,
(iii) its logic deviates from that to be found in Bohr's use, and
therefore
(iv) we need not trouble ourselves overmuch with whether we can
make sense of claiming that religion and science are
complementary in a fashion analogous to that in which Bohr
says that quantum mechanical phenomena are
complementary.2 6
Bedau then attacks the second premise. He grants that the word 'complement' in its
various forms did 'antedate Bohr's adoption of the term', but is also quick to point
264 Ibid., p.206
265 Ibid. p. 207
266
Quoted from Bedau's footnote 15.
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out that all of these pre-Bohr uses adhered to fairly consistent norms. As this family
of terms was used in logic, Bedau reminds us, 'any term T is the complement of any
other term, T' if and only if the conjunction of T and T' exhausts the universe of
discourse.' In geometry, he says 'any angles, a, p, y,.. . are complementary if and
only if their sum is 90°', and in chromatics 'any colour, C, is complementary to
another colour, C', if and only if they are 180° apart on a colour wheel, i.e. yield a
neutral when combined.' Clearly, Bedau's argument continues, even ifBohr did
deviate from the pre-Bohr uses of this family of words, Bohr's use is more consistent
with its earlier usage than what MacKay has in mind because while MacKay allows
an indefinite number of complementary descriptions to apply to a single event, Bohr
maintains the historically 'dyadic relation' of two and only two complementary
descriptions for any given event. Though he merely states this point without further
comment in this symposium, he explains this distinction between Bohr and MacKay
967
in a little more detail in an earlier paper, written with Paul Oppenheim. We find
this slight clarification in Oppenheim and Bedau's 41st footnote, which reads as
follows:
Unlike most writers on complementarity, Reichenbach (p. 159) and
MacKay ([Reply to Alexander] p. 390) expressly permit
'complementarity' to designate a polyadic relation. We ignore this
alternative, since the Uncertainty Principle involves only pairs of
parameters and since Bohr regards this Principle as the basis of
complementarity in Quantum Mechanics.
Undoubtedly it is with these considerations in mind that Bedau pursues this line of
argument in his symposium paper.268 Bedau sums up his brief analysis of the pre-
Bohr uses of the terminology in question concluding as follows:
I suspect MacKay's notion of complementarity is intended to be
faithful neither to Bohr's concept of complementarity nor the pre-Bohr
concept. . ., but is intended to be an entirely new concept with a new
'logic' all its own.
Bedau's argument takes an unexpected twist, however, when he goes on to point out
the fact that MacKay (and all the other participants in the dialogue) do not use the
related terminology 'as though it were an entirely new concept having only
267
(Bedau and Oppenheim 1961)
268 Bedau does not seem to recognise the fact that, unlike Bohr, MacKay does not rely on the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle as a basis for his doctrine, and therefore is not limited (as Bohr may
have been) to dyadic relationships.
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(misleading) orthographic affinities to "complementarity" as found in Bohr or to
"complementary" as found in classical logic, geometry, and chromatics.' The point
of this last statement may not be entirely felt before we see the conclusion Bedau
draws from it. In summing up his 'refutation' ofMacKays argument, he offers us the
following analysis:
Whether, therefore, (i) is true it is difficult to say; in any case, the
truth of (ii) does not tend to establish anything interestingly relevant
because (iii) is false; and the argument to establish (iv) is thus for
several reasons unsound.
It would seem, then, that Bedau genuinely believes that unless MacKay means by
'complementarity' 'an entirely new concept having only (misleading) orthographic
affinities to' its prior uses, its logic does not deviate 'from that to be found in Bohr's
use'. While MacKay's sympathisers may hope for some middle ground between
these two rather extreme alternatives [!], we must remember that this entire argument
against MacKay has taken place in footnotes, so it may not have been expressed as
carefully as it would have been had it been part of Bedau's main text. Besides, even
if the conclusion ofBedau's argument is a little wide of the mark, there is still one
quite strong (if less overt) objection to be dealt with. Bedau has noted his suspicion
that MacKay does not intend to use his terminology faithfully, and this in itself is a
quite serious charge. It should be noted, however, that this charge did not play as
large a role in the footnote that was apparently designed to deal precisely with
MacKay's work as it did in the main body text to which that footnote was attached
(cf. quotation above). This indicates two things: 1) Bedau may not have fully
appreciated MacKay's meaning, and 2) this charge, which we have understood to be
the most serious, is no mere side thought of Bedau's, but a carefully contemplated
objection. It is appropriate, therefore, that in MacKay's response he spends more
time soothing these considered yet implicit worries than Bedau's less coherent
explicit ones.
One final thing that should be noted concerning Bedau's objection is that he does
offer us some hope. While we have seen that the most serious worry that his paper
highlights is that ifwe do not consciously stick closely to Bohr's theory we run the
danger of inconsistency, Bedau observes later in his paper that 'it may be possible
nevertheless to recast the claim of the complementarist so as to avoid emphasis on
any strict analogy with complementarity in quantum mechanics'. From what we
have seen in the first part of this chapter, it would seem that the road Bedau is here
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suggesting may indeed be profitable—though when he completes his 'recasting', he
may be surprised to find himself in the happy company ofMacKay's supporters.
2. MacKay's Response
Rather than respond to Bedau's objection with a detailed analysis (such as we have
just worked through), MacKay responds in a more general fashion. Trusting the
intelligence of his readers, MacKay takes advantage of the opportunity to offer what
he calls an 'overlengthy review of the subject' with the hope that it 'may help restore
objectivity to the discussion of its intrinsic merits.' As this response also
represents MacKay's fullest treatment of the subject, its importance would be
difficult to overstate. On the other hand, most of the ideas he presents here have
already been discussed elsewhere, so we will focus mainly on his comments that
have the most direct relevance to Bedau's objection.
MacKay opens his paper with the following comments, obviously chosen to give the
reader a sense of the purpose behind MacKay's contention that science and theology
are complementary:
Theology, at least in its Christian theistic form, is all-embracing. Our
world is declared to be God's world—the whole of it. All our
knowledge—physical, biological, historical, philosophical—is
knowledge of God's creation. If this is not an empty claim, then the
theologian is bound to seek relations between the statements made in
different academic disciplines and those he makes in specifically
theological terms.
He then proceeds directly to the worry that seems to motivate both Alexander and
Bedau in their somewhat less than rigorous arguments: he concedes, 'a blanket use of
the term is logically empty unless we can say what it would mean for two statements
not to be complementary.'270,271 He is also very quick to warn us, however, that a
269(MacKay 1974c), p.242
270 Ibid. p. 225
271 We should not take this 'concession' to be the result of the criticisms we have been discussing,
however. Indeed, this seems to have been a major concern of his right from the beginning. Perhaps
his most eloquent warning against misuse can be found in a paper he had published in 1953. There he
says:
Whenever a new concept swims into philosophical ken there is a danger that it will be
overworked by the Athenians on the one hand and abused by the Laodiceans on the other.
Complementarity is no universal panacea, and it is a relationship that can be predicated of
two descriptions only with careful safeguards against admitting nonsense. Indeed the
difficult task is not to establish the possibility that two statements are logically
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strict reliance on Bohr's theories would be mistaken. In a footnote to these
comments, he refers us back to a paper he wrote for an earlier symposium on
complementarity,272 in which he rigorously delimited the conditions under which a
set of descriptions can rightly be described as logically complementary. These
conditions (very slightly modified in accordance with MacKay's editorial comments
in the 1974 footnote) should soothe Bedau's most serious worries and provide us
with a clear statement ofwhat it is that we have been arguing for throughout this first
chapter. They are as follows:
1. They have a common reference273
974
2. Each can in principle be exhaustive
3. They make different assertions because,
4. The logical preconditions and/or use (i.e. context) of concepts or
relationships in each are mutually exclusive, so that significant
aspects referred to in one are necessarily omitted from the other.275
As we have seen from our analysis, Alexander's confusion came about through a
misinterpretation of 1 that made him want to deny 2. Bedau, in addition to referring
to Alexander's argument favourably in several places,276 calls the legitimacy of 3 and
4 into question. Hopefully our analysis of their criticisms will help us avoid falling
prey to those misunderstandings in the future, because, as we have alluded to earlier
and will see in much more detail as our analysis progresses, MacKay's doctrine of
complementary, but to find a rigorous way of detecting when they are not... A good deal of
consecrated hard work is needed on the part of Christians to develop a more coherent and
more biblical picture of the relationship between the two .. . But if once we recognise that at
least most theological categories are not 'in the same plane' (in the same logical subspace) as
most scientific categories, there is no longer any theological merit in hunting for gaps in the
scientific pattern. Gaps there are in plenty, But it would seem to be the Christian's duty to
allow—indeed to help—these gaps to fill or widen as they will, in humble and cheerful
obedience to the truth as God reveals it through our scientific discipline, believing that to
have theological stakes in scientific answers to scientific questions is to err in company with
those unbelievers who do the like. ((MacKay 1953a)
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(MacKay 1958a)
273 As we have seen, the 'reference' that complementary descriptions must have in common should be
an event as opposed to an object or mere feature of an event.
274 It should also be clear from our previous discussion that 'exhaustive' as used here means that there
do not have to be any unexplainable 'gaps' in the causal chain inferred by the description—and
further, that this special use of'exhaustive' does not imply 'exclusive'.
275 See footnote 1 of (MacKay 1974c)
276
Including one reference (in his 15th footnote) to 'Alexander's unpublished essay' which was
presented at the same conference at which Bedau's objection and MacKay's response were originally
presented.
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complementary descriptions is the basis for the entire project ofComprehensive
Realism. To misunderstand the way logical complementarity works would
necessarily result in a misunderstanding of the Comprehensive Realist approach to
the mind/body problem, freedom, and our Christian hope.
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Chapter 4: Comprehensive Realism and the Mind/Body
Problem
From the biographical details we discussed in chapter 2, we saw that Donald
MacKay began and ended his career as a theoretical physicist, though his interests
also broadened throughout his life, extending his expertise in philosophical and
theological directions as he expanded his research on communication from a
neurological point of view. It was not until fairly late in his career, however, that he
addressed the metaphysical issues at the root ofmind/body problem. The most likely
reason for his not coming to this question sooner is that he saw himselfmore as a
scientist than a philosopher. Donald MacKay was not a man who had much time for
idle speculation. As we shall see, even when, in the last decade of his life, he came
to address metaphysical issues most directly, he did so as an empirical scientist
addressing philosophical issues rather than as an armchair theologian with an interest
277
in science.
MacKay's late entry into the metaphysical discussion was no coincidence, however.
Because he was unwaveringly committed to the Christian doctrine that all truth is
God's truth and will not end in contradiction, MacKay was infected by a sort of
epistemic optimism that made him suspect the value in pitched ideological battles.
The debate between dualistic interactionism and monistic materialism with regard to
the mind/body problem is just the sort of pitched ideological battle that MacKay was
always keen to avoid. Its historic difficulty and relevance to his research, however,
made it one that he could not easily evade. As we will see in our discussion of this
aspect ofMacKay's thought more clearly than in any other stage of our discussion of
his work, MacKay seemed to believe that ifwe could just get a clear grasp of the
relevant data, all our most difficult ideological differences would disappear.
In our last chapter, we suggested that an accurate understanding ofMacKay's
doctrine of complementary descriptions made the mind/body problem an essentially
grammatical problem, rather than a metaphysical one. In this chapter, we will
attempt to work out in greater detail the kinds of things this understanding of the
mind/body problem led MacKay to say. In the first section we will attempt to spell
277 The author of this thesis, on the other hand, like so many thinkers in this field, is more of the
armchair sort.
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out in more detail the grammar that MacKay had in mind, and in the second we will
investigate how the metaphysical work involved in his development of a science of
the mind progressed under this grammatical model of the problem.
I. Clarifying the Grammar of Anthropology
We will begin our discussion ofMacKay's grammar by seeking an answer to the
fundamental question, 'How do we know when a mental description applies?'. Once
we have pursued that question as far as we can, we will turn to a few practical 'do's
and don'ts' of mental descriptions as we seek further to clear away the obtuse
metaphysical constructs which have crowded the ideological landscape of mental
philosophy for so long.
A. How do we know when a mental description applies?
Because MacKay came to neuroscience through his interest as a theoretical physicist
in the limits of digital and analogue computing devices, his first struggle with the
grammar ofmental language came in the form of questions as to when mental
language should be applied to computers. Though the controversy that fuelled this
project has died down considerably in recent years, MacKay's work, unlike the vast
majority of work in this field, is highly valuable even beyond the pseudo-intellectual
sensationalism that characterised the initial flourish of the A. I. debate. In fact, the
clarity and academic discipline of his work in this area, so uncharacteristic ofmost
thinkers interested in this problem, may bear a large portion of the responsibility for
the diminished interest this debate has seen in recent years—for his essential thesis is
that the A. I. debate is fuelled by the same lack of evidence which is at the heart of
disagreements over the mind/body problem. Like the mind/body problem, MacKay
believed that the A. I. question was a question for grammarians, not metaphysicians.
In his 1962 paper 'The Use of Behavioural Language to Refer to Mechanical
Processes'278 we find the clearest development ofMacKay's grammar ofmental
language. In this paper we find a grammatical table (Figure 1) which represents the
major divisions between the natural types of language that can be applied to people
and mindlike artefacts.
MacKay uses this table to argue that the A. I. debate was ill-founded. He says:
278
(MacKay 1962d)
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The problem I want to discuss is represented by the question marks in
the corresponding column on the right-hand side. It is often expressed
by asking 'Can a machine think?'; and fierce debates have raged
between those designers of automata who regard this as an empirical
question answerable by experiment in the affirmative, and those
philosophers who share the same presupposition but regard the
evidence to date as inadequate . . . But such attempts to save 'the
argument from impotence' 79 seem also to be needless; for if our
'semantic chart' is correct, the short answer to a claim on empirical
grounds that 'machines can think' or that 'minds are machines' is not
'you are empirically justified (or unjustified)' but 'you are talking
nonsense'. For in the human case, it is not brains that are said to
think, feel, hope, fear, but people. To say that a mass of nerve-cells
'thinks' or 'fears' would not be an empirical assertion but a misuse of
• 280
language; and just the same is true for a mass of wires and valves.
Figure 1
Natural Artificial
Personal Aspect Mechanical Aspect Mechanical Aspect Personal Aspect
Person (Joe) Growth Construction
Brain-and-Body Automation ?
('Mass of cells and ('Mass of wires and ?
things') valves')
Carrying signals Carrying signals
Forming an Forming an
information-system information-system
Organising observable Organising observable
behaviour indicative of behaviour indicative of
Thinks, feels, thinking, feeling, thinking, feeling, ?
Hopes, fears . .. hoping, fearing .. . hoping, fearing ...
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MacKay argues in the following papers that what he calls 'the argument from impotence' will
never succeed, because any specification of behaviour which cannot be reproduced in a machine
doubles as design specifications for a machine that does: (MacKay 195 Id; MacKay 1952a; MacKay
1956b)
280
(MacKay 1962d) p. 91
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This is where MacKay's paper gets really interesting. He acknowledges that a wise
computer engineer may take his point in stride, returning with the more meaningful
question ofwhether or not a machine could be constructed which demands
description in mental language. This leads MacKay directly into a rather lengthy
discussion of the question we set out in this section to answer—namely 'How are we
to know when a mental description applies?'.
MacKay's reasoning is lengthy and technical, but for our purposes, his conclusions
can be supported sufficiently by a fairly simple illustration. The illustration we will
develop will be similar to one that he suggests (but does not develop) about halfway
through his argument; but before we introduce the illustration it may be helpful to
examine the conclusions we will seek to draw from it. MacKay argues that there are
two basic requirements that must be met before mental language can be appropriately
used:
First, and obviously, (a) the physical 'bodily situation' must admit of
and support in practice an underspecified state-description showing
appropriate behavioural features: the 'observable indications' of
thinking, feeling, hoping, fearing, etc. But the second, and no less
important, requirement is (b) that we, the arbiters, must be rationally
able and willing to adopt the appropriate standpoint of interactive
relationship, from which the situation acquires some of our own
necessary unspecifiableness-to-ourselves. This I think is the technical
correlate of the much-discussed distinction between the 'I-Thou'
relationship and that of 'I-Object'. In the latter, no comparable barrier
of principle prevents full specification of the object-situation by the
observer, even where the object is a normally functioning human
body.281
MacKay argues that we cannot rationally apply mental descriptions to anything
unless these two conditions are met. But since we are more concerned at this point to
discover the less rigorous conditions under which mental descriptions can be
meaningfully applied, it may be helpful, for the sake of argument, to broaden our
discussion to include looser uses ofmental language. This will allow us to clarify
and support MacKay's conclusion, making illustrative use of the relationship
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Now, the fact that we have already mentioned Fiona's name for her club suggests the
point of the illustration. Fiona refers to her club in personal language. The question
we will most profitably ask of this situation is this: 'To what extent is it meaningful
for her to apply this sort of language?'. To draw this illustration more to the point,
let us say that Fiona builds into the personality she attributes to Buster certain mental
descriptions. 'Buster is fairly grouchy when I wake him up for the first tee', she
might say, 'but on a good sunny day he is usually feeling a lot better by the third
hole. He never likes doglegs, though, and is petrified ofwater.'
Of course, any reader with positivistic tendencies may object at this point that
Fiona's speech is merely an example of the common literary devise known as
'personification', and that ifwe are to learn anything from it, it must be translated
into more meaningful language. But the question we are dealing with here is not 'Is
mental language preferable!'. After all, all but the most die-hard positivist would
agree that that question would have to be answered differently depending on the
speaker's purpose. The question we set out to answer, on the other hand, is 'Is
mental language meaningful?'. The fact that our hypothetical positivist has
suggested that we translate this language can be read as an affirmative answer to this
later question.
We also know, however, that unless Fiona has some strange sort ofpsychological
disorder, the maintenance of Buster's 'personality' requires an act of imagination on
her part.282 And so the interesting question becomes, 'What, exactly, is it that Fiona
must imagine concerning her golf club for the mental description in question to be
meaningful?'
Must she imagine that there is a human brain, complete with the requisite pineal
gland, somewhere inside her club? Perhaps she can get by with a little less than that,
but if so, what must she imagine? Must she imagine that her club has some
mysterious ability to break the laws of physical causal closure, reacting to forces
from some non-physical world of the mind? Substance dualists would probably want
to assert something along the lines of this second proposal, but MacKay suggests that
282 Just in case one is tempted to say that the meaningfulness of Fiona's mental descriptions of Buster
requires some act of imagination on the part of the interpreter of her comments as well, we should,
perhaps, point out why this is not the case. The interpreter does not need to participate in the required
activity of imagination because to interpret Fiona's comments one need only recognise the fact that
Fiona is doing a bit of imagining—and so it is on Fiona's activity that our interest must focus.
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Fiona can get by with even less than that. As the conclusion we quoted above
suggests, MacKay argues that all Fiona needs to imagine is a) that her club displays
human-like behaviour that can be the subject of an underspecified description, and b)
that it is capable of participating with Fiona in the right kind of interactive
relationship.
Her mental descriptions themselves indicate that Fiona has, in fact attributed human¬
like behaviour to Buster. That much seems pretty straightforward. But what are we
to make of the requirement that Buster's behaviour be the subject of an
underspecified description? 'Underspecified' may be a strange word to find tossed
in the midst of the above, otherwise intuitive, necessary conditions for the
application of mental language. Perhaps it could use a little explaining.
The concept of underspecification, as MacKay explains,283 is an essential feature of
mental descriptions, because underspecification is necessary for even the most basic
forms of agency. A completely specified situation, as thinkers like Laplace are
notorious for having taken to logical extremes, leaves no 'options' available—and if
there is one thing that an agent indisputably needs it is more than one option.
In explaining284 this point, MacKay refers to a simple light switch. Ifwe are to say
that it is possible for the switch to be either on or off at any given time (i.e. there are
two viable options for the switch at time T), then the situation picked out in naming
the switch to be considered at any given time must be underspecified. That is just to
say that ifwe have all the relevant details concerning the switch for the time leading
up to time T, (here we are talking about details like when it was last switched on and
when it was last switched off) then at time T it cannot be said that there two viable
options for the switch. Unless the laws of physical causal closure (as summarised,





285 We mentioned earlier that the substance dualist may actually want a violation to this principle to be
implied by a valid mental description, but we must also remember that we set out to give a less
ambitious set of requirements. In bringing up this principle of physical causal closure again, we are
simply pointing out the fact that the underspecification ofmental descriptions should be considered
one of the costs ofpreserving this principle in cases where mental descriptions apply.
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true for all objects—though more complex objects (obviously) require more complex
98f\
'relevant details' to collapse the range of options available.
So with regard to Fiona and Buster, the underspecificity requirement simply means
that Fiona's description of Buster's human-like behaviour (his fear ofwater holes,
for example) cannot involve so many details that there are no options available to
Buster to which his fear could be relevant. More specifically, we can say that if
Fiona's description of any given event involving Buster's action is so detailed that
none of the most basic, physical, causal forces are summarised by some 'higher
level' description, any agent aspect of the description is rendered meaningless.
After all, unless we wanted to appeal to systematic physical causal gaps, there would
be no causal role available for the agent to play.
This is not to say that in order for a mental description to apply, the more explicit
details cannot be available as part of a different description.287 To deny the
possibility of such a detailed alternative would simply be to miss the lesson of logical
988
complementarity and confuse exhaustiveness with exclusiveness. But, because
applying a mental description (by definition) is to treat the thing described as an
agent, and one of the things all agents must do is decide between options, we must
insist that no mental description go down to a level of specificity that would limit the
number of options available to one.289
286 This point should hold even in the much-disputed cases involving the Heisenberg uncertain events
of quantum physics. In these instances the point is not particularly helpful, however, since
Heisenberg's principle states that in these situations it is physically impossible to achieve the level of
specificity required to limit the options available indefinitely (i.e. some degree of structural
underspecificity will plague any attempt to determine the outcome of a quantum event in advance).
287 As we will discuss in our next chapter, MacKay actually has an argument to the effect that there
can be no prediction of future behaviour based on an agent's physical description (even an infinitely
detailed description in a universe in which physical determinism reigns absolutely) that the agent
would be right to believe and wrong to disbelieve (He calls this his argument for 'logical relativity').
Though this argument for logical relativity is part ofMacKay's original argument in the paper we are
now discussing ((MacKay 1962d)), his conclusions hold even without it, so we will delay our
discussion of logical relativity for the time being.
288 We must keep in mind that it is not the situation-described-in-as-much-detail-as-possible that we
are concerned with here. Because we are interested in the grammatical properties of mental
descriptions rather than the metaphysics ofmind (which we will discuss in our next section), we must
always remember that our concern is only with the situation-as-described, which will necessarily
differ with the level of specificity provided.
289 As we will see later (Section II C of this chapter), MacKay had a good deal to say about the
aptitude ofmental descriptions in relation to the level of descriptive specificity.
The Mind/Body Problem 117
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology of Donald M. MacKay
So we see that for Fiona's mental description of her driver to be meaningful, Buster
must (at least by Fiona's estimation—which may, of course be supplemented by
some level of imagination) exhibit human-like behaviour that can be the subject of an
underspecified description. The kinds of human-like behaviour she recognises in her
club we find already implied by the specific mental descriptions suggested (i.e.
grumpiness, dislike, and fear), and the fact that she is dealing only in underspecified
descriptions of Buster's behaviour can be fairly taken for granted.
Though we have not developed the idea, we have also mentioned MacKay's
requirement b): that Fiona is 'able and willing to adopt the appropriate standpoint of
interactive relationship'. We will now attempt to provide a little more detail on this
second requirement. In particular, we will investigate what reason we would expect
anyone entering into such a relationship to have for doing so.
Unfortunately for the sake of our illustration there are not a whole lot of very
interesting things to say with regard to Fiona's motives. It seems that Fiona may
have an indefinite number of reasons for attributing personality to her golf club—all
involving some degree of playfulness. But ifwe were to reinstate a stricter
rationality requirement this issue may become a bit more interesting. What reason
might we give, for example, for our rational reluctance to apply mental descriptions
to some objects even as we recognise the rational bankruptcy of solipsism?
MacKay says that the decision regarding when it is rationally justifiable to enter into
the relationship required for a meaningful mental description requires a certain
'curious logic—a blend of deduction and commitment'.290 He elaborates on the
nature of this curious logic as he continues to discuss the question of whether or not
it would be rational to apply mental descriptions to artefacts. Explaining the difficult
process of dissuading anyone that may be sceptical along these lines he says:
If what I have been arguing is correct, then there is no kind of
evidence that could logically convince us at this point; for it is not on
evidence that our missing conviction depends. What we are suffering
from is not a failure of evidence, but a failure of nerve.291
Some may object that MacKay hasn't really explained a whole lot here. But in some




(MacKay 1962d) p. 101
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answer to look like? Have we become so scientistic that only a reductive argument
will satisfy us? At this point, we may be wise to leave this as a rhetorical question.
B. Some important grammatical do's and don'ts
Now that we have discussed the question ofminimal requirements for the
meaningful application of mental descriptions, all that remains for us to discuss with
regard to MacKay's grammar of mental descriptions is a few assorted do's and
don'ts. In this regard we shall call attention to three specific bits of advice that
MacKay gave in a rather wide assortment of publications. These three bits of advice
are: 1) Always practice semantic hygiene; 2) Remember that the language of
causation has no place in the description of relationships between linguistic levels;
and 3) Remember that there is a difference between a mystery and a counterexample.
1. Semantic Hygiene
In light of our discussion in chapter 3, the first bit of advice can be dealt with rather
simply. The one issue that MacKay stressed more than any other when it comes to
292
grammatical do's and don'ts is the issue he called 'semantic hygiene'. This is the
point we referred to in chapter 3 when we said that we must be careful not to confuse
our categories. Perhaps MacKay's clearest warning along these lines can be found in
the conclusion to the first chapter of his Gifford Lectures, where he says:
What I am pleading for from the outset is that we make a point of
observing what you might call semantic hygiene—a determined effort
to keep our terms brushed clean of infection by careless confusion of
categories. In particular, words like think, believe, hear are words that
in their philosophical categories belong expressly to the I-story. It is
people who think, believe, hear things, like things, see things.
Thinking is something that people do. The brain-story, we doubt not,
has something to be said about it in relation to thinking, such that for
any change in what a man thinks, a change must take place in the
brain's activity. But to talk about 'brains thinking', I suggest,
however common it may be, is philosophically a blunder—a solecism.
292
Though he mentions this bit of advice in many more places, the following statement (in addition to
the ones quoted below) is one of his most explicit:
'True, no "box of wires and valves" could ever validly be said to understand anything; but then, no
"mass of brain cells" does so either. Ifwe carefully compare like with like, it is hard to see why the
semantic capacities of human brains should not be adequately paralleled in those of human artefacts,
even in their present state of development.' (MacKay 1965f) p. 254
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It is not brains but people who think. It is not so much false as
nonsense to say 'my brain thinks'.293
The mistake that MacKay is urging us to avoid in practising this semantic hygiene is
akin to the long acknowledged logical mistake known as 'the use/mention fallacy'
(i.e. the fallacy of assuming that some feature of a referent must be shared by its
symbolic representation and visa versa). These two mistakes are similar in that in
both instances some property of an idea is attributed to the kind of concrete particular
we have learned to associate with that idea. The way this works in the case of bad
semantic hygiene comes out a little more clearly, perhaps, in one of his more concise
statements of this warning. As part of an extended analogy between our mind/brain
relationship and a working electronic calculator's electronics/equation relationship,
he says:
The fact that a quadratic equation with two roots is embodied in a
piece of electronic hardware in no way implies that the hardware at
any level of description as hardware 'has two roots'. The notion
makes no sense, even though the existence of two roots has well-
defined hardware implications.
This statement seems very similar to the way in which we would expect MacKay to
have answered U. T. Place's famous question, 'Is Consciousness a Brain
9QS
Process?'. Since 'consciousness' refers to mental activity and brain processes are
essentially physical, to answer Place's question in the affirmative would simply be to
confuse an essentially abstract activity with the more tangible activity we have
learned (through medical science) to correlate it with. As MacKay wrote elsewhere,
This would be simply to muddle up the two languages—rather like
asserting, or denying, that when a man feels in love, his brain-cells
feel in love. Such a statement is neither true nor false, but
meaningless, because feeling in love is an activity of subjects, not of
objects; and when a man is feeling in love, his brain cells are
presumably fully occupied doing something physically describable in
'object-language' as the correlate of his mental condition.296
2. No Inter-Level Causation
293(MacKay 1991b) p. 9
294
p. 34 of the following posthumous publication: (MacKay 1989)
295
(Place 1956)
296(MacKay 1957a) p. 401
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The second bit of advice central to MacKay's grammar is that we should avoid the
temptation to assume causation. While MacKay's arguments along these lines may
not be as controversial as those of some other Scottish philosophers (esp. David
Hume), this bit of grammar, if valid, would take all the pressure out of philosophical
debates over downward causation, epiphenomenalism and systematic
overdetermination. Though this point would, no doubt, repay development by those
with interests in the 'non-reductive physicalism' school ofmental philosophy, for
now we will narrow our discussion to what MacKay actually said, postponing our
discussion of the broader implications for another venue.
Though there are several other works297 in which MacKay spends considerable time
on this issue, nowhere is he more concise than in his response to Benjamin Libet's
report on the findings of his now famous experiments.298 Though his response is
dealing with control, which is a specific type of causation, the force of his argument
admits simple generalisation. Considering the claim that we control our brains,
MacKay says:
To see the logical non sequitur here, consider first an inanimate
example. The autopilot in an aircraft in a clear sense evaluates and
controls the plane's altitude, speed, and the like. It does so in and
through an internal computational network of physical processes,
which are ultimately linked to receptors and effectors in the aircraft.
But does it in the same sense 'control' these internal processes?
Surely not; these are processes that it has no means of evaluating for
it is in them that it has its own being as an evaluative controller.
As MacKay here makes clear, in all our attempts to trace lines of causation from 'our
bodies' back to 'our minds' we are likely to be disappointed. After all, as we have
learned from countless carefully documented medical case studies, it is only in our
properly functioning bodies (particularly our brains) that our minds (or even our
selves, for that matter) have their being. To even think about what it would look like
for a mind to cause a brain is simply to miss the point. The following hypothetical
dialogue should help illustrate this point:
297 Most notably (MacKay 1965b) especially section 9.3 (pp. 187-8); (MacKay 1966b) especially (pp.
438-9); and (MacKay 1980f) section 2 (p. 1389)
298 In these experiments, Libet was able to record electrophysiological 'readiness potentials' in the
brain, measured through the scalp, immediately preceding voluntary muscle movement. See his
paper: (Libet 1985)
299
(MacKay 1985b) italics added.
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"What colour is this cup?"
"Red."
"How do you know that it is red?"
"Because I know the English language."
"But how do you know that this cup is an instance of what you have been taught to
call 'red"
"Because I see it."
"And how do you know you can trust what your eyes tell you?"
"I don't. My eyes don't tell me anything."
"Are you saying that you are blind?"
"No, I am saying that my eyes don't talk—they see."
"Don't be ridiculous. I know they don't talk, but if you can see, then your eyes are
communicating information to you through your optic nerve."
"So then, where do you say that I am?"300
3. Not AllMysteries Are Counter-Examples
The third and final bit of grammatical advice MacKay repeated throughout his
academic career was that, especially with regard to questions concerning the
relationship between mental and physical descriptions, we should beware not to
confuse 'I don't know' with 'I must be mistaken'. In particular, our failure to
provide an explanation for a given event does not imply that we have misunderstood
that event. After all, our understanding does not have to be complete to be correct.
While this may be a simple and very intuitive point, it is also one that is prone to be
forgotten. The temptation is to assume that since the system in question is able to
explain nicely the very concepts which plague other systems as the toughest of
antinomies, that system will continue to explain away every element ofmystery.
Once one has fallen to this temptation, any remaining mystery comes to be treated as
a counter-example. MacKay's attempts to keep his readers from falling into this
300
Though no specific citation is available, hypothetical conversations similar to this one will most
likely be familiar to students of linguistic philosophy. While this particular arrangement of these
comments is not a direct quotation, no claim to originality can be made to the ideas behind them.
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temptation come most often in the form of explicit reminders not to take his view as
one intended to expel all mystery. The most explicit of these reminders was printed
in 1965.301 Here MacKay says,
This is the topic of the present paper. If it has a thesis, it is that
although there is scope and need for semantic discipline to clarify our
thinking, there remains in this area a real issue—a genuine mystery, if
you like—and not only a pseudo-problem to be covered over by what
amounts to a linguistic bluff.302
We have claimed repeatedly that ifwe see the mind/body problem as MacKay saw it,
the problem is not metaphysical, but grammatical. Could this claim itself not be read
as the kind of 'linguistic bluff that he here warns us about? Ifwe left our
interpretation ofMacKay's understanding of the mind/body relationship here, our
interpretation would certainly be open to this charge. As it is, however, our
grammatical discussion has merely set the stage for the ensuing metaphysical
discussion. Ifwe had not treated the grammatical issues involved here, we would be
very likely to be stuck in the miry pit known in Anglo/American philosophy as the
'mind/body problem'. Now that these issues have been addressed, however, it is to
be hoped that we can move beyond this problem, taking steps to better understand
that indisputable mystery which is the human mind.
II. The Metaphysics Behind the Grammar
Though we should now have a general idea of how MacKay advised us to use mental
language, we have thus far learned very little about what it is exactly that MacKay
believed a mind is. IfMacKay's grammatical solution to the mind/body problem is to
be taken as any more than a linguistic bluff, however, we should expect a more
detailed explanation than we have brought into our discussion thus far. A brief scan
ofMacKay's list of publications should reveal that he had plenty to say on this issue.
Most of his work along these lines was of a strict empirical nature, however, so our
task will be to analyse his considerably less verbose comments on the metaphysical
implications of his empirical findings. We will begin our analysis with a brief
discussion ofwhat he took to be the proper epistemological starting point, and then
seek his answer to the following three questions: 1) What is a mind? 2) What do
301 This warning is developed more fully in several places, most notably in his Gifford Lectures:
(MacKay 1991b) especially pp. 5, 9-10,
302
(MacKay 1965d)p. 321
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minds do? and 3) How are we to bring the tools of empirical science to bear on our
study of the mind?
A. The Proper Epistemological Starting Point
Though he had already published quite a lot ofwork that was very closely related to
TOT
the mind/body problem in metaphysics, MacKay first addressed the problem
directly in 1978.304 It is to this 1978 paper that we will now turn in our effort to
understand what MacKay saw as the proper epistemological starting point to a proper
metaphysical investigation of the concept ofmind.
The first thing MacKay attempts as he approaches the metaphysical aspect of the
mind/body problem is to clear the ideological landscape of unnecessary defensive
structures. He does this by means of the relentless optimism which, as we discussed
in the first section of this chapter, characterised his entire career. He says that:
... on both sides of this debate I believe errors arise not so much in
what each affirms, but in what they think they must deny in order to
affirm it. If I am right, the relationship between mechanistic brain
science and the personal, moral and religious dimensions of human
nature is much more harmonious and constructive than would appear
from current polemics.
We see this optimism again as he introduces his own position. He says:
What is the working neuroscientist to make of all this? Do we have to
choose between a speculative interactionism that sets limits in
principle to scientific explanation of human behaviour, and a
stridently dogmatic and unsubstantiated materialism that reduces the
mind-body problem to a 'brain-rest-of-the-body' problem? I think
not. I believe there is a third option which allows us to affirm what
each side is rightly anxious to safeguard, without having to sacrifice
what either thinks it is necessary to deny.306
Because ofMacKay's basic optimism as to the essential coherence of objective
reality, he takes as his starting point not what others have said along these lines in the
past, or some sophisticated metaphysical theory of his own, but the simple and
303 Most notably, MacKay wrote a chapter for (G. N. A. Vesey 1964). In this chapter, however,
MacKay focuses on how the notion of will relates to the scientific study of the brain, leaving a
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undisputed facts of everyday experience—'our immediate experience ofwhat it is
like to be a person.'307
One of the most important things we know from our experience as people is that we
interact with other people. We observe these other people and come to realise that
they, in turn, observe us. And so it is that we are able to tell two different kinds of
stories about any given event in our lives—one from the first-person, and the other
from the third-person perspective. This perspectival duality roughly parallels the
personal/mechanistic duality we saw represented in the grammatical chart from 'The
Use ofBehavioural Language' (Figure 1), which we looked at in section two of this
chapter. MacKay frequently refers to this distinction as either the 'inside' versus the
1AO
'outside' view or, more commonly the 'I-story/O-story' distinction.
This distinction between these two radically different but complementary forms of
data (i.e. two forms of data which represent irreducibly distinct perspectives on all
and only the same events) available to us as subjects forms the backbone of
MacKay's epistemology—so before proceeding in our analysis of'Selves and
Brains', perhaps we should say a little more about it.
Readers familiar with the 'private language' debate in linguistic philosophy may be
tempted to think ofMacKay's 'I-story' as a sort of private language—especially
given the fact that we have attempted to draw the 'I-story' and 'O-story' out of the
'private' experience of what it is like to be a person. Though this line of reasoning
may have the appearance of a textbook example of a private language theory,309 it
actually has nothing at all to say to this issue. MacKay's I-story is not a private
language, but a story told from a unique point of view.310 It is not the language of
307
p. 601 italics his
308 The T and 'O' here can stand for 'inside' and 'outside'. Because 'inside'/'outside' language can
be pernicious in some situations; however, MacKay also says that 'I' can stand for the first-person
singular and 'O' can stand for 'observer'. In some situations (like the first eight of his Gifford
Lectures), he even changes his syntax a bit, preferring the term 'brain-story' to 'O-story', though this
syntax is not nearly as flexible—causing him to revert back to his old language quite often.
309 Note the similarities between what we have said about MacKay's epistemology and Augustine's
account of learning to speak, recorded in his 'Confessions' and made fun of by Wittgenstein.
310
MacKay seemed to have noticed that his language in 'Selves and Brains' was potentially
misleading along these lines, because in a paper presented in 1982 ((MacKay 1983e), p. 5) MacKay
repeats a rather lengthy passage from that work—but with one important difference. That difference is
that he inserts the following comment: 'In calling this starting point [the 1-Story] "solid", I do not wish
to enter into the hoary debate over the notion of "privileged access". What I am pointing to might be
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the I-story that is private, but the perspective. MacKay's theory simply reminds us
of the fact that our language (and thus, our epistemology) admits of both first and
third-person perspectives.
Though MacKay acknowledged this essential epistemic duality as early as 1951,311
his last presentation of this concept was one of its clearest. The foundational role
played by his I-story/O-story distinction is underlined in his 1986 Gifford Lectures
by the fact that it was the first concept he introduced. Indeed, only one solitary
paragraph of introduction was uttered before he got down to business. The fifth and
sixth sentences of his lectures read like this:
Before we get down to detail, let me try to bring home to you what an
exceedingly odd enterprise it is to try to understand our own brain,
and what a huge conceptual gap there is between two very different
kinds of data which the enterprise requires us somehow to tie together.
All our psychological functions have what we might call an 'inside'
and an 'outside' view.312
The fundamental project of the brain scientist, according to MacKay, is to understand
the relationship between these two stories by discovering a wide range of
correlations between different thought processes and different brain activities. This
process is complicated, however, by the fact that, as conscious subjects themselves,
brain scientists can only sort out the O-story by extracting it from their own I-stories.
After all, as scientists gather data—whether that process be 'direct', by looking at
neural images through brain scanners or microscopes, or 'indirect' by examining the
work of other scientists published in technical journals, they must abstract beliefs
about the relevant public events from their own personal experience (whether direct
or indirect) of those events.
The fundamental project of the epistemologist, as opposed to the brain scientist, is to
try to understand the principle on which the I-story and the O-story relate. Whether
it is worked out explicitly or not, this principle undergirds many of the most
prominent metaphysical positions with regard to the nature ofmind.
better labelled "obliged access": for what I want to emphasise is that the facts of experience to which
the I-story bears witness are facts we would be lying to deny.'
311 On page 118 of (MacKay 195 Id), he says, 'The false dualism which used to be expressed in the
question "how can matter produce mind" would now seem to have its origin in a genuine dualism of
conceptual frames of reference, defined respectively for the viewpoint of actor and spectator.'
312
(MacKay 1991b) p. 1
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Traditionally, it has been reasoned that since all physical matter is at least in
principle publicly observable, yet our thought life is essentially private, our O-stories
must relate to the physical world while our I-stories must relate to some non-physical
world. On the face of it, this sounds relatively intuitive. The difficult thing
philosophers of this persuasion have had to explain is how, exactly, the physical
world of the brain (described by the O-story) and the non-physical world of the mind
(described by the I-story) interact. The philosophical muddles individual thinkers
got themselves into as they sought to work out this interaction, coupled with the
astounding success of 'objective science' (which, as we saw in chapter 3, made the
essentially third-person perspective of observer-predictor a methodological goal) led
other philosophers to suggest that the I-story is nothing but an immature, or emotive
expression of the O-story.
It is with regard to these epistemological foundations that MacKay's position first
shows signs of negotiating the tricky logical space between established views. As
we saw in chapter 3, MacKay argued that complementary descriptions form distinct
categories not because they describe different events, but because they describe the
same events from mutually exclusive perspectives. Therefore, ifwe see the I-story
and the O-story as complementary descriptions, the dualist has no more need of any
distinct, non-physical, ontological realm. This brings us back to the line of reasoning
MacKay presents in 'Selves and Brains'. He puts this argument in the following
way:
But granted that we here face a genuine dualism both of data and
categories, does this require us to postulate a dualism of interacting
'quasi-substantial' entities? That my deliberate thinking and deciding
(sometimes) successfully determines my physical activity is a fact I
would be lying to deny. But is 'interaction' between entities the only
conceptual model of such 'determining' available to us? Surely
not.3
The dualists are not the only ones to which MacKay's analysis presents an
alternative, however. After all, those who have thought it necessary to deny any real
sense of duality (identity theorists) find the support they have had given their claims
undermined by MacKay's analysis as well. Not only does MacKay present us with a
viable third option, but he also points out that identity theory requires horrible abuses
of language wherever personal descriptions are concerned.
313
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In contrast to the identity theorist, MacKay argues that the mind/body problem
requires that we recognise a genuine duality. Equally in contrast to the interactionist,
however, MacKay also argues that this duality is epistemic rather than metaphysical.
The duality is not a duality of substances, but of data.
But must this epistemic duality not have metaphysical implications? In answering
this question, we must be very careful to avoid the philosopher's pet peeve of
confusing epistemology with metaphysics. But avoiding that confusion can also be
quite confusing. Perhaps an example at this point would help clear things up a bit.
In his otherwise very clear and helpful exposition ofMacKay's position on the
mind/body problem, Thomas E. Ludwig appears to have fallen prey to this
epistemological/metaphysical confusion. A brief analysis of one paragraph from his
paper should demonstrate how this happened. We will quote in italics the specific
words that are most important to our analysis. In an attempt to explain how
MacKay's computer analogy helps him trace a path between interactionism and
emergentist materialism, Ludwig says the following:
How does this computer analogy apply to the mind-brain problem?
Let me give you a personal example: I am absolutely persuaded that
my thoughts influence my brain's activity. Why do I believe this? I
have seen the EEG tracings from my own head, recorded in Donald
MacKay's laboratory, and they show dramatic changes as I voluntarily
choose to think about different topics. To say that the physical,
measurable changes in my brain's activity were "determined" or
"caused" by my thoughts does not require the existence of any
particular organ of interaction through which my thoughts could
"disturb" the normal pattern ofmy brain's activity. On the other hand,
I reject the notion that the thoughts I was thinking were merely my
way of expressing, or giving a name to, the particular patterns of
activity going on inside my brain at that moment. I reject that notion,
because I had absolutely no conscious knowledge of the patterns of
my brain's activity until I saw the EEG tracings. The moment-by-
moment changes in my brain's activity, observable by the EEG
technician, were completely unavailable to me, the owner of the brain,
as part ofmy conscious experience at the time.314
There are actually two things going wrong in this paragraph, but they appear to be
related. The first thing that goes wrong is that Ludwig does one of the things
MacKay warned us against—he assumes causation between categories. When
Ludwig used the word 'influence' above, MacKay would have had us say 'are
314 (Ludwig 1997)
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correlated with'. But this confusion is based on a larger one that we are still a couple
of steps away from uncovering.
The second thing that goes wrong in this paragraph is that he confuses his
epistemology with his metaphysics. That simply means that he committed the
logical fallacy of assuming that because he could not know something, it could not
have been the case. In particular, he fallaciously argues that because he 'had
absolutely no conscious knowledge' of his brain activity, it could not have been his
brain's activity that he referred to when he spoke of the thoughts he was thinking.
The fallacious nature of his line of thought is somewhat camouflaged by the fact that
in this situation 'what is the case' is related to his reference. It is tempting to think
that his reference must be connected to his knowledge, but to succumb to this
temptation is logically treacherous. This fallacy might be a bit more evident ifwe
experienced it on a more personal level—after all, very few would be relieved of all
offence by the following excuse: 'No, really! When I said that whoever wrote this
paper was a stupid idiot, I did not know that you wrote it—so I could not have been
saying that you are a stupid idiot. I would never say such a thing!'
In contrast to the way that Ludwig argues this point, MacKay believed that the
failure of the identity thesis is not based on any lack of knowledge on our part. On
the other hand, however, the main reason we must reject the identity thesis is related
to the nature of our knowledge. This distinction should become clearer (and more
important) as we attempt to proceed from MacKay's proper epistemological starting
point into a well-reasoned metaphysical position without confusing our epistemology
with our metaphysics.
The epistemic duality that MacKay recognises implies that, with regard to
metaphysics, we must deal with two distinct causal systems. This concept is very
important, because we find in it the key not only to making a proper transition from
epistemology to metaphysics, but also to understanding MacKay's critique of the
identity thesis. It also explains why it is that MacKay warns us against assuming
causation when all we see is correlation. This whole idea goes back to his demand
that we not confuse exhaustiveness with exclusiveness. After all, the I-story and the
O-story are both causal stories—yet, according to MacKay, they are complementary
descriptions of the very same events.
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We saw in chapter 3 that we can only legitimately call a set of descriptions
'complementary' (as opposed to 'contradictory') when the dimensionality of the
subject matter admits enough distinct, valid perspectives. So, ifwe are to say that
the I-story and the O-story are complementary, how should we define the distinct
perspectives? We have said that the two stories represent (roughly) the first and third
perspectives, but we also noted that MacKay did not intend the I-story to require any
'privileged access' or 'private language'. After all, as we saw in the beginning of our
discussion of 'Man As Observer-Predictor'315 for subjects A and B to participate in
genuine dialogue, it is not enough for them to formulate detached O-stories of each
other. A basic requirement for dialogue is that the participants infer I-stories for each
other—so we cannot say that the complementary perspectives from which the I-story
and O-story are meaningful are distinguished by who has access to them. But if both
sets of data refer to the same event, and are available (at least in principle) to the
same people, how are we to understand the required difference in perspective? In
short, what is to keep the identity theorist from saying that they are just two ways of
expressing the very same story?
As we said above, the epistemic duality that MacKay recognises implies that, with
regard to metaphysics, we must deal with two distinct causal systems. His most
concise statement of this duality comes in a discussion of one of his favourite
metaphors—that of comparing the mind/brain relationship to the relationship
between an electronic calculator and the mathematical equation it is in the process of
solving. He says:
The example also illustrates well the need to distinguish between two
kinds or levels of 'causal' connection—between physical causes on
the one hand, and what systems engineers today term informational or
systemic causes on the other. Physical explanations account for
changes in a system in terms of the flow and exchange of energy and
force; informational explanations do so in terms of the flow and
exchange of information and control. The first trace the dependence
offorce on force; the second the dependence ofform on form. Each
legitimately uses the explanatory 'because'; but much confusion arises
if we fail to follow Aristotle's lead in distinguishing between the quite
different senses of 'cause' involved.316
315 See discussion in chapter three of (MacKay 1955c)
316
(MacKay 1985a) p. 105
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B. What is a Mind, Exactly?
As implied by the above reference to 'informational or systemic causes', MacKay
said that the mind is a system. MacKay develops this idea most explicitly in a paper
titled 'Neural Basis ofCognitive Experience'.317 This paper is an empirical report on
a series of studies performed on split-brain patients. Apparently, MacKay conducted
these experiments during his visit318 to the lab of Roger Sperry, with whom MacKay
iiq
appears to have struck up a friendship through their sparring on the mind/body
problem at a Vatican conference organised by Sir John Eccles,320 and later on the
-59 1
pages ofNeuroscience.
Though his report on these experiments is primarily empirical,322 he has to do a good
deal of philosophy before his findings (or even his method) will make any sense. In
setting out to find the neural basis of cognitive experience, he first has to tell us what
cognitive experience is, in terms that are concrete enough to suggest helpful research.
In short, as part of his justification for the manner in which he goes about looking for
the neural basis ofmind, he must tell us what a mind is.
The first step MacKay takes in justifying his methodology is to differentiate between
the kind of study he is suggesting and searches for the neural bases of other human
capacities. He begins by noting that 'An important conceptual difference confronts
us at the outset between this question and those framed solely in terms of observable
behaviour (whether internal or external)'.323 In particular, looking for the neural
basis of cognitive experience is radically different from the search for, say, the neural




MacKay visited Sperry's lab as a Sherman Fairchild Scholar in 1980.
319 For a well researched comparison of Sperry and MacKay, see (McDonald 1994).
320 See (Eccles 1966).
321 See Sperry's commentary, (Sperry 1980), and MacKay's response: (MacKay 1980f).
322In his report on the conference at which he presented his findings ((MacKay 1980g) p.390) MacKay
has the following to say of his own work:
Finally, D. M. MacKay (University of Keele) described recent experiments, based on his
earlier information-flow analysis of cognitive agency, which gave evidence of goal-conflict
between the two 'halves' of split-brain patients only at the executive level. The inference
suggested was that the direct physical correlate of cognitive agency is not cortical activity as
such, but rather the cooperative activity of a 'supervisory system' whose dominant evaluative
level is embodied in diencephalic or other structures not divided by the splitting operation.
323
(MacKay 1981a) p. 315
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soon as we look for an empirical starting point to solving either question. Ifwe are
looking for the neural basis of visual perception, we start with pulses of light and
work to develop the system of cause and effect set in motion by those pulses of light
coming into contact with a properly functioning eye. This system of cause and effect
has been effectively traced from the eye back to the brain's occipital lobe—such that
we can say with a reasonable degree of confidence that the occipital lobe is the
neurological 'centre' of visual perception. Ifwe are looking for the neural basis of
cognitive experience, on the other hand, it is difficult even to know where to start.
In cases like our search for the neural basis of visual perception, MacKay has
demonstrated the efficacy of constructing and testing 'information-flow models'.
This process can be quite straightforward in cases like this because 'all the
correlations we observe are between data in the same conceptual category'—which is
just to say that all the causes and effects we must work with are parts of the same
causal chain.324 With regard to the neural basis of the mind, on the other hand, we
must correlate two sets of data that are qualitatively different. 'To the eye of the
physiologist, the events of conscious experience seem (literally) to have no business
in the tightly interlocked fabric of his explanatory models.'325
The reason that 'the events of conscious experience' are out ofplace in physiological
models is that the mind is an essentially systematic property—or more specifically, it
is an emergent co-operative process. Perhaps the most appropriate question to ask at
this point would be what 'an emergent co-operative process' means. It means,
according to MacKay, that 'its character depends not on the detailed structure formed
by its elements but on their statistical capacity to promote or inhibit state-transitions
in one another.' This definition would be so obscure as to be largely unhelpful if it
were not accompanied by an example—and the example MacKay provides is a quite
familiar one. After all, while MacKay tells us that 'A flame is a typical co-operative
process', he also reminds us that 'The comparison of the human mind with a flame is
at least as old as Hericlitus'.326
But simply saying that the mind is a co-operative emergent system is not enough—
because there are lots of these kinds of systems (like flames) that are clearly not
324 Ibid. p. 315
325 Ibid. p. 316
326 All the quotations in this paragraph taken from p. 318.
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minds. While, as we learned from our investigation into the grammar ofmental
descriptions, a full set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
mind will always contain a certain degree of vagueness, we have not yet exhausted
all that we can usefully say about minds. We know, for example, that minds think
about things—which means that they are evaluative processes. We also know that
self-reflection is an important aspect of consciousness—which means that minds are
multi-layered evaluative processes. And even more interestingly, because no feature
of our intellectual experience is structurally immune to self-criticism, the layers of
evaluation that make up our cognitive functioning are not static. That is to say that
they are not hierarchical (leaving at least one process 'above' evaluation) but
heterarchical (leaving every sub-system open to the evaluation of others). This
heterarchic feature allows us to have competing desires—even to the extent that the
comparative 'strength' of our priorities is not enough to make all decisions. Yet even
when we hold contradictory priorities with equal strength, we do not find ourselves
at an impasse. No matter how many levels of self-evaluation are already included in
our cognitive process, it seems that we always have the ability to create at least one
more level to 'break the tie', so that we are able to say to ourselves, 'I don't know
which is best, so I will just pick one.'
Though it may sound somewhat complicated to say that the mind is a heterarchically
related multi-level co-operative emergent process, it may turn out to be less
misleading to talk this way than to adopt the supervenience language which is
currently so fashionable in philosophy of mind—but we must postpone this
comparison ofMacKay's understanding with the non-reductive physicalist's for
another project.
C. What Do Minds Do?
Now that we have a rough and ready definition ofwhat a mind is, we must ask
ourselves what this complex process can be expected to accomplish. We have seen
that MacKay strongly advised against assuming causation when all we see is
correlation, but ifwe can't say that the mind causes anything, what reason would we
have for saying that the mind exists at all? At the end of the day, a world filled with
utterly impotent minds is not going to look any different from a world with no minds
at all.
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MacKay reassures us, perhaps most explicitly in his 1980 letter to the editors of the
journal Neuroscience, that while he does urge extreme caution along these lines, he is
against any theory of mental impotence. He summarises his own work along these
lines in the following way:
The information-engineering analogy, however, led me to urge that in
order to avoid confusion we needed different terms from 'causality'
and 'interaction' to denote the interdependence of 'mind' and
T97 A
'matter'. To reduce the risk of misunderstanding, I proposed that
we reserve 'interaction' and 'causality' for the links between events or
entities at the same categorical level, whether mental or physical,
and perhaps speak of 'necessity' for the inter-level relationship.329
The two-way link between mental activity and the physical activity in
which it is immediately embodied is (I suggested) 'a relationship more
intimate than that of cause-and-effect'.330, 1
The reason for MacKay's claim that the relationship between what minds do and
what brains do is 'more intimate than cause and effect' is that mind-talk and brain-
talk refer to the very same events (albeit at different levels of specificity and from
different perspectives) for radically different purposes. So the difference between a
world full of impotent minds (or a world with no minds) and our world is that some
events in our world demand explanation in both mental and physical language. In
those events that demand both kinds of descriptions, the relationship between the
minds in one type of description and the brains (or equivalent) in the other type is
neither one of identity, independence, nor causality, but constant conjunction. The
terms 'mind' and 'brain' pick out different things, in that the entities referred to by
them belong to categories that must be kept distinct. But if the categories must be
kept distinct, and particularly if the necessity of this distinction derives from our
earlier claim that minds and brains participate in distinct causal chains, are we not
TIT
merely retracing the doomed footsteps of the epiphenomenalists?
327 Here MacKay refers us to (MacKay 1953c).
328 Here MacKay refers us specifically to page 24 of (MacKay 1953c).
329 Here MacKay refers us to page 25 of (MacKay 1955c).
330 Here MacKay refers us to (MacKay 1960d).
331
(MacKay 1980f) p. 1389.
332
'Epiphenomenalists', here, refers to those early thinkers, like Huxley, who said that minds were
merely the causally impotent by-product of cerebral activity.
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The short answer to this question is 'no'. The reason MacKay is not bound to a 'yes'
answer here is that those categories in which the irreducibly dual causal stories come
to us are also hierarchically complementary, meaning that for something to be true
on one level (the mental) something else must be true on the other (physical) level
(though not necessarily visa versa). That is just to say that the connection between
'mental properties' and 'physical properties' is neither causal (as the interactionist
would say) nor trivial (as the epiphenomenalist would say), but consistent333—so that
it is possible to make cross-categorypredictions even while it would be pernicious to
call the relationship between the basis and the prediction 'causal'.334
Though MacKay's understanding of 'mental causation' as the constant conjunction
of hierarchically complementary descriptions is complex, it is important for us to
remember that it is not the mere metaphysical speculation of an armchair
philosopher. In fact, he did not even claim that his understanding of this relationship
was original. MacKay regarded this entire feature of his thought as nothing more
than a clear and logically justified statement of the standard, rather well established,
working hypothesis of the neuroscientist.335
D. Applying MacKay's Theory ofMind to the Work of Psychology
The next question that is likely to present itself is how this working hypothesis is
actually to be used by the neuroscientist. In particular, it may serve as an apt
conclusion to our metaphysical study of the mind to apply what we have learned—
asking ourselves how this metaphysical theory informs the very practical process of
bringing the tools of empirical science to bear on our study of the mind.
As we saw in our analysis of what MacKay said a mind is, however, the conceptual
gap between metaphysics and empirical science, like the gap between epistemology
333
Though in the selection quoted immediately above (written in 1980) MacKay uses the word
'necessary', he was careful to back away from such strong terminology later on. On p. 402 of
(MacKay 1985d), he calls the correlation of mental and physical properties a 'working assumption
(and it is no more)'. Again, on p. 4 of (MacKay 1991b) he calls the consistent correlation of changes
in the mind with changes in the brain 'the brain scientist's working assumption'.
334 So, for example, it would be fine to say things like 'He is in a really good mood today, so he is
likely to loan you the money if you ask him for it' while it may be quite misleading to say 'If you ask
him for a loan today, his happiness will probably cause him to give you the money.'
335
Among other places, MacKay makes this point on p. 601 of (MacKay 1978h), p. 402 of (MacKay
1985d), and pp. 4-5 of (MacKay 1991b).
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and metaphysics, is not an easy one to cross. MacKay made this point in the
following terms:
The problem of relating mental activity to brain events (and vice-
versa) presents difficulties of two kinds. One difficulty is to discover
and evaluate relevant empirical evidence. The other and logically
prior difficulty is to discover an operationally satisfactory way of
framing the questions to which we would like empirical answers. The
argument of this paper is that the present confused and inconclusive
debate over the 'mind/brain' problem arises largely from failures in
the second category. For rationally explicable reasons, this problem
presents conceptual pitfalls which have no parallel elsewhere in
science; I shall argue that once these pitfalls are marked and avoided,
the existing evidence fits harmoniously with what each of the
traditional sides in the debate wishes to affirm, without justifying the
negative conclusions supposed necessary by either side.3 6
MacKay argues that when seeking to 'bridge the gap', whether between
metaphysical and mental or empirical and physical descriptions, we must keep three
things in mind: 1) degree ofmagnification (is this causal chain underspecified?); 2)
type of causation (force-on-force or form-on-form?); and 3) degree of certainty (can
we make a logical deduction or only a probabilistic prediction?). These three factors
are in some sense distinct, but they are also very tightly related. After all, we have
seen that ifwe want to evaluate mental activity, the data must be scrutinised at the
proper degree ofmagnification. Ifwe look at the relevant events in too much detail,
we may understand the force-on-force causation taking place at the expense of
missing the form-on-form causation—which, as we saw above, is the only type of
causal story in which systematic entities such as the mind play a clear role. We must
also realise, however, that viewing the relevant events at the appropriate level of
magnification for form/form causation requires our predictions to be couched in
terms ofprobability rather than certainty.
Ifwe want to see how these principles work themselves out in practice, then we need
look no further than MacKay himself. MacKay's recognition of these three tightly
related points affected his career as an empirical brain scientist in several ways. First
of all, as we mentioned in our discussion of what a mind is, MacKay made extensive
use of information-flow models in much of his brain research. While the use of these
kinds of models met with enormous success when used to explore less introspective
forms of mental functioning like perception, his attempts to apply these models to
336
p. 285 of (MacKay 1982b)
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conscious processes were, by his own admission, not always as helpful as
psychologists would have liked. This is not to say that he did not produce some
fascinating work along these lines, however. The work he began in a pair of papers
published in 195 6337 culminated in his fascinating presentation to the 1964 Vatican
conference338—at which he provided an astoundingly detailed model of how such a
complex arrangement of supervisory systems as the human mind might work on the
informational level. With this astoundingly detailed model, he also suggested ways
in which empirical research could be brought to bear on the task of fine-tuning his
ideas. But, as we saw above, structural aspects of the problem being addressed kept
him from being able to give the kind of detail physicists had come to expect of
proper science.
But limits as to the amount of detail it is possible for us to provide with regard to the
mind should not be overly discouraging to psychological study. While it may mean
that it would be misleading to treat psychology as a physical science, the empirical
data gained as the tools of natural science are applied to the brains of normally
conscious subjects are an important resource and foundation for a proper
metaphysics ofmind.339
But regardless of whether we classify psychology as philosophy or science, we must
always remember that in order to focus on the mind, we cannot fall into the trap of
thinking that more detail equals greater focus. After all, if our search for certainty
337
(MacKay 1956d) and (MacKay 1956e)
338
(MacKay 1966b)
339 For a historically important debate on whether psychology should be treated as philosophy or
reduced to natural science, see (Brown 1974; MacKay and MacKay 1973).
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takes us to a level of causal specificity that leaves no options open to the subject, we
have 'missed the forest for the trees', so to speak, and forsaken our pursuit of the
form-on-form causation of the mind for the force— on-force causation of the brain.
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Chapter 5: The Free Will Issue: MacKay's Theory of Logical
Relativity
In our discussion ofMacKay's understanding of the mind/body problem, we argued
that one of the distinguishing characteristics of mental descriptions is that they must
never specify any given situation in such detail that only one viable option is
available to the subject of that description. The natural question that this raises is
also the central question regarding the possibility of physical reductionism, namely:
if it is possible (even theoretically) to provide a description of a given event in such
detail that the outcome of that event is determinable in advance, how is it possible to
avoid the conclusion that any so-called 'options' at a less specific level of description
are merely the illusory results of ignorance? We stated briefly in our last chapter that
MacKay's doctrine of complementary descriptions provides us with a response to
this question. In this chapter we will attempt to present a fuller account of how
MacKay dealt with these issues.
As one might expect, MacKay's answer to this question cannot be a simple one. The
reason that a correct answer to this question must be complex, according to MacKay,
is that it must take into account a rarely discussed paradox involving the application
of our essentially third-person logical system to our selves. Acknowledging certain
similarities to the paradoxes highlighted by Einstein, MacKay called this paradox
'logical relativity'.340
In this chapter, we will introduce MacKay's argument for logical relativity, discuss
some important ways his argument has been misunderstood, and evaluate the effect
340 In the process of naming this principle, MacKay also made several notes about his choice of a
name that may interest us here. As his second concluding point to his 1960 paper 'On the Logical
Indeterminacy of a Free Choice' (which we will be discussing shortly), MacKay says:
Second, and not unrelated, there has emerged the idea of transformation rules according to
which it may be essential for A's belief to differ from B's in order that both may be valid.
This denial of simple transferability constitutes a kind of philosophical Principle of
Relativity, very different from that exaltation of the arbitrary which goes by the name of
'moral relativism'. It resembles rather Einstein's physical principle in its insistence (i) that
only one rigorously prescribable belief is valid for A if B's belief is also valid, but (ii) that
the validity and meaningfulness of a beliefmay depend in a definite and rigorous way upon
who entertains it. It differs, however, in giving no guarantee that A can even formulate from
his standpoint the belief that would be valid for B (until it is out of date) and in making no
assumption that their situations must be symmetrical. (MacKay 1960g) p. 39
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of this paradox on the credibility ofMacKay's broader mind/body complementarity
thesis.
I. MacKay's Theory of Logical Relativity
A. Background
The roots ofMacKay's theory of logical relativity can be seen in his first exchange
published by the British Journalfor the Philosophy ofScience. His first paper
published by that journal ('Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts'341)342 included a
penultimate section titled 'Philosophical Stock-Taking'343 in which he makes some
quite provocative comments concerning the similarity between the function of
calculating machines and that of human brains. While he later claimed that this
paper included only three sentences regarding human free will, the context of these
sentences is vitally important. For this reason, it may be wisest to quote entirely the
three paragraphs he devotes to the broader issue of free will. The first two
paragraphs we will quote concern the way in which it would be best to think of
randomness in an artefact designed to exhibit mindlike behaviour. They set the
context for the third paragraph, which conveys MacKay's thoughts on human free
will. On page 119 we read:
We are accustomed to think of completely random activity as
meaningless and dull. But our artefact shows randomness in the
domain which in a human being is that offree will; and behaviourally
there is no reason in principle why the two should be distinguishable.
All systematic components of human behaviour-patterns can in
principle be simulated. What remains is by definition devoid of
systematic content for the observer, i.e. it exercises no selective action
on the information-space of the observer. Equally by definition, it
must then be classified as the 'completely random component' of the
human behaviour pattern from the observer's point ofview. Yet in the
context of the systematic component it admits of a reasonable
interpretation as the exercise of free choice; and by the actor himself
the calculus of responsibility is normally acknowledged to be directly
applicable to it as such.
341
(MacKay 195 Id)
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The point cannot be pressed in detail here, but it may bear further
consideration, since we are so often inclined to use 'mere randomness'
as a term of dismissal or almost of explanation.
The connection between the apparent free will of our artefact and the
determinate components of its behaviour-pattern inevitably suggests
an analogy with the hoary problem of human free will. This is usually
epitomised in the question, 'Is human free will genuine?' The
question in this form is imprecise, but the parallel may be
illuminating. The choices of a free man are seldom devoid of a
statistically-predictable component; someone who knows him well
can usually score a significant frequency of success in predicting his
choices, though it is most unlikely that they form a stationary time-
series. In the same way the choices of the artefact, given a knowledge
of the various threshold levels defining transition-probabilities, are
statistically predictable on a short term basis. The suggestion is that
the choices of a free man may likewise be governed by statistical
distribution-functions which have a psychological representation and
are in principle determinate; but that individual choices can be
unpredictable in principle, and it is probable that the distribution-
functions are indeterminable in practice.344
Because the purpose of this paper was to discuss the technical degree to which it is
theoretically possible for machines to mimic human behaviour, his statements on free
will are understandably brief and behaviouristic. On the other hand, as we shall see,
the rather rustic sketch of his views that we see here effectively foreshadows the
kinds of things he will say in later discussions. In the course of the published
discussion that these comments provoked, however, MacKay supplements the above
statements with an important qualification, which we will do well to keep in mind
throughout our discussion ofMacKay's involvement in the free will/determinism
debate.
These three paragraphs related to free will provoked a critical comparison of
MacKay and Gilbert Ryle by M. H. Pirenne in 195 2345 and again by W. Mays in
195 3.346 In these responses both writers focus on the complex relationship between
the causal descriptions of physics and the less deterministic relationship between
agents and motives. Pirenne's main point seems to be that we should continue to
work to take into account the first-hand knowledge we all have of our own freedom
despite the fact that we have as yet (in his opinion) no satisfactory way of reconciling
344
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it consistently with a scientifically justifiable physical theory.347 Mays, on the other
hand, is much more critical ofMacKay's view. Mays' criticism, however, is based
more upon a misunderstanding348 ofMacKay's position than on any genuine neglect
on MacKay's part.
The extent to which the responses of these two thinkers influenced MacKay's
thinking would be difficult to calculate, but their papers are important if for no other
reason than that in responding to them, MacKay gives us an important clarification
of his thinking. This clarification provides us with an important key to
understanding his position on the free will question. In particular, his comments
remind us that even while arguments concerning the essential unpredictability of free
action may prove to be the most logically intriguing aspect of his theory, they are not
the most important. After demonstrating the error in Mays' interpretation and
acknowledging sympathy with Pirenne's position, MacKay makes the following
comments:
My three sentences on human choice I now regret, not indeed because
they seem any less valid, but because I consider unpredictability to
have less importance than other criteria for determining responsibility,
and I think the emphasis laid by omitting to say so was wrong.
Fascinating though the implications of unpredictability are for moral
philosophy, I am convinced, as I have pointed out elsewhere,349 that it
does not offer the proper solution to the apparent problem of free
will.350
347 Pirenne's central criticism ofMacKay is expressed in the opening statement of his paper. He says:
In his paper on 'Mind-like Behaviour in Artefacts', Dr. D. M. MacKay says of his mechanical
analogue of the human brain that it 'shows randomness in the domain which in a human being
is that of free will; and behaviourally there is no reason in principle why the two should be
distinguishable.' This may be quite true, but then many a reader will say: I know from my own
direct experience that free will and indetermination are not the same; accordingly, since I have
free will, I conclude that I am essentially different from such a mechanical artefact, at least in
some respects. Dr. MacKay, however, writes that 'no reputable theologian expects to find
physical laws disobeyed in the human brain.' This suggests that in Dr. MacKay's opinion man
is after all essentially similar to such an artefact. It is because it obeys physical laws that the
artefact has no free will, but only indeterminate behaviour. If physical laws rule in the human
brain in the same way as in the artefact, it is hard to see how there can be any genuine human
freedom. The present writer fails to understand how Dr MacKay's conception, in spite of its
complexity and ingenuity, is compatible with free will not being an illusion, (p. 315)
348 Even ifMays' misunderstanding ofMacKay's position were not clear from a simple reading of his
paper, the first two paragraphs of MacKay's response should settle the issue.
349
MacKay's footnote: 'An artefact's approximation to voluntary behaviour', paper read before the
Philosophy of Science Group on October 13, 1952, to be published later; also 'From Mechanism to
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As these comments demonstrate, MacKay had, by this point, developed an
understanding of the relationship between the laws of nature and human freedom that
allowed him to affirm our undeniable first-person sense of being free while at the
same time maintaining that we are truly responsible for our actions. His way of
looking at these questions involved, as we discussed in chapters 1 and 2, his
understanding of logical complementarity. As his thinking along these lines evolved,
MacKay also came to recognise the importance of an interesting kind of paradox
concerning the way in which the truth value of 'objective' or 'third-person'
predictions are fundamentally limited when applied to entities capable of forming
belief structures.
This paradox, which was the justification of his call for us to recognise the principle
of logical relativity, eventually became his most trusted defence against the claim
that determinism at one level of description (brain physiology in particular)
diminishes the value of any claim to freedom made at another level of description.
As we turn to discuss this paradox, however, it is important that we keep in mind the
fact that logical relativity is only one point in a multi-pronged defence of his
position. We may also recognise the irony in the fact that even as MacKay was
emphasising (as we saw immediately above) the fact that unpredictability 'does not
offer the proper solution to the apparent problem of free will', he was also coming to
recognise the importance of a paradox concerning the relative truth value of
deterministic predictions.
B. The Origin of the Paradox
In the early 1970's, sixteen years after MacKay's response to Pirenne and Mays, the
British Journal of the Philosophy ofScience resumed its publication ofpapers
questioning his views on freedom.351 This time, the criticism centred on the paradox
to which we have been alluding. In his first response352 to this second wave of
1C1
#
criticism, MacKay explained how he came upon this paradox. It appears that in
351 See the following papers: (MacKay 1971a).(MacKay 1973b; Landsberg and D. A. Evans 1970;




353 He gives a similar but summarised explanation of how this happened in his Gifford Lectures. See
(MacKay 1991b) p. 207.
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the course of a discussion that began in the late 1940's concerning various aspects of
brain mechanics,354 MacKay introduced a thought experiment he called the
'cerebroscope'.355 Basically, the thought experiment involved imagining a brain
scanner that could produce live reports on what a subject was thinking.
The paradox began to show itself when it came time to talk about what would happen
when the cerebroscope was set up to report what the subject was seeing, and the
subject was watching the cerebroscope. What we would expect to happen in this
situation is that the scanner would go haywire with feedback in the same way that an
amplifier does when a microphone is placed in front of a speaker.
To get around this paradox, the group imagined that the cerebroscope displayed its
results in words rather than in pictures. Though this new situation would obviously
result in more information being displayed than could be comprehended in 'real
time', it would also solve the feedback problem—at least with regard to vision. The
interesting thing about this thought experiment, however, is that the paradox was not
removed altogether. After all, if the cerebroscope was set up to display the current
set of the subject's beliefs, an even deeper paradox emerged. If the subject (for
grammatical simplicity, let us assume that the subject is female in the situation to be
discussed) believed what she read on the cerebroscope's display, then when the
cerebroscope was set up to display her beliefs, we would find a kind of feedback. It
would have to say that she 'believed that she believed that she believed that she
believed.. ,'.356
-5 en
MacKay's first published allusion to this paradox came in 1954 when, in a final
section (titled 'postscript on perspective') of a paper titled 'On Comparing the Brain
with Machines' he briefly explained his position on the relationship between physical
354 These discussions reportedly took place among members of 'The Ratio Club', which met at the
National Hospital in London. The club consisted of around twenty members, including MacKay, A.
M. Turing, Horace Barlow and others.
355 As to when he introduced this thought experiment, MacKay says 'I think in 1952'. (See citations
above.)
356
Obviously, the converse of this example would also be problematic—for if she disbelieved what
she was reading, the only thing that would change in the readout is that 'disbelieves' would have to
replace 'believes'. Likewise, if she believed only up to a point (or some other combination of belief
and disbelief), then the cerebroscope would still be unable to complete a statement, it is just that the
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determinism and the freedom (and resulting responsibility) of agents. Because this
first published reference sets this paradox so well within the wider context of his
system, it will be best again to quote a rather lengthy selection. The last three
paragraphs of his paper read as follows:
It is not because I believe my brain to work indeterministically that I
judge myself to be responsible. On the contrary, the more physically
reliable my brain is, the less excuse I have from my responsibility.
There is an unpredictability that goes with my responsibility, but that
is something different. It is the unpredictability to you of what I shall
do if you offer me your prediction. As a little thought will show, you
would never be able to cope with this by allowing for the effect of
your prediction on me, since I should always be one jump ahead of the
data on which you could base it.
To sum up, I believe most seriously that man is 'more than' the
physical organism we can describe in observer-language. But I
believe that this implies, not necessarily that there must be gaps in the
physical account of his activity, but that he has other aspects that are
revealed only by using another complementary language to describe
the same activity, which in its full nature transcends and combines
what can be said in each.
To explore the implications of such complementarity may throw some
light on the age-old paradox that though we are but dust, we are held
responsible in the sight of God our Maker. But of this responsibility,
whatever our attitude to it, no increase in our understanding of the
brain can relieve us.359
Though such phrases as 'as a little thought will show' may not offer the degree of
guidance we need to trek with him through such a tricky maze as the one we have
entered into here, in the thirty-five years following this publication, MacKay was to
demonstrate this paradox much more explicitly—and to a very wide range of
thinkers. We will now draw on several of these demonstrations as we attempt to
investigate this paradox as fully as possible.
C. Towards a Fuller Explanation of the Paradox
Of all the works in which MacKay explains his theory of logical relativity, the one
that he seems to refer to most often is 'On the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free
358
MacKay identifies (MacKay 1954b) as his first reference to this paradox in (MacKay 1971a).
359
(MacKay 1954b) p. 406
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Choice'. The stated purpose of 'On the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free Choice'
is to call into question what MacKay refers to as the 'stock argument' of those who
think that an advanced physiology of the brain would deny our subjective sense of
personal freedom. MacKay summarises this 'stock argument' as follows:
If my physical brain-processes were wholly physically determined,
and if my decisions could be inferred uniquely from my brain-
processes, then a fully-in formed observer ofmy brain-processes could
know the outcome of my choices with certainty before I made them,
and my impression of freedom in making these choices would
therefore be an illusion, due to mere ignorance of the true state of
affairs.361
While many other would-be defenders of freedom from this attack would point to
some supposed structural indeterminacy in the human brain (usually resulting more
or less directly from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle), MacKay consciously
avoids this move. The reason that he does not want to appeal to indeterminacy is
that, as we shall see, he believes such arguments to be 'misguided and immoral'.362
MacKay believes that appeals to indeterminacy are misguided for at least two
reasons. Firstly, as MacKay points out in an earlier paper, 'my responsibility is
adequately nailed to my door ifmy choice is logically indeterminate until I make it—
which could be true even ifmy brain showed no physical discontinuities'.363
Secondly, arguments from indeterminacy are misguided in that they, like the old
God-of-the-gaps arguments of bygone days, stake the validity of their position on the
assumption that certain causal forces will never be understood by physical science.
In this important regard, such arguments are, quite literally, founded on ignorance—
which is almost never a good idea.
In addition to this form of argument being misguided, however, MacKay also
believed it to be immoral. The reasons for MacKay's claim that this form of
argument is immoral were also stated in the earlier paper we referred to above. He
said that they are immoral because:
360 While the first version of this paper was presented to the Xllth International Congress of
Philosophy (MacKay 1958d), MacKay usually refers to the expanded version of this paper printed by
Mind in 1960 (MacKay 1960g).
361
(MacKay 1960g) p. 31
362
(MacKay 1960g) p. 31
363
(MacKay 1957a), quoted from p. 402 of the reprint in (G. N. A. Vesey 1964) italics added
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... a reliance on physical indeterminacy would deny responsibility for
choices (whether good or bad) for which I think a man has a right to
claim responsibility. This is no less distressing because those who
hold such views do so in the name of human dignity. But I believe
that our true dignity lies in having the humility to see ourselves for
what we are: and I am convinced that the Christian doctrine of man at
any rate, in all its fullness, requires no licence for his brain to suffer
non-physical disturbances. There is, as I have said, a profound
mystery in our human nature; but it stands wholly apart from any
scientific puzzles that we may find in the brain. It will be in our
wisdom to avoid any temptation to confound the two.364
Because MacKay thinks it so inadvisable to argue for any kind of freedom and
responsibility based on indeterminacy, he grants (at least for the sake of argument)
the premise of the argument he set out to refute. Instead of denying the premise,
MacKay denies the validity of the argument. He argues that even ifwe were to
assume that the very strictest theories of determinism with regard to the physical
workings of our brains were correct (though he points out repeatedly that he, as a
brain scientist, sees little reason to hope that it will ever be possible to predict the
outcome of any given brain process with anything other than statistical probability),
the conclusion—that we would be wrong to believe in what is commonly known as
'free will'—would not follow. In highlighting the invalidity of this 'stock
argument', he draws our attention to the paradox at the heart of logical relativity.
The paradox we are seeking to uncover comes about when we think about what the
world would be like if the premise of the argument against freedom really were true.
In many of his works on this subject,365 MacKay asks us to expound on this premise
by means of a thought experiment. MacKay asks us to imagine a world in which all
physical matter behaves according to a finite set of absolute physical laws. In this
imaginary world, we are also to imagine that brain science has advanced to the point
that some super-scientist (we will call her Anna) is capable of calculating all the
causal forces acting on her subject's brain at a given time so accurately that she can,
based on the deterministic physical laws of her universe, accurately predict the exact
state of her subject's brain at some time in the future. And then, based on this brain-
364
(MacKay 1957a), p. 402 of the reprint in (G. N. A. Vesey 1964)
365 To name but a few, see his paper 'Man as Mechanism' (originally printed as (MacKay 1960d), but
reprinted as chapter 2 of (MacKay 1966c) [esp. pp. 62ff]), (MacKay 1974b) pp. 78ff, and especially
his Gifford Lectures (see (MacKay 1991b)pp. 113ff). For a helpful variation on this thought
experiment (making use of the super-scientist in a slightly different kind of prediction) see also his
Riddle Memorial Lecture ((MacKay 1967a) pp. 55ff).
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state prediction, Anna is further able to read off a prediction of what that subject's
future mental state will be—such as the outcome of some decision.
If there is any merit to the argument MacKay set out to investigate, surely any
dreams Anna's subjects may have had concerning their own freedom would be
dashed to pieces by her definite and necessary predictions. But ifwe think more
closely about the situation we have imagined, we will be forced to recognise a
paradox that, according to MacKay, invalidates the argument's final conclusion. For
more detail on how this works, we return to the central argument of his 1960 work.
MacKay's reasoning in 'On the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free Choice' unfolds in
three distinct stages. In his introduction, he characterises these stages as follows:
First, we shall take note of some peculiar restrictions on the predictive
certainty attainable in principle by the observer of an agent. In the
light of these, we must next question whether 'the true state of affairs'
can validly be identified with the view of the observer, and whether
the agent who does not share that view can validly be described as
'ignorant'. The answer will lead us finally to recognise a curious kind
of 'relativity principle' governing talk about the acts of agents,
which—if I am right—shows the stock argument above to be
fallacious.366
1. 'PeculiarRestrictions'
In the case that we have imagined, MacKay argues, there is one very important
restriction that must be placed on Anna and her predictions with regard to the future
brain states of her subjects: for her predictions to be valid, she must (logically must)
keep them secret from her subjects. Though Anna's case is, for multiple reasons,
more philosophically interesting than the case of the real time brain scanner, the two
cases are importantly similar.
What happened with the cerebroscope was that we ran into a technical difficulty with
feedback in the system. Similarly, ifAnna is not extremely careful with her
predictions, she will run into her own kind of feedback problem—though her
difficulties go deeper than mere technicalities.
The reason Anna must be careful with her predictions is that if her subjects ever
become aware of them, these predictions are bound to produce some change in their
brain states. If this were to happen, she would obviously be required to take these
366
(MacKay 1960g) pp. 31&32.
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influences into account. The problem is that in order to judge what effect her
predictions would have, she must know the content of those predictions—which
means that in order to make an accurate prediction, she must already know what her
prediction is going to be. So, to put the matter more clearly, in order to complete her
calculations, she must already have completed them. This, most would agree, would
be a feat that even the most supreme of super scientists is unlikely to accomplish.
2. Anna's Predictions And 'The True State ofAffairs'
Though we may not have initially expected Anna to be obliged to operate in secret,
this restriction by itself would not appear all that overbearing. So far, at least, we
have uncovered nothing so absurd that incompatibilists need worry overmuch about
the validity of their stock argument.
But we must also take care to remember that the argument regards what a person is
right to believe regarding his or her own freedom. This brings us to consider the
question of what the subjects ofAnna's predictions would be right to believe
concerning the validity of her predictions.
In a very general sense, we may want to say that the subjects would be right to
believe that Anna's predictions would be true (even though, of course, they can never
know the content of any given prediction concerning themselves). After all, even if
they cannot be told what Anna's predictions are, it would seem reasonable for
Anna's subjects (particularly if they knew that Anna was a super-scientist and that
they were living in a physically determinate universe) to believe very strongly in
Anna's ability to predict their future. In admitting this general sense of belief in her
predictions, what we are saying is that Anna's subjects would seem quite justified in
writing her a kind of 'epistemic blank cheque', such that what her subjects might
believe is something like, 'I don't know what Anna is predicting exactly, but
whatever it is, that is what I believe'.
But the problem for the incompatibilist is that this general form of belief is the only
kind of beliefAnna's subjects can ever rightly have concerning her predictions. If
she ever were to 'fill out', so to speak, her 'epistemic blank cheque' the cheque
would be invalidated. This is why the secrecy requirement is so interesting. If
Anna's subjects were ever to believe any individual prediction concerning their own
brain states, they must know that individual prediction, and that prediction would be
thus invalidated. It would seem to follow, therefore, that in any given situation, there
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cannot exist any prediction concerning what they will do (based on any form of
mechanistic brain science) that they would be correct to believe. This follows
because while 1) it is impossible to believe any specific thing that one is not aware
of, 2) we have already demonstrated that if Anna's subjects are aware of her
predictions concerning themselves, that prediction must be invalid, because 3) it is
logically impossible for any prediction to be soundly based on causal reasoning that
involves a vicious regress.
Though it would seem quite uncontroversial to say that all people (even the subjects
ofAnna's predictions) would be right to believe 'the true state of affairs', the
question at this point in our analysis becomes what this 'true state of affairs' is. If
Anna's predictions are kept from influencing her subjects, we might be tempted to
say that her predictions represent the true state of affairs. But in this situation we
have a real paradox on our hands. On the one hand, we have said that her subjects
would not be right to believe any ofAnna's individual predictions367 (because if they
believe the predictions, the predictions are thus invalidated). On the other hand,
however, it would seem that, at least in cases where the subjects cannot catch word
of her predictions, isolated observers (including Anna and all others that are not the
subject of the prediction in question) would be correct to believe that her predictions
are valid. And so we see that what Anna's subjects would be correct to believe is
different from what Anna and the isolated observers would be correct to believe. So,
if the converse of our 'uncontroversial' statement concerning 'the true state of
affairs' is true, then 'the true state of affairs' must be different for the observers and
the subjects.
With regard, then, to the argument for incompatibility on which he calls this paradox
to bear, MacKay says the following:
My suggestion, then, is that our 'firm subjective conviction of
freedom' is not primarily a belief about the unpredictability of our
brain-processes but is the entirely justifiable corollary of these
peculiar logical facts. For us as agents, any purported prediction of
our normal choices as 'certain' is strictly incredible, and the key
evidence for it unformulable. It is not that the evidence is unknown to
367
They could, of course, come to believe them after the fact—but by that time her 'predictions'
would no longer regard the subject's future but the subject's past—making them descriptions rather
than predictions. Besides, it would be quite uncontroversial to say that a subject is not free to change
his or her past. What is meant by 'freedom' is that the subject is able to make genuine choices
concerning his or herfuture.
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us; in the nature of the case, no evidence-for-us at that point exists.
To us, choosing is not something to be observed or predicted, but to
be done.368
3. Principle ofLogical Relativity
It is important, ifwe are not to misunderstand where MacKay is going with this
paradox, to remember what his doctrine of complementary descriptions is all about.
In particular, it is important that we recognise the fact that MacKay is arguing for a
kind of relativity—not relativism. While relativity involves the recognition of the
fact that what one would be right to believe depends on one's relation to the objects
of that belief, relativism (i.e. the thesis which MacKay explicitly rejects) states that
objectivity is a mere fiction. The true purpose ofMacKay's argument may be
clarified by asking what he would think it would be right for a third party (an
observer detached from both Anna and her subjects) to believe concerning what
Anna and her subjects would be right to believe. For the sake of linguistic
simplicity, we will call this third party detached observer 'Big Brother'. If what we
discussed earlier regarding MacKay's doctrine of complementary descriptions is
true, Big Brother would be right to believe that both Anna and her subjects are right
in believing different things with regard to the state of affairs in which they are
involved. But it is not enough to say that what Anna and her subjects would be right
to believe is different, for what they believe must be appropriately different. That is,
Big Brother would be right to believe that what Anna and her subjects would be right
to believe would be the state of affairs summarised according to their individual,
appropriate, perspectival indexes. For Big Brother, Anna, or Anna's subjects to
believe anything other than their own perspectivally indexed truths would simply be
wrong. With regard to how the concept of personal freedom relates to these
complementary perspectives, MacKay says the following:
If, however, we are concerned to ask what a member of our linguistic
community may validly believe (e.g.) about the actions he would
subjectively term 'free', I see no escape from the necessity to make
room for two complementary stories, one validly believable only from
the standpoint of detached onlookers, which the agent would be wrong
to try to believe until after his action, the other validly believable from
the standpoint of the agent,—and by the onlookers too insofar as they
permit themselves the exercise of sympathetic imagination. The two
are not mere translations of one another, since it is what is asserted by
368
(MacKay 1960b), p. 37
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the onlookers, and not just its conventional form, that is logically
unacceptable to the agent; yet (ex hypothesi) there is a definite
transformation rule by which (in retrospect at least) the accuracy of
one may be checked in terms of the other.369,370
371But in all this, we are working our way into ground already covered in chapter 3.
One more thing that should be mentioned before we move into a discussion of
MacKay's critics, however, is what could be called 'the condensed version' of
MacKay's argument for logical relativity. Rather than bring the entire imaginary
apparatus of the super-scientist into play, the 'condensed' version of this argument
hinges on the relationship between truth and what we ought to believe. In particular,
MacKay's argument depends on the paradox presented when we consider what it
would be correct for a subject to believe with regard to any complete description of
his or her own present or immediately imminent set ofbeliefs. If the description is
true, then it will be true whether any given person believes it or not—for such is the
nature of objective truth. But since it regards the set of a given cognitive agent's
beliefs, then it cannot be said to be true whether that person believes it or not. After
all, if it is truly a complete description, it must describe that person as either
believing it or not believing it. This condensed version ofMacKay's argument has
received less attention than his expanded argument, however, probably because it
369
(MacKay 1960g), pp. 38&39.
370 In a parallel passage, published five years later, (MacKay 1965c) p.268, MacKay puts this point in
the following terms:
Our main conclusion is that the human sciences have to reckon with an epistemological
Principle of Relativity, whose consequences are more far-reaching than is sometimes
supposed. Because scientist and subject are members of the same linguistic community, the
domain of scientifically ascertainable 'objective fact' inevitably contains significant lacunae,
particularly around the choices of agents. In these areas the difference in standpoint between
scientific observer and agent leads to a necessary difference between the beliefs of each if
both are to believe rightly. Even retrospectively, the only agreement possible in principle is
that each was justified in his belief, because the two 'transform correctly into' one another.
Since the selective functions of the two are different, it would be a mistake to call them
translations of one another. They are correlates, which have a single set of happenings as
their subject; but they view these happenings from mutually exclusive standpoints. Any
superficial appearance of anarchy is therefore illusory.
Much work needs to be done to clarify the nature of the transformation rules linking the
observer's and agent's views, but that in human sciences the link is in general a
transformation, rather than a translation, seems undeniable.
371 See section I. C. 3.
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bears so many similarities to other paradoxes that have been familiar to logicians for
a long time.372
II. Some Objections to MacKay's Position
Now that we have completed a rough sketch ofMacKay's argument for logical
relativity, the time may be right to introduce a brief discussion of some of the most
important misunderstandings ofMacKay's position. Hopefully this discussion will
not only help us to understand how his ideas were received, but will also help us to
understand some of the most relevant of the finer points of his theory. As in the
second part of chapter 3, we will work in the hope that in getting clear on what
MacKay did not mean, we will understand more clearly what he did mean.
We will first discuss a few general types of misunderstanding, and then proceed to
evaluate a few ofMacKay's key critics.
A. Important Misunderstandings
Any theory as logically complex as MacKay's doctrine of logical relativity is bound
to be misunderstood far more often than it is properly grasped (especially when such
a theory is presented to such a wide variety of audiences). Though it would
obviously be impossible to anticipate every way MacKay's theory could be
misunderstood, there are two kinds ofmisunderstanding in particular that seem to be
so common that some brief comment is in order. These are: 1) MacKay is simply
equating freedom and unpredictability and 2) MacKay's view of freedom is
essentially the same as the ancient Stoic view.
1. MacKay is Simply Equating Freedom and Unpredictability
The first misunderstanding we need to address can be dealt with quite briefly. It is
perhaps most clearly expressed by the title to J. McDermott's 1972 paper 'I'm free
"5 "7 "J
because I know that I don't yet know what I am going to do?'
We will attempt to put this misunderstanding to rights by simply re-stating this title
in words that rightly portray MacKay's line of thought: 'I am free because I know
372 As will be known by students of the history of philosophy, Bertrand A. W. Russell (1872-1970)
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that I have not yet decided what I am going to do.' This change from McDermott's
title demonstrates the reason 'I don't yet know what I am going to do'—and that is
the important bit. The point made by MacKay is that I know I do not know because I
cannot know—because it is impossible for any true prediction to exist. It is this
ontological point that MacKay is making, not the lesser epistemological point that, as
McDermott rightly points out, would (if alone) be irrelevant to the question of
whether or not we were right in believing that we are free.
2. MacKay's View ofFreedom is Essentially the Same as the Ancient Stoic View
Because this misunderstanding is significantly more complex than the first one we
dealt with, it will not be possible for us to deal with it quite so quickly. It is of vital
importance to MacKay's project, however, because it stems from a misunderstanding
of the relationship between object language and subject language. Though this
misunderstanding was rarely written about, it is expressed quite clearly by one of the
participants in a published discussion on logical relativity.374
In this discussion, one ofMacKay's interlocutors remarks that the paradox of logical
relativity sounds a lot like the Stoics' understanding of freedom. In the words of this
interlocutor, the Stoic view was that 'If a freely falling stone could think, it would
believe that it falls of its own free will. Seen from the inside, I have a choice at any
moment; but seen from the outside, I am completely determined.' MacKay's
response to this comparison invites a slightly fuller discussion of the relationship
between object language and subject language. He said:
That's just what I want to deny. It is not seen from the outside that /
am completely determined; what's seen from the outside, or rather
what's valid for the outsider, is that my bodily processes are
determined. That is not logically the same thing. If it were, it would
lead to the suggestion 'Well, you're free to believe what you like, but
perhaps you are in error in believing what you like.' My point is that
the agent is not in error in believing what he does; that the 'outside'
data do not establish what is 'really' the case, in such a sense that he's
in error in believing that his choice is underdetermined.
If a falling stone could think, it would more than likely be wrong to believe that it
fell of its own free will. Whether or not it fell of its own free will would depend
374 See (MacKay 1964g) for the full discussion. It was an informal discussion, so the person who
provided us with this helpful misunderstanding will remain unnamed.
375
(MacKay 1964g) p. 360
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largely on how it got into its falling state. If its fall was not caused by its thinking, it
would be wrong for the stone to think that it fell of its own free will. But it would be
equally wrong for any embodied cognitive agent that, say, had been pushed off a cliff
to believe that it fell of its own free will. On the other hand, if a stone really could
think (and not just imitate thinking or something of the sort), then the stone really
would be free in some sense. While it may not be free to fall or not fall (because, we
suppose, not even thinking stones could jump), the thinking stone is free to think—
for what else could we make of its supposed ability to think? In short, real thinking
must be really free. Real falling, on the other hand, can only be said to 'be free' by
extension. The distinction we are attempting to make here is the distinction between
what we do as subjects (i.e. mental activity) and what we do as objects (i.e. physical
activity). This distinction is important because in talking about our selves, we are
talking about embodied subjects—so both forms of activity apply to us, though the
language we must use to accurately describe that activity operates on distinctly
different grammatical systems.
According to MacKay, the distinction between object-language and subject-language
is the key to understanding the relationship (or rather, lack thereof) between the
successes of physiological brain science and the validity of our subjective sense of
freedom. The fear that our subjective sense of freedom will be undermined is
generally the result of confusing our selves-as-objects with our selves-as-subjects.
MacKay makes this point clearly in the following statement:
So I am suggesting that if we are to make sense of the question of
what is classically known as 'free will' by asking, for example,
whether I could have done otherwise if my brain were a physically
determinate system, we must not at any cost allow ourselves to
confuse that with the question: could my brain have done otherwise.
The reason is that it is not brains but persons who choose, persons
who have I-stories to tell. There is no sense that I can see in
attributing free will to brains: brains aren't the kind of things, poor




(MacKay 1991b) p. 203-4
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Though MacKay's critics with regard to this particular aspect of his thought are
legion, it is a truism of philosophical discourse377 that not all criticisms are created
equal. With regard to our present purposes, the three critics with the most legitimate
claims to our attention would be C. J. F. Williams, J. Watkins and William Hasker.
Though each, at the end of the day, disagrees with MacKay in some more or less
important detail, their criticisms draw out aspects ofMacKay's thinking that might
otherwise be easily overlooked. For this reason, regardless of the degree to which
we sympathise with their objections, their work is very important to our study.
1. Williams
The editorial aim of the journal Analysis is to provide the scholarly community with
short, logically rigorous discussions of various contemporary philosophical positions.
In October of 1960—only nine months after the publication of 'On the Logical
Indeterminacy of a Free Choice'—C. J. F. Williams offered the editors ofAnalysis
just what they were looking for. Though the entire exchange between Williams and
MacKay does not even completely fill six pages, their logical trail goes through so
many twists and turns that even an experienced tracker would be required to travel
many leagues to catch them. Though we will concern ourselves as little as possible
with the intricacies of their exchange, a broad overview ofwhat goes on there should
highlight several important points.
a) Williams' Objection378
Williams argues that while part ofMacKay's argument is sound, the part of the
argument that pertains to logical relativity is overstated. The part ofMacKay's
argument that Williams believes is sound is that part which precludes Anna's
subjects from believing her predictions concerning their future. He sets out to
demonstrate that logical relativism does not follow from this part ofMacKay's
argument, however, by introducing a logically parallel proposition.
So, to MacKay's proposition: 'Provided A does not get to hear of this, he is certain to
do X',379 380 Williams proposes the parallel 'A is mistaken in thinkingp\ This
377
Unfortunately, this 'truism' is particularly justified when it comes to those philosophical
discussions that have some religious significance—whether that significance be real or merely in the
heart of the critic.
378 (Williams 1960)
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proposition is parallel because, as Williams points out, it 'expresses a proposition
which is impossible for A himself to express'.381 Using this parallel proposition,
William argues that ifMacKay's 'logical relativity' has any merit, then not only is it
impossible for Anna to provide her subjects with a prediction of their future that
demands their unconditional assent, but it is also impossible for any statement about
false belief to be universally true.
b) MacKay's Reply382
Though MacKay is unhappy with some of the finer points ofWilliams' argument, he
seems, for the most part, to agree with Williams. The only thing that MacKay seems
to disagree with Williams on is the relationship between Williams' analysis and
MacKay's original argument.
To demonstrate his sympathy with Williams, MacKay quotes the topic sentence in
Williams' concluding paragraph ('If the proposition that A will do X is true for
anybody it is true for everybody, even for those who cannot express it'), and
responds with the following analysis:
Now (oddly enough) I am so far from disputing this last dictum, that
my argument can actually be summed up by its converse: if a
proposition is demonstrably tmtrue for anybody, it cannot claim to be
true for everybody.383
MacKay follows up this point by highlighting the fact that the untruth of any
prediction that would deny an agent's sense of freedom is precisely what he set out to
demonstrate. The whole point of the logical relativity argument is that even if our
brains were as mechanistic as clockwork, an agent could defy anyone (even a super-
scientist) to provide a true proposition describing any activity which the agent's
subjective sense of freedom would lead that agent to believe was the outcome of his
379 See (MacKay 1960g) p. 33.
380 In MacKay's paper, 'A' stands for anyone we would call one ofAnna's male subjects. (Remember
that Anna and her subjects came into our discussion only by means of an explanatory side note to 'On
the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free Choice'. When MacKay brings hypothetical people into his
discussions, he generally gives them boring names like 'A', 'B' and 'C'. These boring names, no
doubt, allowed the analytic philosophers of his day to take his arguments more seriously—but that is
more of a note on history than logic.)
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or her future decision. As we saw earlier in our discussion, in arguing for this point,
MacKay concedes the fact that some super-scientist in our hypothetical deterministic
universe could produce predictions that may be valid for all detached observers
(provided that the subject does not come to be aware of it). But MacKay also argues
that this prediction cannot be called true because it would not be valid for the subject
of that prediction (i.e. the subject would not be right to believe it).
With regard to the parallel proposition, proposed by Williams, MacKay agrees that it
is parallel in the sense that 'In each case, A is logically precluded from believing as
"true now" what is asserted secretly by the observer'.384 The difference, however, is
that the propositional form ofAnna's predictions ('Provided A does not get to hear
of this, he is certain to do X')385 is necessarily future-oriented (by virtue of the fact
that it is a prediction rather than a description). Not only that, but the case of Anna's
subjects is also different in that the difficulty is not the result of anyone's having
believed improperly. While on the one hand (in the case of false belief) A can look
back and admit that he could not express the true proposition (at the time he held the
false belief) because his belief structure was importantly out of sync with the truth,
on the other hand, with Anna's prediction, it was not the truth that A's beliefs were
out of sync with, but the majority,386
c) Williams' Response387
Though there are still several points of disagreement (and, perhaps,
misunderstanding) between them, in his response to MacKay's reply, Williams
reminds us that he has conceded the central point to MacKay's argument, but
reminds us that there are still issues to be dealt with. He says:
I suspect that MacKay is confusing the logical impossibility of A's
saying 'Provided I do not get to hear of this I am certain to do X', with
the causal impossibility (inside MacKay's original story) of A's





386 Because MacKay's response is so brief, we have had to rely on some later sources (particularly
(MacKay 1971a)and (MacKay 1967a)) for this analysis. The content of these papers does not appear
to be any different, but without the elaboration he provides there, it would be difficult to know that we
had properly understood his argument in this response to Williams. We will elaborate somewhat on
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fanciful account of psychological determinism which MacKay has
given us were correct, A would indeed be 'wrong to believe' that it
was certain that he would do X, because, as a matter of fact, the only
data on which the reasoning could be based included his ignorance of
the prediction.388
So, to unpack this response a bit, what Williams is essentially saying here is that we
are right when we say that Anna's subjects can't believe any of her predictions. But
the reason they can't believe them must be either causal or logical. If it is logical—
as suggested by the name 'logical relativity'—then the subjects cannot believe the
prediction because of the logical implications of the proposition expressed by the
prediction. Whatever Anna's reasons for making the predictions she makes, ifwe
say that it is logically impossible for her subjects to believe them, we are saying that
believing them would necessitate a logical contradiction (as in the case of a person
believing that he mistakenly believes something). If, on the other hand, the reason is
causal, this means that it has more to do with the causes leading up to any valid
prediction than the logical value of any proposition expressed by such a prediction.
As we know from the form ofMacKay's argument, it is for these 'causal' reasons
that our imaginary situation is paradoxical. The situation is paradoxical because any
influence the prediction might have on the subject would substantially alter the basis
on which any valid prediction would be made. On the other hand, as Williams points
out by asking us to consider what the situation would have looked like ifAnna were
not a super-scientist but a super-astrologer389 (and could thus make her predictions
based on forces out with her subject's domain of agency), the subject's believing the
propositions named by Anna's predictions would not be problematic at all if logic
were all that we had to consider.390
With regard to MacKay's claim that the proposition named by Anna's prediction
requires it to be future-oriented, Williams substantially disagrees. He claims that the
only difference between the sentences 'Provided I do not get to hear of this I am






Obviously Williams has not considered what we have called MacKay's 'condensed argument'
worthy of comment, though it would, of course, present just the sort of logical difficulties Williams
appears to be interested in.
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to do X' is the temporal perspective from which it is spoken. From this, he reasons
391that though the statements have different forms, they both say the very same thing.
To draw all this to some sort of conclusion, the essential objection Williams seems to
be making is that, contrary to what we may be tempted to infer from the name
'logical relativity', MacKay's argument does not stand on strictly logical principles.
On the contrary, MacKay's thesis stands only when based on causal features of the
• • • -109
imaginary world created by the peculiar assumptions of his thought experiment,
d) The Lesson of the Williams Debate
Some readers who are sympathetic with MacKay's position may object to Williams'
line of argument on the grounds that it seems to assume the validity of the very thing
MacKay's thesis calls into question. After all, the context in which Williams says
that the sentences 'Provided I do not get to hear of this I am certain to do X' and
'Provided I had not got to hear of this I would have been certain to do X' refer to the
'very same thing' implies that the 'thing' that they both refer to is a proposition
whose truth value is fixed across time. But ifwe take it as a given that propositions
such as the one alluded to are either true or untrue regardless of the temporal
perspective of the sentences that name them, then it should not be surprising ifwe
should find that we are no more free to affect the truth value of propositions
concerning our future than we are free to affect the truth value of propositions
concerning our past.
But ifwe do not mean by 'free' something like 'free to affect the truth value of
propositions regarding some future state of affairs', it is not clear what the word
could mean. So, to assume the irrelevance of temporal perspective with regard to
propositional truth value is to beg the question of whether our perceived sense of
freedom is illusory—and this is the very question that MacKay set out to address.
391 For more on the way all this works out, see the actual Williams/MacKay debate. It may also be
helpful to note that MacKay responds in much more detail to the kinds of objection Williams is
making in his 1967 Eddington Memorial Lecture (MacKay 1967a). See especially pp. 22-27.
392 As we mentioned earlier, the argumentation in this exchange is extremely complex. Though the
interpretation provided seems to get at the central arguments ofboth sides, it looks very different from
the original presentation, and one can never be entirely sure that the original authors would be happy
with their arguments being thus summarised.
393
NB—by 'untrue' here, we do not necessarily mean 'false' but 'indeterminate'.
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MacKay has highlighted the really interesting logical aspect of this question by
asking what it is right for any given person to believe.1'9''' If it may be the case that
the truth value ofpropositions concerning states of affairs in a person's future is yet
to be determined (i.e. if it may be the case that a person is free), then the only
propositions which that person can believe with certainty would be those
propositions which refer to states of affairs in that person's past. This is so because
(as we have just stated) ifwe are not to beg the question of freedom, we must allow
for the possibility of the truth value of propositions not being established irrespective
of time.
Along the same lines, if a person has no more power to change the truth value of a
given proposition concerning some future state of affairs than that person has to
change the truth value of a proposition concerning some past state of affairs (which
is just to say that he or she is causally removed from the future state of affairs in
question), then that person's situation relative to the truth value of that proposition is
the same as it would be if the proposition regarded a state of affairs in that person's
past.
This means that ifwe are to refrain from begging the question of freedom we must
make two distinctions with regard to what a person would be right to believe. On the
one hand, we must distinguish between what a person is right to believe regarding
the truth value of propositions naming past states of affairs and what a person is right
to believe regarding the truth value of propositions naming future states of affairs.
(For the former the truth value is fixed, and for the latter it is yet-to-be-determined,
or indeterminate). On the other hand, we must also distinguish between what a
person is right to believe regarding the truth value of propositions naming states of
affairs from which that person's present or future actions are causally removed and
what a person is right to believe regarding the truth value of propositions naming
394 In fact, the first conclusion MacKay draws from his discussion in 'On the Logical Indeterminacy of
a Free Choice' is that talking about a person's beliefs is usually less misleading than talking about
abstract propositional truth. He makes this point in the following terms:
First, we have found it expedient to shift our emphasis still further than some modem
philosophers from discussion of the truth of certain propositions in the abstract, to discussion
of the validity of the activities offormulating and believing these propositions. By doing so
we have been able to express in non-contradictory terms what would otherwise have to be
expressed in paradox. It seems possible that this shift of emphasis might be rewarding (and
far from destructive) in some other metaphysical and theological contexts. (MacKay 1960g)
p. 39
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states of affairs from which that person's present or future actions are not causally
removed. (Once again, for the former the truth value is fixed, and for the latter it is
yet-to-be-determined, or indeterminate). This means that a person's causal relation
to the state of affairs named by a proposition is as important as his or her temporal
relation. This is also the basic logical claim of 'logical relativity'.
We could obviously fill pages and pages with this sort of reasoning (eventually
getting to questions such as how truth value is related to propositions, propositions
are related to sentences, sentences are related to our beliefs, and how all of this is
related to our brain states), but at some point we would still have to come to the
question of where all this was getting us. It is to this question that we now turn.
MacKay claims that we must recognise the fact that the truth value of some
propositions is relative to the perspective of the cognitive agent. Since propositions
are traditionally thought to be by definition either true or false forever and always,
what MacKay is calling for is a redefinition of an essential part of our logical system.
But is this call justified? Williams thinks that it is not, though the form of his claim
looks more like an assertion and explanation than an argument. As we turn to our
analysis ofWatkins' criticism, however, we will find an attempt to form universally
meaningful propositions that incorporate the particular aspect of relativity to which
MacKay is calling our attention. IfWatkins' argument succeeds, therefore, he will
have dealt with the paradoxical situations about which MacKay is worried within the
presupposed apparatus of our orthodox logical system.
2. Watkins
Though we have already referred several times to the debate over MacKay's logical
relativity published by the British Journalfor the Philosophy ofScience, one of his
critics in that debate deserves special attention. As we mentioned above, J. W. N.
-5QC
Watkins attempts in that debate to add an important 'amendment to MacKay'.
The amendment to MacKay that Watkins suggests involves bringing some fairly
complex logical tools (most ofwhich were borrowed from Rudolf Carnap)396 to bear
on Anna's work—thus producing some rather complex propositions that are able to
account for all the differences between cognitive agents that we have discussed thus
395 (Watkins 1971)
396 Watkins cites Carnap's 'Meaning and Necessity' (Carnap 1956) several times.
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far. Though it would take us significantly off course to investigate the intricate
details ofWatkins' argument, those readers who are interested in these matters will
find Watkins' paper richly rewarding.397 The most interesting aspect ofWatkins'
criticism for our present purposes, however, is the response that it draws from
MacKay.398
The main reason that MacKay does not go along with attempts such as that made by
Watkins to incorporate all aspects of relativity within one, grand, objective
proposition is that the newly formed proposition disguises the difference between the
situations ofAnna and her subjects.
On the face of it, this reinstitution ofuniformity does not sound like such an unhappy
prospect. After all, removing the differences between what people would be right to
believe and wrong to disbelieve reinforces the appeal made by our epistemic
consciences to unequivocally believe the true state of affairs. If it is possible to
describe the true state of affairs in a way that is binding on all cognitive subjects
everywhere, that would seem to be the best way to extend the boundaries of the
Kingdom of Truth—reinforcing the epistemic reign that all lovers ofwisdom should
loyally support. When thinking along these lines, it would seem reasonable to
suspect MacKay of mixed epistemic loyalties. After all, if he is not supporting the
universal reign of truth, is that not a clear sign that he has thrown in his lot with the
rebel relativists—appealing to differences among the perspectives of cognitive agents
in such a way that inevitably leads to radical subjectivity?
Not at all. In fact, it is the very strictness ofMacKay's epistemic conscience that
makes him uneasy with such a grand unified proposition. He argues that in trying to
explain away the 'inescapable element of relativity'' which must be recognised in the
paradoxical situations to which he has called our attention by 'framing a non-
relativistic conditional prediction valid for both parties' we would be doing 'less than
justice to the rigour and uniqueness of the prediction that (ex hypothesi) does exist
397 Watkins' paper is not only logically fascinating, but (surprisingly, given the genre) very well
written.
398 We must remember that the only reason we are discussing these critics is to get a better grasp of
what MacKay was saying.
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with an unconditional claim to the assent of all who are fully detached from the
agent'.399
IfWatkins were to succeed, argues MacKay, we would miss an important truth about
the world we live in (which can hardly be called epistemic loyalty). Calling any
prediction Anna could make of her subject's behaviour 'P', MacKay elaborates on
the importance of retaining the concept of logical relativity in the following way:
In short, however much we encrust P with conditionals, we cannot
find a formulation that determines in advance the truth value of P for
A. Its truth value is something for A himself to determine, by the
process we call making up his mind. It remains indeterminate-for-A
until he does so.400
Though there may be some contexts in which it would be best to explain away the
relative aspects of propositions (when dealing with propositions such as 'A wrongly
believes Y' for example), there are other contexts in which ifwe are to understand
the world rightly, we do better to leave the relativity in. The reason that we must
leave the relativity in some propositions and not others is that in some cases the
relativity is trivial, while in others it is vital.
With regard to propositions such as 'A wrongly believes Y', A can look back on the
situation and say 'Oh yes, I was wrong to have got myself into the situation which
disallowed me from believing that proposition, which everyone else was right to
believe'. With regard to propositions such as those implied by Anna's predictions,
however, the situation is importantly different—for it would have been improper for
one of her subjects to believe what a detached observer would have believed and no
one can be faultedfor this being the case. The relativity of statements of this latter
sort is the result of the epistemic world being as it should be, while the converse is
true of the former sort of proposition. So the question becomes not 'Is it possible to
state the proposition in a form in which it can be universally accepted by all?' but
'Would we be more epistemically loyal by stating the proposition in a form which
can be universally accepted by all, or would that process require us to perniciously
lump all cognitive agents in the same epistemological boat?'
3<w These quotations taken from pp.276-277 of (MacKay 1971a)
400
(MacKay 1971a) p. 281
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As we concluded with regard to Williams' criticism, the side of this debate that we
come out on is more than likely a simple feature of which principles we most loyally
hold to. Are we more sure that all propositions are either true or untrue irrespective
of their beholders, or do we believe that we, as free, cognitive agents bear a special
relationship to those propositions concerning the states of affairs of our own futures?
At this point in our discussion, it may be tempting to suggest that ifMacKay had
only given up on the insistence that the implications of his argument are logical as
opposed to causal orpractical or something like that, then he would have put the
fears of his critics to rest and his readers would have been freed from their problems
of divided loyalties. After all, we may be tempted to conclude, ifwe simply leave
the fundamentals of traditional logic alone and say that his point only regards the
absolute limits of any perceived threat from mechanistic brain science, then his
practical goal (that of demonstrating the compatibility of a brain science that
assumes physical causal closure and a psychology that presupposes an agent's ability
to make free rational and moral choices)401 is achieved. Unfortunately, however,
things are not quite so simple (if 'simple' is a word we can meaningfully use while
discussing such a complex argument). As we shall see as we turn our attention to the
final critic we will be discussing, we must be very careful with the 'causal' side of
MacKay's argument as well.
3. Hasker
Of all the many, many critics ofMacKay's doctrine of logical relativity, the one who
presses the 'causal' side of his analysis the furthest is William Hasker402. In his
initial criticism, he accounts for both logical and causal aspects ofMacKay's
hypothetical situation in such a way as to produce a prediction that is, while perhaps
not absolutely fine-grained, deterministic enough for any practical purpose.
a) Hasker's Objection
The first novel contribution ofHasker's criticism is that he makes important strides
in the effort to remove the destructive effect ofAnna's vicious regress. He does this
401
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with the suggestion that Anna take into account the effect that any given prediction
may have on her subjects.
Now, of course, as we have seen, it would be quite overly optimistic to suggest that
she can calculate the effect that herfinal prediction will have on her subjects right
from the start. After all, not even she can know what herfinal prediction will be
until it is, in fact, calculated. But Hasker's idea is that Anna simply needs to start
somewhere. If she were to start by calculating what would happen if her subject
were to become aware of a prediction (PI) based on all the causal features of her
subject's brain except the effect of her calculation, then she can refine her prediction,
thus producing P2. If she then calculates the effect that P2 would have on her
subject, she will get to P3—an even better prediction. The idea is that (eventually)
the difference produced by calculating the effects of her prediction one more time
will be negligible. Once she gets to this point, Anna can simply present her subject
with the prediction (Px), knowing that that prediction will not need to be modified in
any significant way as a result of any change in the subject's brain state produced by
that subject's having become aware of the prediction. Anna will thus have arrived at
an accurate (if not infinitely precise) prediction of her subject's future brain state,
which is sufficient to produce an accurate prediction of that subject's future
behaviour.403
But, as Hasker recognises, MacKay's argument against Anna's unequivocally true
prediction goes deeper than this. After all, even Anna's best planned predictions will
have to take her subject's belief-structure into account—so we cannot say that her
predictions are true 'whether or not her subjects believe them'. Even if she
accurately predicts that her subjects will believe her prediction, her prediction may
not have been accurate if her subject had not believed it—so, in at least this
important sense, the validity of Anna's predictions is up to her subjects.
403
Though these comments on the strategy Anna should take to reduce the effects of this vicious
regress are dismissed out of hand by MacKay, they are interesting in that they represent an attempt to
take the causal paradox seriously. Incidentally, the response MacKay would most likely have made if
he saw fit to expend journal space to refute this line of reasoning would have been that, unfortunately
for any super-scientist working on Hasker's strategy, neural firing is an essentially stochastic
process—so while the differences between Anna's Px and Px+7 may appear statistically negligible, it
would be impossible to tell (without doing the actual calculations which necessitate the actual
prediction received by her subjects) whether or not any difference (however small) would produce a
real difference at the system level. For a more detailed explanation of how this works, see chapter 10
(especially pp. 218&219) of his Gifford Lectures (MacKay 1991b).
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Here Hasker again has us consider the causal (as opposed to logical) implications.
In particular, he points out that causally speaking, belief and unbelief are not options
for Anna's subjects—for she has predicted, based on her successive calculations, that
the brains of her subjects will be in such a state that they will believe predictions of
the type that she has offered them. Just as it is logically possible that her subjects
would turn into toads upon hearing her predictions rather than have their freedom
denied, it is also logically possible for them to simply disbelieve them—but neither
of these options should be considered in the situation that we have envisioned,
because neither of them is causally possible.
Hasker regards MacKay's argument as a very helpful (though at the end of the day
unsound) attempt to preserve the viability of our subjective sense of freedom. He
also, in the conclusion to his critique, offers us his own thoughts concerning how to
preserve our concept of freedom in the face of the successes of recent physical brain
science. But, as these suggestions are only tangentially related to our task at hand,
we will leave it to others to analyse his work—continuing instead to MacKay's
response to his criticism.
b) MacKay's Response
The first point MacKay calls our attention to in his response to Hasker is that ifwe
are to forsake the distinction (repeatedly called for by MacKay) between body-talk
and mind-talk, then our case is indeed hopeless. On the other hand, we must also
recognise the fact that mind-talk (and, indeed, any kind of logic-talk) is meaningless
unless we admit some sort of underspecified description such that it is at least
logically possible to be wrong. Words like 'right', 'wrong', 'ignorance', 'belief,
and, indeed, even 'freedom' simply have no meaning except in the context of an
underspecified description.404
Once we have committed ourselves to mental/logical language by asking what a
subject would be right to believe, the situation becomes somewhat different from
what Hasker may have imagined. MacKay spells this out in the following passage:
If brain theory could produce a detailed prediction of the state of my
cognitive machinery at precisely 10 p.m. tonight (even one involving
millions of items of distinct information), the test of whether any part
of this has an unconditional claim to my assent is not whether in
404
as we discussed in Chapter 4
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practice I could understand or be rationally convinced of it, but
whether (granted the assumptions of the brain theorist) its rational
basis is sound and would be equally sound whether or not I believed
it. To this question whether or not I will or can in fact believe (or
disbelieve) it, or understand the rational basis for it or even get to hear
of it, is irrelevant. What is at issue is the strength of its claim to my
assent. Would it be equally accurate whether or not embodied-in-
MacKay's-cognitive-system? If (as I argue in the passage cited by
Hasker) the answer is 'no', then its claim to my assent is not
unconditional. . . There is all the difference in the world between
arguing that an agent could not in practice comprehend and accept a
prediction and arguing (as I do in the main case) that even if he could
comprehend it, it would be self-disqualified from any unconditional
claim to his assent.405
As we might have come to expect from MacKay, an accurate understanding of the
situation necessitates some understanding of the way complementary descriptions
work. Though, as we saw in our evaluation ofWilliams' and Watkins' criticisms,
the doctrine of complementary descriptions is not a feature of traditional, abstract
logic; it is also not a concept based solely on empirical grounds. The doctrine of
complementary descriptions is a doctrine that is necessitated by the fact that we, as
cognitive agents, must play simultaneous roles in multiple logical sub-systems.406
While the over all system of abstract truth posed by traditional logic may well be
independent of any individual situation, we (of course) are not. So our existential
situation logically necessitates that ifwe want to apply any aspect of abstract truth to
our status as individual cognitive agents (by, for example, asking what it would be
right for us to believe) we must take our own subjective logical situation (i.e. the
intersection of our specific set of essentially third-person logical sub-systems) into
account. This is the essential truth ofMacKay's doctrine of logical relativity.
The paradoxical situation in MacKay's thought experiment comes about as the result
ofAnna's subjects having to play simultaneous roles in the physical world of
neurophysics (assumed in the thought experiment to be deterministic) and the logical
world of agents (which we bring under scrutiny by asking what they would be right
to believe). Though these two roles must be played simultaneously, it is of vital
405
(MacKay 1978f) pp. 142&143
406 Given the fact that we are embodied cognitive agents, we must recognise that even in participating
in the most abstract of logical exercises, we simultaneously participate in the more concrete logical
system of physical 'cause and effect'. When contemplating pure mathematics, for example, we must
burn calories—so while participating in the abstract logical world of timeless truth and falsity, we
simultaneously participate in the concrete logical world of physical cause and effect.
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importance that we do not identify them with each other. Though MacKay makes
this point in many places, one of the clearest is also in his response to Hasker. He
says:
What would actually follow if physical determinism were true is only
that for the purposes ofa neurophysiological Predictor, calculating in
physical categories, the principles of my logical reasoning are
superfluous. But by the same token, for my purposes as a rational
agent reasoning in moral categories, the complementary data of the
neurophysiologist are equally 'superfluous'. Indeed, as we have seen,
they are not even data for me until after the event. It is a logical error
(though a common one) to imagine that predictive adequacy at one
level of analysis proves the factors recognisable at another level to be
'inoperative'.407
It is for these reasons—not simply causal, nor simply logical—that MacKay is
justified in calling for us to recognise this essential aspect of relativity concerning
what we would be right to believe. As he puts it, 'It is a groundless logical illusion
(analogous to the pre-Einstein conception of absolute space and time) to conceive of
the viewpoint of a detached observer as having epistemological priority over that of
the conscious agent himself.408
c) Hasker's Reply409
Hasker's reply to MacKay's response, while perhaps not quite as interesting as his
original criticisms, brings out one final point that we would do well to consider.
Hasker first thanks MacKay for his response, claiming that it has enabled him to
strengthen his argument against logical relativity significantly. As it turns out,
however, this 'strengthened' argument does not bear much similarity to the original.
Hasker begins his strengthened argument by calling attention to MacKay's definition
of freedom. Calling this definition 'MacKay's Criterion', Hasker tells us that
'According to MacKay, I am a free and rational agent if and only if there is no
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accept.'410 Once he has introduced this criterion, Hasker's argument is fairly simple.
He says:
According to MacKay's Criterion, I am free and responsible in my
actions unless it is possible for there to be a prediction of my actions
which I am rationally obligated to accept—which he takes to mean
that the prediction must be sound whether or not I believe it. But
(given the mechanistic hypothesis) it turns out that the idea of a
prediction meeting this requirement is self-contradictory—so the
statement that no such prediction is possible is a tautology. Now it is
well known that nothing follows from a tautology except another
tautology. But the claim that I am a free and responsible agent is by
no means a tautology. It follows that MacKay's Criterion is wrong.41
Hasker's skeletal model of the logical form of this part ofMacKay's argument would
seem more or less accurate. Whether or not this could properly be called a tautology,
on the other hand, is quite another question. And we must also remember that this
'strengthened' argument deals with only part of the overall argument for logical
relativism—for it (as opposed to his original objection) deals only with the logical
(and not the causal) side of the story. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point
(and take stock of our discussion of these important misunderstandings) would be to
put together a longer summary ofMacKay's argument involving logical relativity.
C. Taking Stock
The first step we must take in summarising MacKay's argument is to recall the
argument that MacKay sets out to dispute. That argument, as we saw above, goes
something like this (this argument will be largely quoted from the fourth paragraph
of (MacKay 1960g)):
PI: My physical brain-processes are wholly physically determined.
P2: My decisions can be inferred uniquely from my brain processes.
CI: A fully-informed observer ofmy brain-processes could know the
outcome ofmy choices with certainty before I made them.
C2 (from CI): My impression of freedom in making these choices is
therefore an illusion, due to mere ignorance of the true state of affairs.
While most challenges to this argument challenge at least one of the two premises,
MacKay's argument is unique in asserting that even ifwe were to grant the premises,
410
(Hasker 1978) p. 149
4,1
(Hasker 1978) p. 151
Logical Relativity 170
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology of Donald M. MacKay
the only form ofCI that follows does not support C2. The reason that a valid
version ofCI does not support C2 is that while CI only holds for an observer who is
causally detached from the subject of those predictions, C2 concerns what the subject
would be right to believe. This, of course, goes straight to the heart of MacKay's
provocative logical relativity thesis—that in order to correctly believe what is
objectively true, what one cognitive agent must believe will be different from what
another cognitive agent (occupying a radically different perspective on the situation
in question) must believe. So, at least in its original form, the main force of
MacKay's argument stands or falls with his doctrine of logical relativity.
Williams has argued that MacKay's logical relativity thesis is not justified on the
basis of logic alone. By this he means that Anna's subjects are not precluded from
believing Anna's predictions because the predictions themselves would entail a
logical contradiction if believed by the subjects. Though it may appear contradictory
for an agent to believe a statement of the form 'As long as I do not hear of this
prediction, it will be absolutely certain', this appearance of contradiction is removed
ifwe simply change the form of this statement to the past tense—so that the subject
believes 'Provided I had not heard of this prediction, it would have been absolutely
certain'.
But even aside from the question of whether it is possible to change the form of a
prediction to the past tense without changing its content, this 'purely logical'
rationale challenged by Williams is not necessarily MacKay's central motivation in
calling for us to recognise the principle of logical relativity. MacKay's argument is
not that Anna's subjects' belief of her predictions would entail a logical
contradiction, but that their belief (or non-belief) would alter the truth value of her
predictions. There is a sense in which this argument is causal (as opposed to
Williams' definition of 'logical'), but there is also a sense in which it is logical (as
opposed to Hasker's initial assumptions with regard to whether it is possible for
Anna's subjects to either believe or disbelieve her predictions). On the one hand, it
is causal—because ifAnna's subjects believe her predictions, they undercut the
reasons Anna had for making the prediction she did. On the other hand, however,
MacKay's argument is also logical—because it concerns what Anna's subjects would
be right to believe. The whole reason Anna's situation is so paradoxical is that it
weaves lines of physical and mental causation so tightly together that it is difficult to
avoid blurring the necessary distinctions.
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Though the questions we ask of the situation require us to jump repeatedly from one
form of causation to the other, it is vitally important that we keep the kinds of
causation involved distinct. Logical relativity features heavily in this situation
because the different characters involved (i.e. Anna and her subjects) are situated at
such radically different intersections of physical and mental causal stories. This
being the case, regardless ofwhether or not it is possible to incorporate all the
relevant conditionals into a grand unified proposition which is true for observers and
subjects alike, MacKay claims that the most accurate way to understand the situation
is to name much simpler propositions, which have different truth values depending
on the perspective from which they are comprehended. If this process also requires a
slight modification in the way we have thought about the definition of 'proposition'
in the past—well, that is what progress is supposed to do.
But even ifwe remain uncommitted regarding the Einstein-like revolution MacKay
envisioned in logic (with regard to the absolute univocality of propositions), there are
still some very important lessons to be learned from this debate. For one thing, this
debate helps to emphasise what an exceedingly complex struggle we must engage in
ifwe are to apply our learning about the brain to our knowledge about the mind. In
particular, this debate helps us to see that the only hope we have of properly
understanding the complex relationship between the physical causal story of brain
events and the freedom of physically embodied subjects lies in keeping straight the
kinds of things that can properly be said of each kind of causal system. In short, this
is just to say that we must be strict about our grammar.
Though we have already spent a good deal of time discussing the different grammars
ofmental and physical descriptions, in discussing MacKay's doctrine of logical
relativity we have also been elaborating on these different grammars as we have
struggled to understand the complex situation that Anna and her subjects worked
themselves into.
Logical Relativity 172
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
Chapter 6: Comprehensive Realism and Individual
Eschatology
In the first section of our study (chapters 1 & 2), we briefly canvassed some of the
historical ideas that have proven to be most influential on the metaphysical
anthropology of the contemporary evangelical Protestant Church. We also discussed
the rise of post-Kantian psychology and the attempt of identity theorists to build
upon the mistakes of the early behaviourists. But we also described a few of the
most famous reactions to identity theory, concluding with the observation that a
consensus among philosophers interested in the mind/body relationship remains
elusive.
On the other hand, however, we concluded chapter 1 with the hopeful suggestion that
a study of Donald M. MacKay's thinking may help the contemporary evangelical
Protestant Church to re-think its position on the mind/body relationship in the light of
the past several centuries of general revelation. The purpose of chapters 3-5 is to
present a systematic overview of Donald M. MacKay's position on this issue. To
that end, we first introduced his doctrine of complementary descriptions (chapter 3)
and then explained how he related that doctrine to the mind/body problem in general
(chapter 4) and the confusion surrounding the idea of human freedom in particular
(chapter 5).
What we have not spoken of thus far, however, is MacKay's position with regard to
the closely related question of individual eschatology. In particular, we have yet to
answer the question of how a mind/body position that takes our embodiment as
seriously as MacKay's does can make sense of the basic Christian notion of eternal
life. It is to this question that we will turn our attention in this chapter. Our method
in this chapter, however, will have to be somewhat different from the method we
employed in previous chapters. The reason we must alter our method is twofold. On
the one hand, MacKay wrote considerably less on this issue than he did on the issues
discussed in chapters 3-5. In fact, the only complete work MacKay devoted to our
present topic also happens to be the final complete work of his career—his final
Gifford Lecture. On the other hand, individual eschatology, as opposed to his logical
notion of complementary descriptions or the mind/body problem in general or even
the free will issue, is a topic upon which our preconceived ideas as to the desiderata
of a complete theory are considerably less distinct.
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Our course of action for this chapter, therefore, will be to open our discussion with a
brief assessment of some of the theological issues raised by MacKay's
contemporaries that are ofmost importance to our present topic. We will then be in a
position to better understand the tensions within this aspect ofMacKay's own theory
as well as the overall merits of his mature position.
I. The Struggle in MacKay Era Theology
Before entering our discussion ofMacKay's ideas concerning the possibility of
eternal life, it is important for us to realise that this issue, like so many others we
have been discussing, has been the source of no small controversy. This controversy
took on especial gusto in the mid-1900's and continues today. At the base of this
controversy is the question of how (and to what extent) Christian teaching on eternal
life, which stresses the resurrection of the body, is to be distinguished from the
Platonic teaching, which stresses the soul's survival ofbodily death.
There are really two questions at issue here—one of which we could ask ofbiblical
theologians and the other of which would be ofmore interest to philosophical
theologians. The question we would want to ask biblical theologians is, 'In what
way (if at all) is biblical teaching on eternal life importantly different from Platonic
doctrine?' On the other hand, the question we would want to ask of philosophical
theologians would be 'Do either (or both) of these doctrines make sense? (i.e. do
they bear up under close philosophical scrutiny?) Up until the mid twentieth century,
neither of these questions was particularly controversial. Most theologians thought
that biblical and Platonic notions of eternal life were importantly similar and that
either of these quite similar notions would bear up under close philosophical
scrutiny. What happened in MacKay's lifetime, however, is that both of these more
or less standard answers came under intense criticism. John Baillie anticipated this
criticism in 1933 when, in his discussion of'The Nature of Eternal Life' he said:
Many questions may be asked but none can be answered. There is,
however, one question of this kind that must not go quite
unmentioned—the question whether the life everlasting is an
embodied life. We have already studied the waverings of the thought
of the past concerning this issue. On the one hand it has been felt that
since the life we hope for is a life which will altogether transcend the
present material and temporal and spatial order, material bodies like
our present ones would be wholly unsuited to the conduct of it. On
the other hand there has been the difficulty of conceiving how a soul
can have any effective life, or can indeed exist at all, without the co-
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operation of its bodily organism. The Greeks were more acutely
aware of the former difficulty, the Jews of the latter ... Ifwe press the
question whether it is the body transformed or another body which
replaces it, we receive no clear or united answer [from Scripture]. Not
even St. Paul, who has set out his judgement at considerable length,
can be pinned down to a certain pronouncement on this point. And
perhaps this is no surprise. For which of us has ever pinned down to a
certain pronouncement on the parallel question at what point a
stocking that has been darned ceases to be the same stocking and
becomes a new one?412
A. The Controversy in Biblical Theology
Though Baillie implies in this passage that the biblical and Greek understandings of
the nature of eternal life were different, it was not until twenty years later that the
common assumption of their basic similarity was directly challenged. This explicit
challenge was offered by Oscar Cullmann in his short but provocative booklet titled
'Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? the witness of the New
Testament'. In this booklet, Cullmann leaves no doubt as to his position. He
answers our question of whether biblical and Greek teachings concerning eternal life
are importantly similar with a resounding 'no!'. He says, 'The fact that later
Christianity effected a link between the two beliefs and that today the ordinary
Christian simply confuses them has not persuaded me to be silent about what I, in
common with most exegetes, regard as true ... 1 Corinthians 15 has been sacrificed
for the Phaedo.,4U
Cullmann's work is most famous for his eloquent comparison of the deaths of
Socrates and Jesus, but his argument is not limited to that comparison. Although the
stark differences between Greek and Christian notions of a noble death are important,
the reason these differences are so important is that they highlight a basic difference
in understanding regarding the nature of death. These differences are important to
our present study because they particularly concern the prospects of a better life
beyond the grave.
Cullmann argues that whereas Plato taught that death is nothing more than the
liberation of the soul from its bondage to the body, the Bible teaches the exact
opposite. The Bible, according to Cullmann, teaches that death is not our liberator,
412
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but our jailor. According to Cullmann's interpretation of the Bible, our liberation
will not be from our body, but from death. He argues that the Platonic hope (that,
although it is somewhat natural to fear death, the truth is that our souls have been
immortal all along) is radically different from the hope offered by Christianity.
Cullmann emphasises that our Christian hope lies exclusively in our union with
Christ in the revolutionary event of his bodily resurrection. He makes this point in
the following way:
If one recognizes that death and eternal life in the New Testament are
always bound up with the Christ-event, then it becomes clear that for
the first Christians the soul is not intrinsically immortal, but rather
became so only through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and through
faith in Him. It also becomes clear that death is not intrinsically the
friend, but rather that its 'sting', its power, is taken away only through
the victory of Jesus over it in His death. And lastly, it becomes clear
that the resurrection already accomplished is not the state of
fulfilment, for that remains in the future until the body is also
resurrected, which will not occur until 'the last day'.414
This point ofCullmann's has very deep implications, as evinced by the multifaceted
debate his little booklet started. For our purposes, however, we should highlight only
one very important principle: Our hope for eternal life does not lie exclusively in the
finished work of God's creation. Our hope also depends also upon the ongoing415
work of redemption. To put this point a slightly different way, we should note that
the Christian does not simply trust in the immortal nature of his or her soul for
assurance of life beyond the grave (as does the Platonist). The Christian places all
hope for eternal life solely in the person and work of Jesus Christ.
Although Cullmann's work has attracted more reaction than we could possibly hope
to deal with here, it may be helpful to note that his admirers and critics alike have
agreed upon this central principle we are highlighting. C. K. Barrett, for example,
has been one ofCullman's sharpest critics. In his 1964 Drew Lecture on
Immortality, Barrett argues that while the Greeks may have tended to speak of
'immortal souls' where we would expect the Jews to insert language of 'bodily
resurrection', the relationship between the two systems of doctrine is much tighter
414
(Cullmann 1958) p. 17
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By 'ongoing' here, no challenge is intended to the doctrine of the perfection of Christ's work. The
'ongoing' aspect of redemption does not regard its accomplishment, but its application (cf. (Murray
1979)).
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than Cullmann and others have alleged. Even as he criticises Cullman's provocative
thesis, however, he agrees that this hope is, for the Christian, grounded not in his or
her own nature, but only in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. He puts this point in the
following way:
It [the Christian hope] is not grounded in himself—his intellectual
process, his virtues, or his religious observances—but in God alone.
Yet God himself has assured his creatures of the future, first by the
resurrection of Jesus Christ, and secondly by implanting in man, in
virtue not of his creation but of his redemption, the seed of
immortality.416
Debate over the relationship between Greek immortality and the biblical concept of
bodily resurrection continues even today. Even if Cullmann may have overstated his
case, however, in the years since that important work, it has become more and more
common to note the fact that for the Christian, death is not a friend, but an enemy.
The Christian hope is that life in Christ is no longer bound to 'the law of sin and
death'.417 The Good News is that humanity's enemy has been overcome by Christ's
perfect life, horrible death and glorious resurrection.
Further, the frank admission of this radical distinction between Greek and Christian
thought has led to other biblical theological breakthroughs in the understanding of
the Christian hope as well. In particular, the greater emphasis put on the person and
work of Christ in relation to our hope for eternal life has tended to make our visions
of life beyond the grave much more concrete. After all, Jesus did not simply defeat
death by allowing his physical body to be killed while continuing to live in some
highly abstract form. His victory over death came in the form of his bodily
resurrection. This means that if our hope for eternal life is the hope that he will make
us like himself on that last day, our participation in his victory (i.e. our eternal life)
likewise begins with our bodily resurrection. N.T. Wright has recently taken up just
this line of thinking in his refutation ofwhat he calls the 'pie-in-the-sky-when-you-
die' attitude of contemporary Christians with regard to the doctrine of eternal life.
He says:
Christians regularly speak of their hope in terms of 'going to heaven
when they die.' One hears it in hymns; one finds it in prayers . . . One
hears it in sermons, both explicitly and implicitly. The point seems to
416
(Barrett 1979) p. 87
417 Romans 8:2b
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be that there is something called 'eternity', which is regularly spoken
of as though it has only the loosest of connections with space and
time, and one day we are going to step into this eternal existence,
whether in the form of heaven or of hell, which has almost nothing to
do with this earth and this present history. I suggest that this view,
widely held though it is, is far less warranted by the New Testament
than would normally be supposed; can be at the very least very
seriously misleading, and at worst quite positively damaging to a
healthy Christian faith; and should be challenged by a more biblical
picture altogether. I suggest instead that what we find in the New
Testament, and what I commend, is the Christian hope for a new, or
renewed, heaven and a new, or renewed earth, with these two
integrated together.418
With more specific reference to the points raised by Cullmann and debated by
biblical theologians throughout MacKay's lifetime, Wright demonstrates both a
respectful reserve regarding the complexity of the controversy and a solid
commitment to the central lesson ofCullmann's work. In his section titled
'Resurrection and Immortality' he says:
Resurrection and immortality are not simply to be played off against
one another, as used to be done. Things are not that easy . . . There is,
however, a well-known view of immortality which is not found in the
early Jewish world and the New Testament (with the possible
exception of Philo), namely, the Platonic view of the body as a shell
which the immortal soul happens to inhabit for a while.419
Though Wright's research in this area (and that of his colleagues) is both fascinating
and related to our study, a full study of these recent contributions would take us
significantly beyond our present task. We mention Wright's work only as an
example of the kind of thinking that eventually grew out of the increased interest in
eternal life expressed by Cullman and his colleagues.
But biblical theologians were not the only scholars working on the Christian notion
of eternal life throughout MacKay's lifetime. As we suggested earlier, philosophical
theologians also took especial interest in this issue. From the early 1950's, for
example, Anglo/American philosophers began to question the intelligibility of
disembodied existence, a concept upon which the Platonic hope explicitly rests. The
natural question this movement presented to Christian philosophical theologians,
418
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therefore, was whether the Christian doctrine of eternal life could survive the demise
of its Greek counterpart.
B. Philosophical Theology
As John Baillie pointed out in the selection we quoted at the beginning of this
section, questions concerning the extent to which the eternal life of which the Bible
speaks is embodied life have long posed a difficult theological problem. During
MacKay's lifetime, however, these questions came to be addressed with increasing
interest. Since Gilbert Ryle effectively demonstrated the philosophical heresy of
Descartes' 'Doctrine of the Ghost in the Machine' in 1949,420 the possibility of
surviving bodily death required a post-Cartesian expression. As suggested earlier,
the most important questions that were being asked by philosophical theologians
during MacKay's career for our purposes were: 1) 'Does the very idea of
disembodied existence bear up under philosophical scrutiny?' and 2) 'Can a
Christian notion of resurrection that does bear up under philosophical scrutiny be
formulated in such a way as to rescue our hope for eternal life?'
1. Disembodied Existence?
The most significant philosophical objection to the idea of disembodied existence
can be generally regarded as Wittgensteinian. A classic example of the kind of
objection that chiefly concerns us here can be found in Peter Geach's Mental Acts,
section 25, titled 'Could Sensuous Experiences Occur Apart from an Organism?'421
Geach begins this section by acknowledging the fact that most people would
consider it a least logically possible to believe in disembodied experience. After all,
accounts of people who seem to have died for relatively short periods of time only to
'come back' with stories of leaving their bodies at the site of an automobile crash or
on a hospital bed, et cetera, have been common for quite some time. Though we may
not always believe such stories, it would seem severe to dismiss them as logically
impossible. After all, if it is even possible to imagine something being true, then it is
(by definition) logically possible. At the very least, it must be acknowledged that
this position has historical opinion on its side, for people throughout history have
420
(Ryle 1949)
421 (Geach 1957) (pp. 11-117) NB: All page numbers for this work relate to the 1971 edition.
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considered it possible (logically possible, at least) to accept testimonies concerning
disembodied sensuous experience—rising out of one's body, seeing the scene of
one's death from a distance, and so on. In general, it has been believed that such
accounts of disembodied sensuous experience provide logically comprehensible
descriptions of what someone believes to be the case. Whether these accounts are
belief-worthy, therefore, has been generally considered a question for a posteriori
investigation rather than a priori analysis.
But Geach asks us to look a bit closer at what it is that we think these familiar
accounts describe. Are we really imagining disembodied sensuous experience, or are
we merely imagining that our experience is mediated by a subtle body—a ghost, if
you will—that is capable of separation from the gross body that we inhabit
throughout life? If it really is such a subtle body that we are imagining, then we
must admit that we are not in fact imagining truly disembodied sensory experience at
all. In that case we would simply have smoothed the metaphorical bump in the rug
only to have it pop up in another place; for we would have successfully imagined
sensory experience apart from the gross body only at the expense of having initiated
a parallel series of questions regarding the possibility of imagining sensory
experience apart from the subtle body. In short, we will have solved the mind/gross-
body problem only at the expense of having initiated a mind/subtle-body problem.
Furthermore, it could be argued that the subtle problem is even more difficult than
the gross problem due to the fact that our belief that we are, in fact, subtle bodies is
encouraged by absolutely no other reason than that it helps us get around the
mind/gross-body problem.
But what happens ifwe reject this subtle alternative? Can we not merely insist that it
is a genuinely disembodied consciousness that we are imagining as the source of
sensory experience after separation from the dead gross body? Ifwe are tempted by
this alternative, argues Geach, we need to ask ourselves what we mean when we say
that this disembodied consciousness is the subject of sensation. What, after all, is
sensation? To be sure, it is quite a familiar concept—so familiar, in fact, that we are
very rarely inclined to attempt an explanation. And when we do attempt such an
explanation, it is quite tempting to explain the concept wrongly, as Geach
exemplifies in the following way:
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'The verb "to see" has its meaning for me because I do see—I have
that experience!' Nonsense. As well suppose that I can come to know
what a minus quantity is by setting out to lose weight.422
Fortunately, however, Geach does not leave us there. He continues with an
explanation:
What shows a man to have the concept of seeing is not merely that he
sees, but that he can take an intelligent part in our everyday use of the
word 'seeing'. Our concept of sight has its life only in connection
with a whole set of other concepts, some of them relating to the
physical characteristics of visible objects, others relating to the
behaviour of people who see things.423
The point that Geach is driving home here is that conceptual understanding is not
grounded on the private experience of silent reflection and extended (albeit rather
tenuously) to include the possibility of other minds. On the contrary, 'I learn to use
the word "see" of others and ofmyself simultaneously'.424 Furthermore, Geach
argues that we understand all concepts only in relation to other concepts. He makes
this point in the following way:
as with a spider's web, some connexions may be broken with
impunity, but if you break enough the whole web collapses—the
concept becomes unusable. Just such a collapse happens, I believe,
when we try to think of seeing, hearing, pain, emotion, etc., going on
independently of a body.425
But given the fact that we have all heard accounts of people who genuinely believe
themselves to have experienced a whole series of disembodied sensations, how can it
be that disembodied sensation is not only impossible in fact, but also logically
impossible? 426 Even if survivors of near-death experiences are mistaken in what in
422
(Geach 1957) p. 112
423
(Geach 1957) p. 112
424
(Geach 1957) p. 113
425
(Geach 1957) p. 113
426 If this conclusion seems a bit rash, perhaps it would help to see how he revised this argument in
another book, published twelve years later. In 1969 he said:
... I am not putting forward a theory, but just reminding you of very familiar features in the
everyday use of the verb 'to see' and related expressions; our ordinary talk about seeing
would cease to be intelligible if there were cut out of it such expressions as 'I can't see, it's
too far off, 'I caught his eye', 'Don't look round', etc. Do not let the bogy of behaviourism
scare you off observing these features; I am not asking you to believe that 'to see' is itself a
word for a kind of behaviour. But the concept of seeing can be maintained only because it
has threads of connexion with these other non-psychological concepts; break enough threads,
and the concept of seeing collapses. (Geach 1969) p. 21
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fact took place, is not the mere telling of the familiar near-death-experience story
evidence that such a situation is at least imaginable (and thus logically possible)?
The implication of Geach's argument is that such stories are not onlyfactually
mistaken, but also conceptually misunderstood—both by the teller and the listener
who thinks such a story logically possible.
Perhaps it would be wise to unpack this position with reference to a clearer example.
It is generally agreed to be impossible to imagine a square circle. But we must also
acknowledge that it is possible to be mistaken about what it is possible to imagine.
Someone may, for example, think that it is possible to imagine a square circle
(though that person would, of course, be wrong). It may even possible to think that
one has successfully imagined a square circle (though such a person would, again, be
wrong).
Perhaps we should think this out in a little more detail. Let us suppose that a very
bored mathematician sets up an equation on a properly functioning computer so that
the computer displays, one at a time, every logically possible graphic depiction of
circularity. For a few hundred years, the computer produces nothing but billions and
billions of circles, each almost imperceptibly different from the one preceding it. But
then one day, a striking discovery is made. The graphic displays being generated by
the computer can be seen to have four, distinct, equilateral sides! All the
mathematicians of the age grapple with the functions producing these four-sided
figures and agree that they are, in fact, the functions of circles, but are also, at the
same time, functions for squares! A series of square circles has been discovered!
It must be admitted that few who are familiar with the concepts of 'square' and
'circle' would be tempted by such a story to think it really possible to imagine such a
story being true. The concepts of 'square' and 'circle' are mutually exclusive. What
should be obvious from this example, however, is that it is possible to be mistaken
about what it is possible to imagine. After all, the little story above was nothing
more than an exceedingly obvious version ofjust such a mistake. More to the point,
the only way to be fooled into thinking that one has imagined a square circle is to
either forget that one is meant to be imagining circles and imagine a square or to get
so used to imagining circles that one forgets how the concept of 'square' is meant to
be applied.
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According to Geach, it is this same principle that is at work in the case of the near-
death experience. Since the concept of sensation necessarily involves interaction
between physical bodies, the only way to be confused into thinking that one has
successfully imagined disembodied sensation is to either forget that it is sensation
that one is meant to be imagining, or to forget that the alleged experience is taking
place in the absence of a body.
Geach goes on to argue that while such a denial of the possibility of disembodied
sensation may seem to rule out all possibility of disembodied existence, this is not
necessarily the case. He points to Thomas Aquinas as an example of a great
philosopher who denied the possibility of disembodied sensation, yet affirmed the
possibility of intelligent existence (even suffering) without that experience being
grounded anywhere in the physical world. While he only mentions Aquinas in
Mental Acts (almost in passing) to show that recognising the impossibility of
disembodied sensuous experience does not automatically make one a materialist, he
develops the implications of Aquinas' thinking a bit more in God and the Soul. In
this later development, he asks the important question of whether it is possible for an
individual person to survive her own death by reverting to a disembodied existence.
He says:
In our human life thinking and choosing are intricately bound up with
a play of sensations and mental images and emotions; if after a
lifetime of thinking and choosing in this human way there is left only
a disembodied mind whose thought is wholly non-sensuous and
whose rational choices are unaccompanied by any human feelings—
can we say there remains the same person? Surely not: such a soul is
not the person who died but a mere remnant of him. And this is just
what Aquinas says (in his commentary on 1 Corinthians 15): anima
mea non est ego, my soul is not I; and if only souls are saved, I am not
saved, nor is any man. If some time after Peter Geach's death there is
again a man identifiable as Peter Geach, then Peter Geach again, or
still, lives: otherwise not.427
The point of all this is that while it may make sense to say that we exist even after
death, it does not make sense to say that we have any sort of personal life without
any sort of personal embodiment. This form of reasoning lead Geach, in God and the
427
(Geach 1969) p. 22
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Soul, to conclude that 'unless a man comes to life again by resurrection, he does not
live again after death.'428
And so we see that just as Cullmann effectively challenged the traditional answer to
the question ofwhether the Christian and Greek conceptions of eternal life are
importantly different, Geach challenged the traditional answer to the question of
whether the Christian and Greek conceptions of eternal life were equally intelligible.
Geach argued that any hope for life after death that did not include bodily
resurrection (such as the Platonic hope) distorts our concepts of personal survival
beyond recognition. He suggests that the Christian hope for bodily resurrection is
the only truly intelligible form of hope for life after bodily death.
Unfortunately, however, his argument for the intelligibility of the Christian hope
depends almost exclusively on his demonstration that it does not fall to the same
arguments that destroyed the Platonic hope. The question, therefore, remains as to
whether the Christian hope of bodily resurrection might fall prey to other
philosophical arguments not necessarily related to the idea of disembodied existence.
D. Z. Phillips, for example, follows Geach step by step in his argument against the
dualistic dream of surviving death by severing all connection with the dying body,
but then extends the same line of argument against the traditional Christian hope for
life beyond the grave through bodily resurrection.
In his Death and Immortality, published just one year after Geach's God and the
Soul, Phillips argues that just as sensation does not make sense in the absence of a
body, so death does not make sense if its subject is understood to live afterwards. He
says that 'If one understands what is meant by "survival" and what is meant by
"death", then one is at a loss to know what it means to talk of surviving death.'429
Phillips argues that ifwe were to meet a man on the street who claimed to be raised
from the dead, it would be difficult to make sense ofwhat was being claimed. If the
man was claiming that he had been raised in a 'new body', we could not say that he
was the one who had experienced death. Such a man would merely be claiming to
have somehow been born in a grave. On the other hand, if the man were to say that
his now-living body was the same body that had been buried by his relatives two
days after his death, which took place a year ago, we would have no reason to
428
(Geach 1969) p. 28
429
(Phillips 1970) p. 15
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believe that he had ever really died. Ifwe understand what it means to die, we
cannot say that a person dies and then lives again. That is simply not how the
concept of death works.
In light of this criticism of the traditional Christian notion of eternal life, Phillips
argues that 'questions about the immortality of the soul are seen not to be questions
concerning the extent of a man's life, and in particular concerning whether that life
can extend beyond the grave, but questions concerning the kind of life a man is
living.'430 Thus he re-defines the biblical concept of eternal life as the renunciation
of all concern for the temporal in favour of the eternal, explaining:
This renunciation is what the believer means by dying to the self. He
ceases to see himself as the centre of his world. Death's lesson for the
believer is to force him to recognise what all his natural instincts want
to resist, namely, that he has no claims on the way things go. Most of
all, he is forced to realise that his own life is not a necessity.431
And so we see that while Geach interpreted his argument against the idea of
disembodied sensory experience as evidence that the Christian hope in the
resurrection of the body was the only philosophically sound hope for life after death,
others employed the same kind of thinking in an appeal to move beyond such
'selfish' hopes as the hope for future personal existence.
But instead of re-thinking the concept of eternal life in light of such biblical concepts
as 'dying to self, why not take the radical event of Jesus' bodily resurrection as an
invitation to re-think our concept of death? After all, is this not what St. Paul was
getting at when he rejoices in the gospel, saying 'Death has been swallowed up in
victory. Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting?'432
Contrary to what Phillips seems to be suggesting, when the Bible talks about dying to
self, it links such concepts not with the annihilation of personal existence, but with
the hope of being made 'alive to God in Jesus Christ'.433
Even so, however, Phillips is correct in saying that any hope for life after death
would necessitate a re-thinking of our concept of death. This is the kind of re¬
thinking to which Cullmann implicitly refers in calling Jesus' bodily resurrection
430
(Phillips 1970) p. 49
431 (Phillips 1970) pp. 52-53
432 1 Corinthians 15:54-55
433 Cf. Romans 6:6-11
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'revolutionary'. Unfortunately, however, our work is not complete when we simply
state that a revolution in our idea of death has taken place. We must also show that
such a revolution is intelligible. This task was also taken up in earnest by several of
MacKay's contemporaries.
2. Bodily Resurrection?
All of the most explicit cases of bodily resurrection reported in the Christian
Scriptures involve the resurrection ofpersons only recently deceased.434 In the case
of Jesus Christ, far and away the most important for our purposes, he had only been
dead for three days. While these events may be difficult for modern minds to
comprehend, they present a much simpler case than does our Christian hope in a
future resurrection of all believers (even those who have been dead for thousands of
years). How would such a future resurrection go? One of the first philosophical
theologians ofMacKay's lifetime to attempt a precise answer to this question was
John Hick. Though his explanation of the resurrection was part of a much bigger
project, we will restrict our discussion to that portion of his work that relates to our
present topic.
a) Hick and the Resurrection World
Early in John Hick's career, he was concerned with the demands of thinkers
influenced by logical positivism. These thinkers argued that since a statement could
only be truly meaningful if it was verifiable in principle, and Christianity is not
verifiable, Christianity is not truly meaningful. Hick answered arguments of this
kind by saying that Christianity is, indeed, verifiable—just not for the living. He said
that because we will all know at the resurrection whether Christianity is true or not,
the meaningfulness of Christianity is well established even ifwe accept the overly
strict standards of verificationism. For his argument to work, however, he had to
434 In the case of Samuel being 'awakened' for Saul by the Witch of Endor (1 Samuel 28:7ff) the
scriptural account seems to suggest a temporary manifestation rather than bodily resurrection. The
same should be said of the appearance ofMoses on the mount of transfiguration (Matthew 17:3 and
Mark 9:4). While in these cases the deceased are visible—suggesting at least some form of bodily
existence, the dissimilarities with clear cases of bodily resurrection are so great that these cases would
be better treated in another category. Another problematic case is presented by the dead 'holy people'
who were restored to life when Jesus died (Matthew 27:52&53). While we cannot say for certain that
these people were only recently deceased, the account of this phenomenon is sufficiently obscure to
justify reluctance with regard to treating it as a paradigm case.
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show that the Christian idea ofbodily resurrection is at least conceivable. This, of
course, is where Hick's work conies to relate to our present topic.
In his 1960 paper 'Theology and Verification', Hick explains how a modern mind
might think ofbodily resurrection.435 He begins his explanation as follows:
Let me sketch a very odd possibility (concerning which, however, I
wish to emphasise not so much its oddness as its possibility!), and
then see how far it can be stretched in the direction of the notion of the
resurrection body. In the process of stretching it will become even
more odd than it was before; but my aim will be to show that,
however odd, it remains within the bounds of the logically possible.436
The possibility he begins his explanation by sketching involves a situation very
similar to Star Trek style teleportation. A person instantly vanishes in one place
while an exact replica of that person simultaneously appears in another place. The
replication turns out to be so exact that all memories, fingerprints, personality traits
and even beliefs are identical with the person who disappeared. Though such a
situation is highly unlikely, Hick argues that the way we would undoubtedly interpret
such an event would be to say that the person who disappeared had not, in fact,
ceased to exist simultaneously with the appearance of the replica, but that the person
who had disappeared and the spatially distant person who had appeared are one and
the same person. 'We should have no reasonable alternative', Hick argues, 'but to
extend our usage of "the same person" to cover the strange new case'.437
Next, Hick stretches this example in the direction he thinks we need to go in order to
rightly understand the bodily resurrection. He asks us to imagine that instead of
instantly disappearing, a person suddenly dies; and as that person dies, the exact
replica once again appears in another place. Here things are somewhat different in
that we have two bodies that would appear identical except for the fact that one is
dead and the other is alive. The living person sincerely believes that it is the same
person that died and has all the requisite mental and physical states—except, of
course for being dead and maintaining spatial continuity with the original body (a
role adequately fulfilled by the corpse). Hick says of this case that
Once again the factors inclining us to say that the one who died and
the one who appeared are the same person would outweigh the factors
435
(Hick 1960) especially pp. 20-25
436 (Hick 1960) pp. 21-22
437
(Hick 1960) p. 22
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inclining us to say that they are different people. Once again we
should have to extend our usage of 'the same person' to cover this
438
new case.
Hick then argues that the only way in which we would need to modify this case to
understand the concept of bodily resurrection would be to say that instead of the
'new' person appearing at another place in this world upon death, that person appears
in what he calls 'the resurrection world'.
Whether or not this argument for the intelligibility of bodily resurrection is really
intelligible (or even biblical, for that matter) may be the subject of reasonable
dispute, but the historical significance of this argument among philosophical
theologians interested in the mind/body problem and personal eschatology cannot be
denied. It is worth noting, however, that Hick himself believed that there had to be
much more to the story than this very basic account. In reply to some of his critics
thirty-one years later, for example, he said:
In spelling out the replica concept I was trying to show that the
Christian doctrine of resurrection is not ruled out by the Rylean-type
philosophy of mind and the more recent mind-brain identity theory.
But at the same time, right from the first edition of the little
Philosophy of Religion text in 1963, I have held that some of the
parapsychological phenomena, particularly extra-sensory perception,
demonstrate mental interaction independently of the brain. In Death
and Eternal Life I tried to put these two strands together—the ideas of
replica-style resurrection and of mental life independently of the
physical brain. They come together in the hypothesis of a
disembodied bardo phase immediately after death, followed in due
course by re-embodiment in another space-time, and indeed possibly a
succession of such re-embodiments separated by a succession of
bardo phases. In the bardo phase we create our own mind-dependent
world, and seeing our desires (including our unconscious desires)
reflected in it we undergo a kind of psychoanalytic experience as a
result of which our next embodiment becomes a relatively new
439
b) Mavrodes and van Inwagen on bodily continuity
One of the most common criticisms of Hick's conception of bodily resurrection (or
teleportation to 'the resurrection world') is that it does not preserve any form of
bodily continuity—which is generally considered to be a necessary condition for
438 (Hick 1960) p. 23
439
(Hick 1991) p. 160
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personal identity. Though he does not attempt to defend Hick's particular
formulation of the doctrine ofbodily resurrection, one of the most historically
significant recent defences of the doctrine of bodily resurrection against such
criticisms was offered by George Mavrodes in 1977.
In his 'The Life Everlasting and the Bodily Criterion of Identity',440 Mavrodes argues
that the bodily criterion for personal identity is philosophically uninformative.
Though his argument is highly technical, his basic thesis is relatively simple.
According to Mavrodes, ifwe say 'person x and person y are the same person if and
only if they have the same body', we will have every bit as much trouble defining the
'sameness' in which such bodily continuity consists as we would have in defining the
more generic form of sameness employed in the statement 'x and y are the same
person if and only if they are the same person'.
To be sure, Mavrodes' position has the advantage of simplicity. And it is important
in our present context to note that this simplicity is not merely a philosophical
advantage—it also has the advantage of apparent loyalty to the scriptural account.
After all, Paul seems to favour such simplicity in his all-important treatment of the
doctrine ofbodily resurrection in his first letter to the Corinthians. He says: 'But
someone may ask, "How are the dead raised? With what kind of body will they
come?" How foolish! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. But God
gives it a body as he has determined . . .'441
It is also important to note, however, that Paul does not stop his explanation of the
bodily resurrection with this admonition against idle speculation. In the verses that
follow, he provides us, in the limited metaphysical vocabulary of his day, with what
many would consider the fullest account of the doctrine of the bodily resurrection
provided in Scripture. Is this not an invitation (with the important admonition
against idle speculation at the forefront of our minds) to say all that our limited
understanding will allow us to say about this doctrine?
All that Mavrodes has said (in this paper, at least) about the doctrine of the bodily
resurrection is that the person that is raised will be the same person that died. Other
theologians throughout history have thought it necessary to incorporate some concept
440 (Mavrodes 1977)
441 1 Corinthians 15: 35-37a
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of temporary disembodied existence into the doctrine of bodily resurrection to ensure
that the resurrected person is more than a mere replica.442 But in response to the
worries expressed by recent thinkers concerning the comprehensibility of such an
intermediate state, are there not other options available to us in our attempt to
expound upon such complex doctrines?
Despite the importance ofMavrodes' simple argument, more and more philosophical
theologians throughout MacKay's lifetime called for some intelligible version of the
bodily continuity criterion to fill the logical hole left in the doctrine of bodily
resurrection when the intelligibility of a disembodied intermediate state is called into
question. The first, and no doubt most important, ofMavrodes' critics to offer such
an account of bodily continuity was Peter van Inwagen.
In his response to Mavrodes' 1977 paper, van Inwagen argues that if an exposition of
the doctrine of the bodily resurrection is to be helpful, it must avoid defending
traditional ways of talking about the doctrine at the expense of the doctrine's
intelligibility. The following paragraph demonstrates the flavour of van Inwagen's
thought:
In what follows, there is one word that I shall avoid using: 'body'. I
have no idea what this word means, at least as Mavrodes and Quinn
use it. Each of them talks as if it were obvious that there is associated
with each of us in some intimate way a physical object called 'his
body.' But I am unable to determine what that object might be. More
precisely, I am unable to determine what such phrases as 'Mavrodes'
body' are supposed to mean. The word 'body' in these phrases cannot
simply be redundant (like 'himself in 'Mavrodes himself) or such
questions as the question whether Mavrodes might 'have different
bodies at different times' would make no sense whatever 443
Lest one object that we must define the word 'body' ifwe are ever to make sense of
the doctrine of the bodily resurrection, van Inwagen is quick to add the following
explanation:
At any rate, it seems to be no part ofChristian doctrine that each of us
has a thing called 'a body'. There is, of course, the doctrine called
'the Resurrection of the Body' in which all Christians must believe.
How the doctrine got that name is an interesting question that belongs
to the history of ideas. What the doctrine says (in part) is that one day
442 As we saw above, even Hick eventually took recourse in this plea to disembodied existence with
the invention of what he called the 'bardo phase' between bodily existences.
443
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all or most men will be restored to life by God, and that after this
restoration these men will not be 'ghosts' or 'pure spirits' (whatever
precisely those terms might mean) but will be able to walk about and
touch one another, and to speak aloud; they will reflect light, have
definite positions in space, and will each of them weigh a certain
number of pounds.444
The problem, according to van Inwagen, is not (as Mavrodes seems to suggest) that
there are competing ideas ofwhat it would mean for a resurrected person to be the
same person as a person who lived and died long before, one of which is simple and
the other of which demands that the criterion ofbodily continuity be added to the
simple idea as a necessary condition for personal identity. The problem is that
'personal continuity' and 'bodily continuity' are not, according to van Inwagen,
distinguishable concepts.
After discussing several possible theories of personal identity that would allow for a
person long dead (whose body had been physically destroyed one way or another) to
rise again and finding all such theories fatally flawed, van Inwagen presents his
readers with one of the most infamous lines in this entire debate: 'What follows
from this about the Christian hope of resurrection? Very little of interest, I think.
All that follows is that ifChristianity is true, then what I earlier called "certain facts
about the present age" are not facts' 445 These 'certain facts' include the fact that the
bodies ofmany people whom we have every reason to believe will be resurrected
have already been destroyed. After all, van Inwagen argues, if a body is really
destroyed, it cannot be simply resurrected; the most that can be done for a destroyed
body is to replicate it, and resurrection and replication are different precisely in that
the former and not the latter preserves personal identity.
The way in which van Inwagen argues that the bodily resurrection should be
understood, therefore, is as simple as it is absurd. He says that the pieces ofmeat we
normally call 'human corpses' are really the mere, dead replicas of people who have
been whisked off to heaven for safekeeping. God could have preserved each dying
person right before our eyes, transforming them into an incorruptible physical state in
which they would persist until the resurrection. Likewise, he could have simply
whisked our bodies off to heaven or some other place where they would be preserved
444
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until the end of the present world. But either of these options would have made
miracles an obvious feature of every single human life, and such imprudently
frequent intervention into the physical causal nexus would be uncharacteristic of the
god who values faith over sight (or perhaps we should say 'faith oversight').
Though the discussion in philosophical theology over how personal identity is
maintained throughout death, a long period of decay, and subsequent bodily
resurrection continues in earnest to the present day, we will delay our discussion of
recent contributions until after we have outlined MacKay's position. And before we
begin our discussion ofMacKay's brief comments on eternal life, we need to
mention one more of his contemporaries—the systematic theologian, G. C.
Berkouwer.
C. Systematic Theology
One of the defining characteristics of G. C. Berkouwer's Man: The Image ofGod,
published in 1962, is its recognition of the substantial unity of the human person.446
Berkouwer is aware of the longstanding historical dispute over this issue, yet his
position is clear. He acknowledges the trend ofmodern theologians to reject as
fallacious the attempts of earlier theologians (most notably, Calvin) to divide
metaphysical anthropology into its 'higher' and Tower' parts, attributing the image
ofGod to the higher and not the lower parts, and he resolutely sides with these
contemporary theologians. He says, 'According to the story in Genesis, the whole
man is made in the image of God, and Genesis certainly does not imply that certain
"higher" qualities exclusively make up the content of the image.'447
In addition to the biblical and philosophical reasons we have already discussed for
rejecting any strong form of dualism in Christian metaphysical anthropology,
Berkouwer also stresses an important, distinctly theological, rationale: the radical
446 Wolfhart Pannenberg is another prominent systematic theologian has written extensively on the
implications of anthropological holism for theological anthropology (see especially (Pannenberg
1985)). Though his work is concerned more with the relationship between the self and society than
the mind/body problem, there are many important parallels between these different kinds of
anthropological holism. For philosophical elaboration on this Pannenberg style of anthropological
holism, see (Taylor 1989). For a recent collection of recent essays elaborating on this form of
theological anthropology, see (Gregersen, Drees, and Gorman 2000).
447
(Berkouwer 1962) p. 75
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dependence of the whole human being (and, indeed, all of creation) on the person
and power of its Creator.448
Ifwe were to accept a Platonic notion of the image of God in humanity, in which the
soul reflects the divine in virtue of its substantial immortality and the body is merely
the manifestation of our temporary involvement in the world of becoming, then the
dividing line between the eternal and the finite would obviously be drawn between
the body and soul of the human being. Yet Berkouwer rightly recognises that this
position contrasts sharply with the biblical doctrine of the image of God. After all,
the Christian doctrine of creation draws the line between the eternal and the finite not
between body and soul, but between the Creator and creature. The Christian doctrine
of the divine image must therefore be defined more carefully. Though a full
discussion of humanity's creation in the divine image would take us significantly off
course at this point, it is important to note Berkouwer's emphasis on the
Creator/creature distinction with regard to our prospects for eternal life. In his
chapter on immortality, for example, he makes the telling point that the word
'immortality' only occurs twice in the Scriptures 'first in connection with God, who
alone is immortal (I Timothy 6:16), and secondly in relation to mortality which must
put on immortality (I Corinthians 15:53)'.449
Furthermore, Berkouwer's discussion of anthropological holism and the doctrine of
the intermediate state takes him even further away from a Platonic metaphysical
anthropology. He introduces this discussion with the following observation
concerning those theologians who would accept the principle of anthropological
holism:
There can then be no idea that death affects merely the body, as a part
ofman; the soul is also affected by death, so that after man dies, there
remains only one eschatological perspective: awakening from death.
That is a perspective which has nothing to do with the 'natural'
448 He exposits this rationale not only in his discussion of Barth's theological anthropology (pp. 93ff)
but also (and especially) in his discussion of the question as to whether there is 'a way from the
radical messages of Scripture to the immortality of the soul' ((Berkouwer 1962) p. 248). In this latter
context, he offers the following quotation from Kuyper's Loci, V. p. 45: 'The concept of dependence
in human existence (i.e., man's creatureliness) cannot be combined with the concept of the
immortality of the soul.' (Berkouwer 1962) p. 248
449
(Berkouwer 1962) p. 243
Individual Eschatology 193
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
immortality or indestructibility of the soul, but comes exclusively
from God's future creative act in Jesus Christ.450
In much more detail than we can summarise here, Berkouwer then outlines the
positions of several contemporary theologians who are committed to anthropological
holism, recognising the fact that while some, more radical, thinkers451 understand the
rejection of anthropological substance dualism as a requirement that we go on to
reject the idea of any intermediate state in which dead believers can be said to await
bodily resurrection, other anthropological holists are more timid in the face of such a
complex and historically orthodox doctrine. Among this second group of holistic
theologians we find Helmut Thielicke and Oscar Cullmann.452 According to
Berkouwer, the chief reason 'we can say that the orthodox doctrine of the
intermediate state has not yet been generally rejected' is that it is not clear how such
a rejection could be brought into accord with New Testament references to 'the
thereafter'.453
Berkouwer concludes his discussion of the intermediate state (and thus his chapter on
immortality) with a discussion of the Reformed creeds. In this discussion, he makes
two points very clearly: 1) all of the most important Reformed creeds speak of an
intermediate state and 2) the purpose of these creedal statements was not to produce
an orthodox formulation ofmetaphysical anthropology but to express the Christian
hope in the face of death in the anthropological terminology that was most
meaningful to contemporary participants in that hope. We find a characteristic
statement of these two points in the following selection:
The Reformation confessions show no shadow of a doubt regarding
continued existence after death, as is evident from Lord's Day 22 of
the Heidelberg Catechism and from numerous other places. But,
equally, in these confessions, there is no mention of natural
immortality as an independent theme. The perspective of the eschaton
dominates them and the relation of man to God's judgement and
grace, which death does not abolish. Death and man's continued
existence are indeed spoken of in anthropological categories, in terms
450
(Berkouwer 1962) p. 250
451 Here he refers primarily to Althaus and Van der Leeuw.
452 Berkouwer specifically names only Thielicke in this group, though Cullman's comments in the
final chapter of his Immortality ofthe Soul or Resurrection ofthe Dead? (Cullmann 1958)
demonstrate that he is also reluctant to directly challenge the concept of a conscious intermediate
state.
453
(Berkouwer 1962) p. 254
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of soul and body (as in the Latin text of Lord's Day 22), but this fact
does not imply a systematic anthropological analysis in the sense of
substantial dichotomy or of a natural immortality therein implied;
rather the main point is the expectation of salvation which, in Christ,
defies death, and in which we anticipate being united with Him.454
Before we move on to our discussion ofMacKay's individual eschatology and how
his thinking was shaped by the theological contributions of his contemporaries, it
may be a good idea to recap what we have judged to be the most important biblical,
philosophical and systematic theological advances made during his academic career.
To this end, we can highlight several key points.
First, from our discussion ofOscar Cullman's work, we have seen that increasing
attention was paid during MacKay's lifetime to our unity with Christ in the radical
event of his bodily resurrection as a distinction between the Greek and Christian
hope for eternal life.
Second, we have highlighted two trends among philosophical theologians of
MacKay's day. The first trend, seen most explicitly among Wittgensteinian
philosophical theologians, involves the tendency to question the idea that personal
life can continue in a disembodied form after bodily death. The second trend in
philosophical theology involves the effort to understand personal identity in such a
way that it is at least logically possible to maintain personal continuity from normal
human life, through death and bodily decay, to some future personal existence
commonly referred to as 'bodily resurrection'.
Our third point, drawn to our attention by G. C. Berkouwer, was a distinctly
theological contribution to the problem ofmetaphysical anthropology as it relates to
individual eschatology. This point was the fruit of the increased attention paid to the
unity of humanity's psychological, spiritual, and physical nature by twentieth century
theologians. The result was a more distinctively Christian Creator/creature
distinction, which contrasts sharply with the Platonic distinction between the divine¬
like immortal soul and the less respectable, mortal body. It is with these important
contributions in mind, therefore, that we now turn our attention to MacKay's
understanding of the Christian doctrine of eternal life.
454
(Berkouwer 1962) p. 271
Individual Eschatology 195
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
II. MacKay on Eternal Life
The first thing that we must reiterate concerning MacKay's understanding of eternal
life is that he wrote considerably less about it than he wrote about any of the other
topics we have addressed so far. Given the fact that, as we saw in chapter 2, he
considered himself to be primarily an empirical scientist who addressed theological
issues only as they related to his empirical work, his reserve with regard to this issue
was understandable. After all, he did his best to live by his favourite motto: 'When
short of data, keep mind open, and mouth shut'.455
Though there is naturally very little in the way of scientific evidence directly relating
to our hope for life beyond the grave, on several occasions MacKay's work forced
him to deal with issues so closely related to the Christian hope for eternal life that he
could not help but venture a few comments. In this section we will attempt to
systematise the most important of these comments, addressing key questions as they
arise and relating his answers, where possible, to the contributions of his
contemporaries in biblical, philosophical, and systematic theology.
A. The Created Order (and Its End)
With regard to MacKay's earliest hints as to how a Christian doctrine of eternal life,
informed by the best data general and special revelation have to offer, should go, the
first of his publications that demand our attention is also his most overtly
metaphysical. He titled it 'Divine Activity in a Scientific World'.456
Published in 1960, the same year he took up the chair at the University of Keele that
he would occupy for the rest of his career, this paper, more than any other he ever
wrote, offers us a picture ofMacKay's understanding of the physical world and its
relation to its Creator. As we shall soon see, of all the points summarised earlier
concerning the contributions made during MacKay's lifetime by biblical,
philosophical, and systematic theology, the one point that MacKay himself
emphasised most is our radical dependence on the sustaining power of our Creator.
This early paper provides us with a clear example of how MacKay's understanding
of the Creator/creature distinction works itself out in ordinary human experience.
455
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Beginning with a few comments on the kind of Creator that Christians believe in, he
says:
Our Christian Faith is in One who transcends in His nature every
category of human description. We know of Him only what He has
been pleased to reveal to us; and it must be one of our controlling
convictions that there is infinitely more to the Being of God than
anything or all that our minds can now apprehend of Him.457
The fact that 'we can know of Him only what He has been pleased to reveal to us',
means that we can neither claim to have exhaustively understood our Creator nor
reject those truths concerning Himself with which He has seen fit to provide us.
MacKay elaborates upon this doctrine by identifying two features of the Bible. First,
because Christianity regards it as the Word of God, believers must recognise its
absolute authority. Second, because language must always assume a certain point of
view (i.e. to say anything, one cannot simultaneously say everything), biblical
interpreters must take great care to recognise the logical perspective from which each
individual biblical statement is made. Failure to recognise the first feature of the
Bible would result in the 'inverted humility' of theological scepticism while failure
to recognise the second would result in the misplaced pride of 'word-perfect'
fundamentalism.458
From this recognition of our complete epistemic dependence upon our Creator,
MacKay goes on to assess the relative merits of materialism on the one hand and
idealism on the other, concluding as follows:
Scripture and common sense alike suggest to us that there is some
truth in both materialist and the idealist answers. Suppose then that
we explore the possibility adumbrated in the opening paragraphs, that
the materialist and idealist models fail, not because their propositions
are false, but because they are of inadequate logical dimensionality
they are each trying, metaphorically speaking, to cram all the
information in a multi-dimensional subject into a single two-
dimensional projection. Like the plan and elevation views of a girder
bridge, neither is false yet each alone would mislead if regarded as a
complete account.459
Of course we should have anticipated by now that he would bring his doctrine of
complementary descriptions to bear on this complex issue. In this instance, he uses
457
(MacKay 1960b) p. 75
458 The phrases 'inverted pride' and 'word-perfect' are taken from (MacKay 1960b) p. 75.
459
(MacKay 1960b) pp. 81-82
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his favourite logical tool to build an understanding of the physical world, recognising
the objectivity in which the physical world stands relative to any individual or
collective human will, while at the same time acknowledging the radical sense in
which all of creation is subject to the will of its Creator. He explains this
complementary understanding of the physical world by drawing the distinction
between what he calls 'static' and 'dynamic' stability.
'Static stability', as MacKay defines the term, is that stability that results from an
inflexible medium. Statues and paintings would therefore provide us with clear
examples of objects having static stability. Dynamic stability, on the other hand, is
that stability that results from mere regularity within a dynamic medium. A classic
example of this kind of stability would be an object displayed on a video screen or
the curve at the top of a waterfall. Drawing this distinction between dynamic and
static stability allows him to explain the extreme regularity of a world that
nonetheless depends entirely upon the continuing will of its Creator for its existence
from one moment to the next.460
Lest we should miss the importance of this metaphysical statement for our present
investigation into MacKay's understanding of the Christian doctrine of eternal life,
we should also highlight the single paragraph of this twenty-one page paper that
makes up his section titled 'The End of the World'. Making the implications of his
argument as explicit as his characteristic caution allows, MacKay says:
Presumably from the scientific standpoint the most dramatic
supernatural event in the world-picture of Christian Revelation would
be the end of the world, when 'the heavens shall be folded up as a
garment,' and 'we shall all be changed'. It was this among other
considerations that first led to the present thought-model, and it brings
out perhaps most clearly the difference made by thinking of the
object-world in terms of dynamic stability. If we ask what kind of
task God would have in winding up the natural order, materialism
would answer in terms of a wholesale removal-operation. Idealism
460 He explains this relationship between God and the physical world in the following way:
The suggestion which I believe to represent Biblical teaching on the subject is that in
ultimate terms the events of our experience are directly given by God, and that the coherence
we find in these events is to be attributed directly to the continually coherent and infinitely
detailed Will of God their Giver. The stability of the world of objects is then to be conceived
of as a dynamic stability, completely dependable for just so long as God wishes to give us
experience in the current pattern, yet expressive only of one phase of the Divine Plan and
Purpose, and thus liable, in His good time, to be replaced by something unimaginably better.
(MacKay 1960b) p. 83
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would regard it as a problem of the eradication and replacement of
ideas. (Neither might be expected to be unduly hospitable to the
possibility.) From our present standpoint, we should think of it as a
matter of a total change of the pattern of events mediating the object
world, having as its 'interpretation' in object-language a wholesale
removal-operation, and at the same time amounting from the
subjective standpoint to the eradication and replacement of the
corresponding system of ideas of material objects. Only that which
has acquired eternal status the pattern of our eternally-significant
choices made in positive response to God will ultimately survive . . .
But a more detailed discussion of eschatology is certainly not within
• 461
our present province.
And so we see that in his first clear reference to our future Christian hope, MacKay
heavily emphasises the Creator/creature distinction. But what about our personal
hope for life beyond the grave? MacKay is, after all, very careful not to elaborate on
the extent to which we as individual human beings are to survive the end of the
world. He says that 'the pattern of our eternally-significant choices made in positive
response to God' will continue into the eschaton, but to what extent can these
'patterns' be identified as 'us'? In seeking answers to these questions, the most
obvious direction to look would be towards MacKay's understanding of spiritual
life—especially as it relates to his decidedly holistic metaphysical anthropology.
B. Spiritual Life
MacKay's simplest explanation of spiritual life regards it as an aspect of events in
which we participate, bearing much the same relationship to mental events as mental
events bear to physical events. Though he never offers a great deal of explanation as
to how this relationship between our spiritual and mental lives should go, he offers
one of his most extensive early hints in another of his papers originally published in
I960.462 Under the heading 'Spiritual life' he says:
Finally, what of 'spiritual' life? Could we perhaps agree now that in
the kind of way that we see psychological life 'embodied' in the
physical brain, it is at least not implausible to see, in biblical terms,
spiritual life as 'embodied' in the psychological mechanism of a man,
if God by His grace is willing to give that man that new life? The
suggestion would then be that this acquisition of life, in the New
Testament sense, does not necessarily entail something which is
inexplicable psychologically. In other words, I do not think the
461
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Christian has any more reason to do battle with the psychology of
religion, even the psychology of conversion, than the physiology of
the brain. We may well doubt that such private matter will yield much
grist for the scientific mill; but that is not to say that the scientist is
wrong to look for Taws' in what data he can get.
I am suggesting, then, that spiritual life may be thought of in a general
way as related to the scientific mechanistic structure of psychological
theory (with which Freud among others has dealt) in the kind of way
that psychological life can be said to be related to the activity of the
nerve cells and other mechanical components (with which physiology
is concerned). True, as distinct from superficial, conversion is the
only way known to Christian faith of bringing about this
transformation in a way which 'follows on' and does not do violence
to the personality embodied.463 464
Though this statement provides us with a general idea of how MacKay understood
spiritual life to be related to mental and physical life, he does not offer much detail
regarding the kind of personal life that results from such a divine gift. In particular,
of the many questions he leaves unanswered, the one that most directly concerns our
present project is this: 'How are we to understand the Christian hope for personal
life beyond the grave?'.
In 1965 MacKay revised and combined two earlier papers465 to form a book chapter
on the relationship between mechanical and psychological aspects of human
nature.466 In this contribution, we find another ofMacKay's early explanations of
what he means by 'spiritual life'. Though this work still offers us only relatively
vague hints as to our prospects for personal survival, we do find in them more detail
than we have seen thus far. While discussing the common tendency among Christian
thinkers to speak of our souls as rational 'things' that are somehow attached to our
bodies in a removable sort ofway, MacKay says:
But is that currently 'traditional' view—or habit of speech—in fact
Biblical? It would seem that for the Hebrews at least a debate in these
terms could scarcely have been formulated, for their view of Nature
entertained no such concept as 'mere matter obeying mechanical
463
Though this paper was originally published in the now difficult to find early volumes of Faith and
Thought, this quotation was taken from its slightly revised reprint (MacKay 1966c) pp. 67&68.
464
Though we do not have the space here for a full discussion of the relationship between religious
conversion and empirical psychology, the kind of relationship MacKay here suggests is treated in
much more detail by his lifelong friend and accomplished psychologist M. A. Jeeves in his 1967
booklet titled Scientific Psychology and Christian Belief (Jeeves 1967).
465
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laws'. The main Biblical distinction would seem to be between
'spirit' on the one hand, and 'mind-body' or 'organism' on the other.
Spiritual life is declared to be something not automatically present in
a human being, but having to be received in repentance as the gift of
God; it is eternal, and not limited to the spatio-temporal phase of the
human organism.467
Though he makes it very clear that 'spiritual life' is something above and beyond
'mental life', it may not be immediately clear what it means for such a life to be
eternal while every other feature of our existence would seem to be temporal.
Af.Q
MacKay never made any direct reference to D. Z. Phillips, but it is very possible
that (at least at this point in his career) he understood 'spiritual life' in much the
same way that Phillips used the concept of 'eternal life'.
Such a similarity to Phillips would seem to darken our prospects for finding hope for
personal life beyond the grave in MacKay's thinking. If such a darkening of
prospects were to take place, however, this would not merely be the result of
MacKay's similarity to Phillips on the doctrine of eternal (or 'spiritual') life. On the
contrary, such a result would also demonstrate that we had been 'prospecting' in the
wrong place. For though MacKay clearly distinguishes between our eternal spiritual
lives and 'the spatio-temporal phase of the human organism', MacKay's position
must be distinguished from that of Phillips in at least this respect: MacKay's hope
for life beyond the grave cannot be neatly identified with confidence in the eternality
of spiritual life. We see this difference between MacKay's hope for life beyond the
grave and the mere belief that spiritual life is eternal in the next paragraph after the
one quoted immediately above, which reads:
The concepts of mental life on the other hand find no Biblical mention
apart from a body of some sort. The doctrine of the resurrection of the
body indeed lends weight to the suggestion that Biblically mind and
467
(MacKay 1965b) p. 189
468 It may be worth noting that the only one of his contemporaries whom we discussed earlier that
MacKay ever did refer to directly was G. C. Berkouwer. In (MacKay 1978b) we read:
In biblical thought, man is distinguished from all other animals as 'made in the image of
God.' What this means in theological depth has been the subject of unending debate [here
MacKay inserts a footnote, saying 'A detailed survey of the biblical evidence is given in
(Berkouwer 1962)']. For our present purposes, however, we can extract three essential
ingredients: 1. Man has rational faculties capable of apprehending not only concrete facts of
his immediate environment, but also abstract ideas, including truths revealed by God. 2.
Man's death on earth does not annul his relationship (whether of love or rebellion) with his
Creator. 3. Man is answerable to God for his actions: he can be called to account by his
Creator, (p. 179)
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body constitute two aspects of a concrete unity. This is not to say that
the perishing of the present body is the end of the personality it
mediated: for the person concerned it need not necessarily be even an
interruption. (Even in the case of an artefact a complete knowledge of
its momentary state before destruction could enable its personality to
be reproduced and to 'take up where it left off in a new mechanism,
not necessarily built out of the same material.) The continuity that
matters is not a continuity of material but of memories and
relationships, past and present, above all with God Himself.469
Here we see that even as MacKay contrasts the temporality of our existence as
'mind-bodies' with the eternality of'spiritual life', MacKay does not limit our
prospects for life beyond the grave to any non-physical, non-mental, or impersonal
eternal significance in which our spiritual lives may be understood to consist. In
contrast to Phillips, MacKay continues to hope in some literal form of the Christian
doctrine ofbodily resurrection.
C. Resurrection and Re-embodiment
By his own admission,470 he had not yet worked out these ideas in any detail when he
completed this work. Yet it is important for us to note a certain tension in this way
of thinking that will persist throughout MacKay's career. On the one hand, it is our
'spiritual life' that MacKay calls eternal. He even contrasts this eternal spiritual life
with our temporal, psychosomatic life. But, as we have seen, when talking about our
prospects for personal life beyond the grave, he directs our hope not towards the
eternality of our spiritual life, but towards some literal form of the Christian doctrine
of bodily resurrection. On the other hand, however, in saying that 'the continuity
that matters is not a continuity of material but of memories and relationships', he
stresses the importance of our mental lives with regard to our prospects for future
personal life to the point of neglect for our present physical embodiment.
This neglect for our present physical embodiment would be quite uncontroversial if it
were merely due to his having taken the possibility of our resurrection by the
469
(MacKay 1965b) p. 189
470
MacKay concludes his next paragraph (and thus his section on eternal life) with the following
disclaimer:
But here the water is deep, and speculation finds few landmarks in revelation. It is evident
that no linguistic distinction that one might wish to draw has any parallel in common usage,
even in translations of the Bible, where 'spirit', 'soul' and 'mind' are often interchanged.
But conceptually the distinction seems clear and necessary, and might perhaps be followed
up with profit by those more competent to do so. (MacKay 1965b) p. 189
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mysteriously miraculous power of the Holy Spirit for granted, as would have been
the case if, for instance, he had simply made the point (as Cullman and many others
have done) that our hope for continued personal life does not depend on the
eternality of our spiritual lives but on our union with Christ in the radical event of his
bodily resurrection. After all, if he had limited his point in this way, he could have
neglected the unimportant details of our bodily resurrection (as Cullman and others
have also done), simply asserting that this mysterious and miraculous unity brings
about our bodily resurrection in such a way that our 'memories and relationships' are
left intact. As it is, however, MacKay positively insists that after death, the future of
our present embodiment is wholly insignificant. This assertion ofMacKay's is
underlined by the fact that until the final years of his career, he preferred to speak of
our hope for future re-embodiment rather than resurrection. Before contrasting this
position with the one he developed later in his career, however, we need to clarify his
early position a bit more.
1. Early Comments
Though MacKay's early understanding of resurrection as re-embodiment may not
turn out to be the fullest interpretation of the biblical data that we can hope for, we
must remember that we are focusing on a very minor aspect ofMacKay's early
thought. Even though we will attempt in this section to highlight a slight shift in his
thinking, we must note from the outset that MacKay never expressed interest in the
intricate details of individual eschatology.471 In any case, his early preference for the
term 're-embodiment' as opposed to 'resurrection' should not be construed as any
sort of challenge to the authority of Scripture. Though we may not agree with his
interpretation, it is clear that the preference in question was due to the fact that he
thought 're-embodiment' to be a (perhaps more scientifically precise) synonym for
'resurrection' rather than an altogether new concept that he had analysed and judged
to be better founded. This feature ofMacKay's early thought is displayed most
clearly when, in his 1975 Henry Drummond Lecture at Stirling University, he
471 With regard to MacKay's lack of interest in the intricate details of how our bodily resurrection
should be understood, it may be of interest to note that when, in March of 2002, she was informed that
the present work was being undertaken, Dr. Valerie MacKay (D. M. MacKay's widow) said that if her
late husband had been asked for details concerning our biblical hope he would have responded with
words to the following effect: 'We are not told these things to satisfy idle curiosity: we are told
enough to live by in obedience' (from personal correspondence dated 26/3/2002).
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interrupts his own discussion of the possibility of our future re-embodiment in the
following way:
I am now arguing that if this is the kind of relationship that holds
between us and our bodies, then there is no more obstacle in principle
to our embodiment—'resurrection' is the biblical name for it—than
there is in the case of the man whose computer has been destroyed,
but who wants the same computation to continue in a new
embodiment.472
And so we see that, far from proposing a scientistic alternative to the biblical
doctrine ofbodily resurrection, MacKay thought that he was being more true to the
general teaching of Scripture by using the term 're-embodiment' than the more
traditional term 'resurrection'.
a) Biblical Interpretation
Of all his statements disregarding the future of our present embodiment, perhaps his
most radical was written in 1979. There we read:
If it is our Creator's will that we shall again have our being as
conscious agents in his presence, the provision of an appropriate body
will be up to him. The fate of our present embodiment is of no
consequence. The biblical promise is that we shall be 'raised to life'
in a fresh embodiment, perhaps radically different from our present
one (see 1 Cor. 15), but still bearing the same personal significance.
All this, with the glorious hope held out by Christ's resurrection, is
fully as compatible with the view outlined above as with the more
traditional imagery.473
As MacKay implies in this passage, his claim that 'the fate of our present
embodiment is of no consequence' is supported by his interpretation of 1 Corinthians
15.474 He provides us with his most detailed exposition of this scriptural passage in
472
(MacKay 1980a) p. 102
473
(MacKay 1979c) p. 102
474
MacKay also refers to 1 Corinthians 15 (again, without providing much in the way of expository
detail) in two parallel passages. First, on page 56 of (MacKay 1966c), he says:
This is not meant to be a theological study, nor should undue pressure be put on individual
metaphors; but it does seem that the Bible gives very little encouragement to the idea that we
should regard ourselves as somehow seated at the controls in a chariot, our body, which is
quite separate from us. Paul does use the imagery of living in a tent, or wearing a suit of
clothes, to represent embodiment; but these current idioms of the day are introduced in the
course ofmaking quite different points. When the doctrine of the body itself is in question,
the image he uses is that of the seed (1 Corinthians 15).
A second parallel passage can be found on p. 441 of (MacKay 1985d) where we read:
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his contribution to a book on Christian philosophy of science, published in 1978. In
his section on immortality we read:
In 1 Corinthians, chapter 15, which gives our most explicit teaching
on the Christian hope of eternal life, we find a remarkably similar
emphasis. We are given no promise of physical continuity, let alone
identity, between our present body and the resurrection body. As
when a grain of wheat is sown, the blade that rises from the ground is
a quite different structure, so at death we are 'sown as an animal body,
. . . raised as a spiritual body' (1 Cor. 15:44, NEB). The continuity
implied is, rather, at the level of our personal relationship with God;
the personality that is ours will find expression in a new embodiment,
perhaps unimaginably different from our present one, but still having
the same essential characterological structure that identifies and
distinguishes us as individuals here and now.475
But does such an account of resurrection as re-embodiment really do justice to the
biblical doctrine? Would it be safe to say, for example, that the empty tomb of Jesus
is irrelevant to our Christian hope?
But surely any argument against MacKay along these lines would be too harsh.
After all, MacKay never called Christ's resurrection a re-embodiment, nor does his
use of the term with regard to our life after death necessarily imply that the
grounding of our hope (i.e. Jesus' restoration to life after being dead three days)
should be understood in a similar manner. Perhaps we could simply say that Jesus'
restoration to life, because his corpse had not yet been completely destroyed, was a
case that can most literally be described as a resurrection whereas the hope that his
resurrection secured for us is for our re-embodiment. After all, it is most reasonable
to think that our corpses (unlike Jesus' corpse) will be completely destroyed before
we live again.
The simplest objection to this interpretation, on the other hand, would be that (as
MacKay clearly recognised) the Bible never uses the term 're-embodiment' to speak
of our future life. But this objection would not be likely to convince even the most
literalistic ofbiblical interpreters. After all, it only applies to most English
Briefly, if the relation between our conscious experience and our brain activity is one of
embodiment rather than one of quasi-physical interaction between two different worlds, then
the destruction of our present embodiment would certainly imply the termination of our
conscious experience in this space-time; but it would not at all rule out the possibility, if our
Creator so willed it, that we should find ourselves reembodied, perhaps (as Paul hints in I
Cor. 15) in some unimaginably different embodiment, 'in the resurrection.'
475
(MacKay 1978b) p. 183
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translations of the Bible—not necessarily the Bible itself. As it turns out, the Greek
word ('avacrrr||ii') that is normally translated 'to resurrect' has a much broader
lexical range than its English counterpart. In Matthew 22:24, for example, a form of
'avaorrpi,' is used to refer to procreation—an event to which we would hardly apply
our English word 'resurrection'.476 If it is valid to understand one process referred to
in Greek by the verb 'avaoxripi' as 'procreation' and another process referred to by
the same Greek verb as 'resurrection' would the modern English term 're-
embodiment' not fall well within the ancient lexical range of 'auacrrrpi'?
But even ifwe concede the point that MacKay's early preference for 're-
embodiment' was within the lexical range of '(xvaoxripi', it is still not clear that 're-
embodiment' is the process to which Paul intended to refer in 1 Corinthians 15.
After all, the metaphor Paul uses is that of a seed's relation to the plant it produces.
Though there is obviously an intense dissimilarity between seeds and the plants they
produce, this dissimilarity would not necessarily imply that what physically happens
to a planted seed is irrelevant to the future life of the plant. Is it really legitimate,
therefore, to conclude from Paul's exposition that 'the fate of our present
embodiment is of no consequence'?
Perhaps it would be best to come back to this question after we have discussed the
philosophical reasoning behind his choice of terminology in more detail. For now,
however, it is important for us to note that MacKay was careful in this early, brief
exposition of 1 Corinthians 15 to limit his comments to what is and is not guaranteed
by the text. In particular, we must note that he was very careful not to extend his
analysis into a full-blown speculative theory—especially one that could be only
tentatively supported by the Scriptures. MacKay's preference for the term 're-
embodiment' as opposed to 'resurrection' does not imply that he had more to say
about the end of the world than was portrayed by the traditional terminology. On the
contrary, MacKay seems to have preferred 're-embodiment' precisely because it
476 In this verse, the Greek 'keyovtec;, AiSdaxcde, Mcouaf|c elrev, 'Eccu u<; drroGdvii iJ.fi texva,
eiuyapPpeuaei. o dSekc{)6<; autou tf)v yuvatxa autou xat avaatf|aeL aireppa tco cxSeAcpcS autou.' is
translated '"Teacher," they said, "Moses told us that if a man dies without having children, his brother
must marry the widow and have children for him.'" in the NIV. Some older translations, such as the
Authorized Version, seek to preserve the connection between 'avaarrun' and 'to resurrect' as tightly
as possible, though the resulting usage of'to raise up' is an obvious stretch of the modern lexical
range of this class of English verbs. In the Authorized Version, this verse is rendered: 'Saying,
Master, Moses said, If a man die, having no children, his brother shall marry his wife, and raise up
seed unto his brother.'
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implies less that 'resurrection'. His understanding of Scripture merely led him to
believe that physical continuity was not guaranteed, and, as we shall soon see, his
early philosophical considerations led him to believe that it was not necessary.
b) Early Philosophical Considerations
The philosophical considerations that seem to have led MacKay to understand our
life beyond the grave as 're-embodiment' rather than 'resurrection' are very closely
related to the arguments of John Hick we discussed earlier. In the paragraphs
immediately following his exposition of 1 Corinthians 15 (quoted above), MacKay
responds to arguments levelled against Hick's explanation of resurrection as
analogous to Star Trek style teleportation—particularly those arguments suggesting
that such a 'resurrection' should not be resurrection at all, but merely replication. He
says that such arguments, depending, as they must, upon the criterion of bodily
continuity to distinguish between resurrection bodies and replica persons, are
'strangely perverse'. 'Nothing is more universally accepted', MacKay argues, 'than
our daily experience of waking up to find ourselves the same individuals who went
to sleep the night before, despite all kinds of metabolic changes in our bodily
tissues.'477 As we have seen from our discussion of dynamic and static stability,
MacKay believed that there is one and only one criterion by which we can absolutely
determine the identity of any created object from one moment to the next—the
sovereign will of the Creator. Whatever he may have come to conclude with regard
to the importance of our present embodiment for our prospects of resurrection, on
this point he remained unequivocally clear throughout his life. As we see from this
early writing, MacKay saw this radical dependence on the sovereign will of the
Creator as an alleviation of any epistemic need for the concept of bodily continuity
as a ground for personal identity. With regard to those who would cling to some
notion ofbodily continuity for objective reference, therefore, MacKay says:
Mysterious though the idea of resurrection may be, there would seem
to be no basic logical difference between the problem of personal
identity upon waking up in another world and that of waking up in this
world. The objective reference in either case must of course be
ontologically to the fiat of our Creator, to whom we owe our continual
identity moment by moment, day by day. If He knows and recognises
us in the resurrection as those whom He knew in the days of our flesh,
477
(MacKay 1978b) p. 184
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then by the same token, that is who we are in fact, for it is our Creator
who alone determines and gives being to what is the case.478
Clearly, we must admit that this kind of reasoning flows from a healthy recognition
of the Creator/creature distinction. We as creatures depend upon our Creator every
moment of every day. We depend upon the provision of our Creator for the world in
which we live and even our very own bodily selves. But surely it would be
misleading to speak of our Creator's consistent provision from one moment to the
next as a succession of physical 're-embodiments'. Furthermore, we have seen from
our brief discussion ofMacKay's early comments that he not only preferred the term
're-embodiment' to 'resurrection', but he also went so far in his denial of the bodily
criterion for personal continuity as to claim that 'the fate of our present embodiment
is of no consequence'.479 At the very close of his academic career, however, a slight
but very important shift took place with regard to MacKay's understanding of
personal continuity.
2. Later Comments
The most extended treatment MacKay ever gave to the question of life beyond the
grave was presented in his final Gifford Lecture at the University ofGlasgow.
Sadly, when he presented this series of lectures, MacKay himselfwas a very sick
man. As he offered his most extensive comments ever regarding our prospects for
life beyond the grave, he was painfully aware of the fact that his own death was very
near.
In this lecture, he first acknowledges the fact that the metaphysical anthropology he
had developed throughout his career strongly suggests that the end of our present
embodiment is the end of us. Throughout his life he had argued that substance
dualism, the most historically popular understanding of human immortality, is a
philosophical notion for which no solid scientific or biblical evidence exists.
MacKay clearly maintained this position even when faced with the imminent reality
of his own death.
478
(MacKay 1978b) p. 184
479
(MacKay 1979c) p. 102
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But in saying that his metaphysical anthropology left 'nothing automatic about
immortality',480 he was not denying any hope of future existence. As we have seen,
MacKay believed in a literal form of bodily resurrection at the end of time. It was
quite natural, therefore, to follow up his affirmation that our personal lives are
intricately bound up with some form of embodiment with a discussion of the
question that most interests us in this portion of our study, namely: 'How intimate is
481
our dependence on this particular embodiment?'
He opens his discussion of this question with the following observation:
At first sight this might seem a senseless question. Whatever our
theory of the relation between brain and mind, we have come across
plenty of evidence that if our brain is damaged our mind is
correspondingly maimed, and if the damage is great enough we lose
consciousness or die. If our conscious agency is thought of as
embodied in our brain activity, it is even more obvious that we must
keep our embodiment in good order by eating and drinking just
enough of the right stuff, and not too much of the wrong stuff, if we
want our minds to function normally.482
He then develops this point with reference to two of his favourite examples of the
complementarity relationship: a message written in lights and a triangle drawn in
chalk. He draws our attention to the fact that if you muck about with the wiring of a
marquis sign, you are liable to distort the message being displayed. Likewise, you
can't change the way the message reads without making some electrical changes. In
this sense, the message and the medium are intricately related. More to the point, if
you drop a bomb on the sign (or, less dramatically, you were to merely unplug it), it
would not make sense to expect the message to continue being displayed. But does
this really mean that the message no longer exists? Would it not be possible for a
person who read the sign just before it quit working to write out the message by hand
on another sign? Clearly we would not say that it was a new message (as long as the
meaning had not changed) despite the fact that there was absolutely no physical
continuity between the old marquis sign and the new handwritten one. Ifwe extend
this metaphor back to the relationship between a human being and its physical
embodiment, we can better understand some of the philosophical reasons MacKay
480
(MacKay 1991b) p. 259
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(MacKay 1991b) p. 259
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had for preferring the term 're-embodiment' to 'resurrection'. After all, if our
present embodiment, which consists of the 'dust' of this earth (cursed by God after
the fall ofAdam) is cremated after we die, and ifwe believe that the Scriptures
promise a future life, embodied in the glorified, un-cursed matter of the New
Creation, need we assume any physical continuity between our old, cursed ashes and
our new, glorified flesh? Clearly, MacKay's early preference for the term 're-
embodiment' as opposed to 'resurrection' implied that he thought any such
assumption unnecessary.
But as we have noted, MacKay's understanding of the bodily resurrection made an
important shift in the final years of his career. We begin to see the reasoning behind
this shift as he moves from a discussion of his favourite examples of the
complementarity relationship to a discussion of the specific case presented by our
multifaceted existence.
As he comes to address the relationship between our personalities and our present
embodiment more specifically, MacKay reminds us that this relationship involves
aspects of interdependence as well as independence. Clearly, if you want to keep a
person's conscious experience from being carried out in your dressing room, the
most effective way to do so is to lock the door. Keep out the body and you keep out
the soul. In at least this respect, we all recognise the interdependence of conscious
experience and its physical embodiment. But we have also become quite
comfortable with the fact that this interdependence is tempered by a degree of
independence as well. After all, it is a well-known fact that the vast majority of
molecules making up our physical embodiments will be replaced at some point in our
lives. Given these dual aspects of independence and interdependence, the natural
question for our purposes is this: How many cells can be replaced at one time
without calling our identity into question?
In his final Gifford Lecture, MacKay begins his discussion of this question with
another analogy. He asks us to consider the case of a computer system set up to
answer questions regarding train service by telephone. With regard to such a system,
MacKay observes that there is no limit in principle to the number of hardware
components that can be replaced without changing the essential nature of the system.
After all, we have defined the system not by its physical nature, but by its ability to
distribute information. Changes in the flow of energy, therefore, at least to the extent
that these changes leave the basic flow of information intact, do not threaten the
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survival of our system as we have defined it. Obviously, this analogy would suggest
that the fate of our present embodiment is of no consequence to our prospects for life
beyond the grave in a new embodiment. But this analogy only holds to the extent
that we, like our imaginary system, are in essence nothing but information
processors. And we know that MacKay was keen throughout his life to avoid the
fallacy he affectionately called 'nothing buttery'.
This is the context in which MacKay again comes to address the possibility raised by
Hick that we are 'teleported', as it were, into the resurrection world as soon as we
die. As we saw earlier, Hick's model would suggest that the physical continuity
between past and future embodiments are irrelevant when contrasted with the
continuity of our selves-as-information-flow-systems.
Given MacKay's preference for speaking of 're-embodiment' as opposed to
'resurrection', along with his claim, only seven years earlier, that 'The fate of our
483
present embodiment is of no consequence', it is quite natural for us to take
MacKay's response to the teleportation example for granted. After all, as recently as
1978 he had called the arguments of Hick's critics 'strangely perverse'.484 It may
come as somewhat of a surprise, therefore, to find that in his final Gifford Lecture,
MacKay takes a somewhat different position. Not only does he refrain from using
the term 're-embodiment' with reference to the biblical doctrine of bodily
resurrection, but he also goes so far as to suggest that with regard to the imagined
possibility of teleportation, 'it would seem absurd to suggest that what identifies you
is simply the information-flow pattern in your nervous system'.485 Instead of
repeating his assertion that 'the fate of our present embodiment is of no
consequence', he states in his Gifford Lecture that '. . . our physical embodiment
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The most immediate answer to this question is that he seems to have broadened his
interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15—specifically with regard to the reservations that
we expressed earlier concerning Paul's analogy of a seed and its resulting plant.
Whereas in his early exposition of this passage, MacKay had not mentioned any
aspect of continuity between the seeds and plants, we find a more complete treatment
487of this metaphor in his published Gifford Lectures. There we read:
Remember, for example, how Paul, writing in 1 Corinthians 15
imagines an objector who says: 'What's all this talk about the
resurrection? What sort of a body are they supposed to be provided
with? Where do they get their body from?' and Paul says: 'You
foolish man; when you plant a seed in the ground, you don't expect a
seed to come up; you expect a shoot, a blade, which will be physically
quite different.' He doesn't go into biological detail, his conceptions
were no doubt different from ours. But the point he is making is that
there is an element ofcontinuity, what comes up is related to the seed
that is put in, yet the plant is different in all kinds ofways.488
But what are we to make of this 'element of continuity' between our present and
future embodiments? After all, MacKay insisted throughout his career that our
bodily resurrection should not be understood as the mere re-assembly and
resuscitation of disintegrated corpses. If he really believed that our spiritual, mental,
487 The section from which we have taken this quotation is one of the very few sections ofBehind the
Eye that does not follow the transcript ofMacKay's lecture verbatim. Though the portion of this
section that varies from the original transcript is not included in our quotation, it does form part of the
context, and thus our interpretation depends upon it.
As we have noted, MacKay was a very sick man when he gave these lectures. Before he died,
therefore, he charged his wife with the task of editing his lectures for publication, clarifying points
that he may not have thoroughly explained and integrating his answers to questions back into the text
of his lectures. One of the few comments that his widow saw fit to integrate into this section may
actually camouflage the shift in emphasis we are attempting to highlight (though it does not, if
properly interpreted, significantly alter the point he was making). This comment reads as follows:
'What matters is the combination of discontinuity of embodiment with a continuity sufficient to make
it meaningful to use the same name, as it were, of the resurrected one.' (p. 271)
MacKay's widow is not to be faulted for having added this comment to the section from which we are
quoting. After all, this comment was quoted directly from the question and answer session
immediately following this lecture. The one sense in which its addition could be misleading,
however, is that as it is placed in Behind the Eye, the 'discontinuity of embodiment' could be
inteipreted as a complete, physical discontinuity—suggesting, once again, that what MacKay had in
mind was a 're-embodiment' as opposed to a 'resurrection'. The question MacKay was addressing
when he uttered the inserted comment, however, regarded the temporal relationship between the
person who dies in this world and the person who is resurrected in the world to come. Taken in its
original context, therefore, we see more plainly than we might have otherwise seen that what MacKay
meant by the phrase 'discontinuity of embodiment' was not necessarily a physical discontinuity but a
temporal one. We will discuss this distinction in more detail in chapter 7.
488
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and physical lives constituted complementary descriptions of the very same
multifaceted events, why should he back away from the implications suggested by
his favourite examples of complementarity?
b) Logical Considerations
The most obvious answer to this question is that at some point late in his career, he
came to recognise important dissimilarities between our embodiment and his
favourite examples of complementarity. After all, MacKay openly acknowledged
the fact that any important dissimilarity (if such a dissimilarity exists) would force us
to reject any simple argument from analogy.489
MacKay explains one such dissimilarity in a paper he presented to the 9th
International Wittgenstein Symposium in 1984. In this paper, MacKay explores
several philosophical implications of thinking of our mental lives as embodied in our
central nervous systems. For our purposes, the most important philosophical
implication to which he draws our attention involves the way in which the brain
processes information. To understand the significance of the way our brains process
information, however, we must first understand the basic difference between digital
and analogue processing.
The main difference between digital and analogue processing is that whereas digital
processing always follows some explicit program, analogue processing depends not
only on its pre-programmed instructions, but also on some physical variable. In
adding the numbers 1 and 2, for example, the digital method would involve looking
up the numerals ' 1' and '2' on some sort of addition table and reading off the answer
provided. The analogue method, on the other hand, would be more like a physical
experiment. We could, for example, extend a single finger, then extend two more,
and finally, count how many fingers are extended.
4S<) On the proper use of arguments from analogy, MacKay said the following in his Gifford Lectures:
First and foremost, we need to know which features of these simpler examples of
embodiment are present in our own case and which are not. Analogies are fine as a way of
helping us to see possibilities we might otherwise have overlooked or dismissed as
meaningless, but the possibilities they suggest must be examined on their own merits, and
cannot be defended just by appeal to the analogies that suggested them. (MacKay 1991b) p.
260
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This distinction is important because a considerable amount of analogue processing
goes on within the human brain. The most important philosophical implication of
this feature of our brains is that our personalities are not related to our brains in the
simple (and essentially removable) sort ofway that the software (or system of rules)
is related to the hardware (or rule-following mechanism) of a digital computer.
Because our brains normally function in a way that involves what can be best
characterised as analogue information processing, they are intricately tied to multiple
physical variables for their proper function. Further, because our personalities are
essentially linked to the ways in which we respond to various bits of information, our
personalities are intricately tied up with the specific piece of physical matter that we
call 'our brains'. MacKay makes this point in the following way:
. . . since all that characterizes us as individuals (our memories,
dispositions, skills etc.) depends ex hypothesi on the detailed physical
structure upon and in which the aforementioned 'internal
experimentation' is carried out, and on which each twist and turn of
our experience leaves its mark in a widely distributed and largely
implicit physical form, it is impossible even in principle to divorce our
personal identity from the specific brain-matter in which it is
embodied, in the easy way in which the identity of an equation can be
divorced from its specific embodiment in a digital computer. I am the
individual whose brain-matter went through this and that specific
course as a result of these and those specific internal experiments in
and upon it ... In short, for us as embodied persons, 'matter
matters'.490
It is not difficult to understand how such reasoning led MacKay away from his early
insistence that the fate of our present physical embodiment is irrelevant. We must
also be careful, however, not to overstate the implications of this shift in his thought.
After all, he never, at any point in his career, gave any credence to the bodily
criterion of identity. MacKay always appealed to the sovereign will of the Creator as
the only infallible judge between personal continuity and replication. Furthermore,
even before the shift in his thinking that we have been discussing had taken place,
MacKay was very careful to note that his characterisation of our future life as re-
embodiment was not intended to imply that the cogency ofbiblical doctrine depends
in any way on an argument from analogy with a digital computer.491
490
(MacKay 1985a) pp. 107-108
491 In (MacKay 1980a), for example, he says, 'Please do not mistake this as an argument for believing
in eternal life by analogy with computers; all it does is to demonstrate a fallacy in the contrary
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III. Taking Stock
Of all the contributions we mentioned in the first section of this chapter, G. C.
Berkouwer's theological anthropology is the only work directly cited by MacKay.492
MacKay's agreement with Berkouwer, however, is not indicated merely by
MacKay's brief reference to Berkouwer's work. After all, MacKay published his
own statement of the creation's radical dependence upon its Creator two years before
the publication ofMan: The Image ofGod, demonstrating that he and Berkouwer
were part of the same theological tradition all along.
With regard to his colleagues in philosophical theology, we have identified in this
chapter a slight shift in MacKay's thought regarding the relative importance of our
present embodiment, indicating that while he had agreed with Hick's argument
utterly disregarding the fate of our physical bodies in the early stages of his career,
he clearly dismissed this position in the later years of his life. We have also seen,
however, that MacKay never insisted, as van Inwagen did, that bodily continuity
must be maintained between the people we are now and the people we will be in the
life to come. Furthermore, we have seen that MacKay's rejection of the bodily
criterion of personal identity extended beyond the 'negative' arguments ofMavrodes,
which merely argued that the bodily criterion introduced a vicious regress. Instead,
we have seen that MacKay offered a 'positive' account of the one true objective
reference. This positive account further emphasises the importance of the
Creator/creature distinction because it recognises the ultimate epistemic authority of
our Creator's sovereign will.
MacKay never referred directly to Wittgensteinian arguments against the possibility
ofmeaningful, disembodied, personal existence, though we have seen in this chapter
that his position was clearly compatible with theirs.493 He was also quick to point
out, however, that while the Holy Spirit invites us to begin our eternally significant
argument. Christians base their belief on Christ's promise that the Creator will give those who love
him a reembodied existence, as the very same agents in some different realm. My argument is that
this promise makes no less sense today than when it was first proclaimed.' (p. 102)
492(MacKay 1978b) p. 179.
493 While MacKay did not go quite so far as the Wittgensteinians in renouncing the very intelligibility
of disembodied existence, he repeatedly emphasised the fact that neither his understanding of the
mind/body relationship nor the testimonies of any biblical writer give any reason to believe that
human conscious activity can take place in the absence of a body (see, for example, (MacKay 1991b)
p. 274 n. 1).
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'spiritual' lives here and now, the biblical promise of eternal life extends beyond our
participation in this fallen world. The Bible gives us hope of a new life, commencing
with our bodily resurrection in a new world order.
Of all the contributions we summarised in the first part of this chapter, the one that
relates least directly to MacKay's published comments is the contribution ofOscar
Cullman and subsequent biblical theologians. Given the nature of debate over the
mind/body problem during MacKay's lifetime, it is natural that such contributions
would not be cited directly by someone playing MacKay's scholarly role. In the
years since MacKay's death, however, debate over the mind/body problem among
openly Christian philosophers has taken on a distinctively eschatological flavour. In
this new dispensation of philosophical debate, a much broader range of biblical
evidence is being taken into account. After all, the Bible offers us a lot more
information regarding the life to come than that presented in 1 Corinthians 15. Jesus,
for example, promised the thief on the cross, 'Today you will be with me in
paradise.' Can such a promise be reconciled with a metaphysical anthropology that
takes our embodiment as seriously as does Comprehensive Realism? This is the sort
of question to which debate over the mind/body problem in Christian philosophy has
turned in the past few years. And it is to this new dispensation of the age-old
controversy that we shall now turn our attention as we move into our seventh and
final chapter.
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Chapter 7: Comprehensive Realism and the Next Generation
As far as our present study is concerned, one of the most important features of
philosophical debate over the mind/body problem since the end of Donald MacKay's
academic career is that it has been taken up in earnest by distinctively Christian
philosophers. This recent influx of serious Christian philosophers, together with
several serious philosophical difficulties, has led to the widespread demise of
reductionistic mind/brain identity theory. In recent years, therefore, several
important philosophers have attempted to 'resurrect' some form of dualism—despite
the fact that the undeniable trend in medical science continues to suggest an ever-
tightening link between our physical and mental lives494. As we shall soon see, this
recent tendency away from reductionism has not only inspired one philosopher's
gallant attempt to resurrect the ancient, Cartesian view, but it has also spawned a new
generation of attempts at a consistent non-reductive-yet-holistic position. The
problem of personal identity, however, continues to haunt those Christian
philosophers who would want to embrace both some form of holism and some hope
for life beyond the grave. For this reason, several attempts have also been made
recently to explain how bodily resurrection might be said to preserve personal
identity.
In this chapter, we will begin with a discussion of several recently defended general
theories ofmetaphysical anthropology. We will start with an evaluation of John
Foster's philosophical arguments. Foster is important to our study because since the
end ofMacKay's academic career he has, almost single-handedly, attempted to
establish a strictly a-religious argument to persuade contemporary philosophers to
return to their Cartesian roots, openly recognising the two distinct substances of
which all rational creatures are (at least according to Foster) composed. After
attempting a response to Foster's arguments from a Comprehensive Realist
perspective, we will discuss several novel positions recently put forward by Christian
philosophers, ranging from the emergent dualism ofWilliam Hasker to the non-
dualist Constitution View put forward by Lynne Rudder Baker.
494 We will be discussing the works of several of these dualists in the sections that follow. For more
discussion on the attempted revival of dualism by Christian philosophers, see parts 1 and 2 of
(Corcoran, 2001).
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Recognising the fact that most of the recent controversy over Christian holistic
metaphysical anthropologies surrounds the issue of personal identity and life beyond
the grave, we will then turn our attention to recent attempts to develop a theory of
personal identity that is compatible with classical Christian eschatology. There we
will continue our evaluation of Lynne Rudder Baker's Constitution View with a
discussion of her comments regarding the possibility of bodily resurrection. We will
also discuss Kevin Corcoran's contribution this discussion, contrasting his position
with Baker's in such a way as to introduce a broader discussion of how the
Comprehensive Realist might work toward a fuller understanding of individual
eschatology.
I. Recent Contributions to General Metaphysical Anthropology
A. John Foster and the Return of Substance Dualism
As we saw in chapter 1, the trend ofmetaphysical anthropology for the past few
centuries has been (in general) away from Cartesian-style substance dualism. In
1991, however, John Foster published a substantial critique of holism,495 effectively
establishing his role as Cartesian dualism's most significant modern-day defender. It
was, no doubt, primarily for this reason that he was invited to participate in the
important 1998 Notre Dame conference 'Varieties ofDualism'. His paper for that
conference was subsequently published as the initial essay in Kevin Corcoran's
recent collection Soul, Body, and Survival.
Foster begins this recent contribution,496 titled 'A Brief Defence of the Cartesian
View', by arguing that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical because it is
both sui generis and fundamental. As we have seen, this is a conclusion with which
MacKay would wholeheartedly agree.497 After all, while MacKay was careful not to





497 In his review of Swinburne's Evolution of the Soul (Swinburne 1986) for example, MacKay says:
Neglect of the primacy of conscious experience has indeed blighted most attempts to see man
in purely material terms (the materialist position is remotely plausable only when the
materialist is talking about people other than himself). But is dualist interactionism the only
reasonable alternative? (MacKay 1986b) p. 679.
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both the I-story and the O-story are undeniably valid perspectives on every conscious
human experience.
Foster explains what he means by 'sui generis and fundamental', however, in a way
that may make a Comprehensive Realist a bit nervous. He says that 'this involves a
denial of any form of psychophysical identity (the identity ofmental phenomena
with physical phenomena).'498 While the denial ofwhich Foster speaks is one that
could be accepted by the Comprehensive Realist, it would seem to be, at best,
misleading. After all, while MacKay would readily agree with Foster so far as to say
that the terms 'mental event' and 'physical event' denote very different concepts, in
so far as Foster means to imply that it is impossible for both concepts to apply to a
single event, MacKay would most certainly disagree. It is, however, Foster's
disagreement from MacKay on this point that distinguishes his position as a radical
form of dualism.
But Foster's dualism is not just any radical form of dualism. His dualism is of the
old Cartesian variety known as 'substance dualism'. For Foster not only assumes
that the necessity of a conceptual mental/physical distinction necessarily implies a
distinction between mental and physical events, but he also assumes that for any
mental/physical distinction to be meaningful, it must hold with regard to items as
well as events and concepts.499 It is this final assumption that makes Foster a
substance dualist. We see this feature of his thinking perhaps most explicitly in his
attempt to refute what is known as the 'token identity thesis'.
The distinction between the 'token' and 'type' identity theses is roughly the same as
the distinction we made in chapter 2 between the positions put forward by J. J. C.
Smart and U. T. Place, though it is has grown much more specific since the papers
we discussed there were published. Whereas the type identity thesis maintains that
mental descriptions are nothing more than physical descriptions expressed in
different language, the token identity thesis is a bit more careful. It makes the lesser
claim that for every legitimate mental description there must also obtain some
physical description (whether we know exactly how such a physical description
should go or not) such that in every event to which an important aspect of that
specific mental description applies, an important aspect of that specific physical
498
(Foster 2001) p. 15
499 See quotation immediately below.
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description also applies. While this may sound like a very complicated way of
describing the token identity thesis, this complexity (or precision, to be a bit more
positive about it) is necessary if one is to maintain logical distinctions between
descriptions, events, and entities.500 This is precisely the complexity that Foster's
characterisation of the token identity thesis lacks; and this lack of precision forces
him to reject the token identity thesis as he understands it.
We see the consequence of Foster's imprecision most clearly in a single line of his
argument against the token identity thesis. Arguing from the fact that the terms
'mental' and 'physical' denote different conceptual kinds, Foster reasons that for the
token identity thesis to work, 'we have to be able to understand how ITEMS of such
apparently different kinds can be numerically the same'.501 As MacKay would, no
doubt, be quick to point out, however, without Foster's equivocation between
concepts and objects, his criticism would not stand. After all, to introduce a less
complicated example, the admittedly different concepts denoted by the terms 'red'
and 'ball' give us no problems in saying that a red ball is one, single ITEM.
Now that we have seen how Foster introduces this important equivocation, its role in
his overall argument for substance dualism should be obvious. Foster summarises
his argument in the following way:
If, as I have argued, mentality is something sui generis and
fundamental, and if, as I have also argued, it is to be ultimately
represented as belonging to subjects, then we have to accept that these
subjects are wholly non-physical. We have to accept that, even
though we ordinarily ascribe mentality to corporeal objects (in
particular, to human beings construed as members of an animal
species), the entities which fundamentally qualify as the subjects of
the mentality involved (the entities which feature as subjects in the
philosophically fundamental account) are wholly non-physical in their
intrinsic nature, and (being thus non-physical in nature) are without
location in physical space. 2
Once we see the central equivocation in Foster's argument, we do not even need to
pursue the question ofwhy he assumes that subjects must always be non-physical or
why such allegedly non-physical entities cannot be located in physical space.
500 For more on the tendency to blur distinctions between descriptions, events, and entities when
attempting to define the token identity thesis, see (Norman 2004) pagination not yet set.
501
(Foster 2001) p. 19 (italics his, capitals mine)
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Though our recognition of this crucial equivocation makes his paper significantly
less important to our present study, we need to comment on one remaining feature of
his paper before we move on to discuss the less radical forms of dualism that have
been put forward more recently. In his final section, Foster admits that substance
dualism leaves us with one very important question unanswered, namely: 'How do
non-material souls such as ours come to be conjoined with physical bodies?'. While
the causal implications of this question form the substance of Jaegwon Kim's
argument against substance dualism published immediately after Foster's essay in
Corcoran's collection,503 this question does not seem to bother Foster at all. After
all, he argues, this question suggests a perfect philosophical job description for God.
But in saying this, he is not moving away from the a-religious foundation of his
argument for substance dualism. He is, rather, tacking a religious, apologetic
argument on the end of his a-religious argument for substance dualism. For, since
Foster believes that he has already argued strongly for substance dualist metaphysical
anthropology, the question of how our souls come to be conjoined to our bodies does
not give Foster a reason to be suspicious of substance dualism. He does think that it
provides, however, a reason to be suspicious of atheism.
Though there is much more that could be said concerning this kind of argument for
the existence ofGod, it will suffice for our present purposes to say that the
Comprehensive Realist can rejoice in the fact that her belief in God is not founded
upon ignorance of any kind, much less such an ill-founded ignorance as that which
Foster's apologetic would encourage. After all, MacKay directly addressed just this
sort of argument when he unequivocally asserted that 'Christianity has no stakes in
our ignorance of the physical causes of brain events'.504
B. William Haslcer and Emergent Dualism
As we saw in chapter 5, William Hasker shares many philosophical interests and
commitments with MacKay, though he is significantly less comfortable than
MacKay with the idea of studying brain physiology in the hopes of gaining insight
into our mental processes. In chapter 5, we saw how this difference worked itself out
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within a hypothetically mechanistic universe. As Hasker has come to address the
mind/body problem more specifically in recent years,505 we see this same difference
revealing itself in a slightly different way. Whereas MacKay actively promoted the
tendency to think ofmind and body as an essential unity, provocatively referring to
human beings as 'The Clockwork Image', Hasker is equally provocative in his
resistance to this tendency, calling his position 'emergent dualism'. Rhetoric aside,
however, the most striking feature ofHasker's theory is its similarity to MacKay's.
Hasker's favourite argument against taking the unity ofmind and body too seriously
is what he calls 'the unity of consciousness argument'. In his 1995 paper
'Concerning the Unity of Consciousness',506 Hasker argues that because our
conscious experience is essentially simple, we (as the subjects of that unitary
conscious experience) must be likewise simple. Since our physical bodies are not
simple, therefore, we are not (strictly speaking) our bodies. Concerning the project,
encouraged by MacKay, of trying to learn more about human beings by studying the
brain as an information processor, Hasker says:
But the unity-of-consciousness argument places an important barrier
in the way of this project, by pointing to a property of the mind—my
awareness of my present visual field—which is not a logical
consequence of the properties of and relations between the brain's
physical parts.
We may conclude, then, that mind is logically irreducible to the brain,
in that it has properties which are not logically implied by the
properties of, and relations between, the physical parts of the brain.
But from this it follows, in view of the principle of reducibility, that
the mind is also ontologically irreducible to the brain; in Sellars'
phrase the mind is 'correlated with' rather than 'consists of the
507brain's parts.
We have seen that MacKay would be in complete agreement with Hasker's claim
that 'the mind is logically irreducible to the brain', though their reasoning is
considerably different. Whereas Hasker seems to be deriving his evidence for
irreducibility almost exclusively from the fact that features of our mental lives can be
identified that cannot properly said to be features of our physical lives, MacKay's
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reasoning is considerably broader. MacKay did not simply point out a few differing
features between our concepts of 'mind' and 'brain'; he called our attention the fact
that mental and physical descriptions assume radically different perspectives on the
events being described. The irreducibility ofmind to brain, therefore, is not,
according to MacKay, grounded merely in any number of asymmetrical features, but
on the much broader asymmetry of standpoint.
This brings us to Hasker's claim that logical irreducibility implies ontological
irreducibility. Before we can say anything definitive concerning the Comprehensive
Realist's response to such a claim, we need to clarify what it is that Hasker is
claiming. First, Hasker clearly believes that the kind of 'ontological irreducibility'
he is arguing for implies some form of dualism. At least to this extent, the
Comprehensive Realist would clearly be somewhat uncomfortable. Interestingly,
however, Hasker goes on to claim that his form of dualism, the kind of dualism
implied by 'ontological irreducibility', is not necessarily a dualism of fully
independent substances. This claim would, of course, allay at least the worst of the
Comprehensive Realist's worries—though much more detail would be required to
make an acceptance of Hasker's position likely.
In explaining what is meant by 'ontological irreducibility', Hasker offers the
following example:
Here a comparison can be drawn with such a familiar physical
phenomenon as a magnetic field, which is correlated with but does not
consist of the 'system of objects' which is the generating magnet.
Such an 'emergent self can, I would argue, play the role not only of
the consciousness which is aware of the visual field, but of the acting
subject of free moral choice.
When, in a later work, he develops this position with regard to our prospects for life
beyond the grave, he elaborates on this example further, saying:
In principle, emergent dualism leaves open the question of life after
death for human beings. Certainly the theory provides no
metaphysical guarantee of survival. If anything, the field analogy cuts
the other way: stop the generator, destroy the magnet, and the
magnetic field disappears. It seems however, that there is at least the
logical possibility for the field to continue without its supporting
magnet; it is, after all, a distinct individual. No doubt an omnipotent
God could annihilate all of the electromagnets in a particle
accelerator, and instantaneously replace them with others, while
508
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causing the identical field to persist in being. Or, he could directly
sustain the field by his own power, without the need for a material
'generator' of any kind. Perhaps there is no reason why God would
do this. But Christians believe there is indeed a reason for God to
concern himself with the continued existence of rational souls.509
Since we can see such obvious similarity between the way Hasker unpacks his notion
of the 'ontological irreducibility' of the mind and the way MacKay explains the
relationship between persons and their embodiments (as we saw most explicitly in
chapter 6), the Comprehensive Realist may choose to simply dismiss the
terminological differences introduced by Hasker's insistence that his theory is a form
of dualism. But why would Hasker want to deny that we can study our minds by
studying the physiological structures of our brains despite the fact that much has
been learned about the parallel case of magnetic fields by the physiological study of
magnets (even to the extent that we can now build magnets, complete with the
magnetic fields they inevitably produce)? Perhaps Hasker offers some help to those
who cannot understand the motivation for his denial in the following qualification:
The properties of the magnetic field and the other fields identified by
physics do not seem to be emergent in the strong sense required for
the properties of mind. Nor does it seem that these fields possess the
kind of unity that is required for the mind, as shown by the unity-of-
consciousness argument. The analogy with the magnetic field is
useful in enabling us to conceive of the ontological status of the mind
according to the present theory.510
Unfortunately, however, Hasker has yet to develop his conception of the kind of
difference he has in mind when he says that magnetic fields do not 'posses the kind
of unity that is required for the mind'. For this reason, the Comprehensive Realist
may not yet be convinced that the dis-analogies within Hasker's own example are
strong enough to preclude the kind of physiological study in which MacKay spent
most of his life profitably engaged—the kind of physiological study that was inspired
by his suspicion of dualism on the one hand and reductionism on the other.
C. Nancey Murphy and Non-reductive Physicalism
Nancey Murphy has made another of the most interesting attempts at solving the
mind/body problem since the end ofMacKay's career. Murphy's system is of
509
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special interest to our present study because of the distinct way in which she seeks to
avoid being classified as either a dualist or a monist. As a sign of her resistance to
both extreme alternatives, she calls her position 'non-reductive physicalism'.511 Like
all the truly great theorists ofAnglo/American philosophy, she resolutely refuses to
give up on any of the desiderata of an adequate solution. Whether her efforts have
been rewarded by the production of a final solution, however, remains a question
upon which not even she appears overly sanguine.512
As Murphy explains her own theory, the key to understanding her strategy for
maintaining a physicalist position that is genuinely non-reductionist is the concept,
widely discussed in modern mental philosophy, of supervenience. Unfortunately,
however, the concept of supervenience is every bit as difficult to comprehend in its
513intricate details as is the entire problem presented by metaphysical anthropology.'
Fortunately for our present purposes, on the other hand, the overall function of this
concept in Murphy's metaphysical anthropology is relatively simple. She uses it to
explain the notion of downward causation—the phenomena by which 'higher order'
entities (such as minds) contribute causal features to the Tower order' entities (such
as bodies) upon which they depend.
Rather than moving straight into the arduous process of attempting to reproduce
Murphy's explanation of how downward causation is meant to work, therefore, we
first need to understand why it is that she believes it necessary to recognise such a
form of causal interaction.
Despite the qualifier 'non-reductive' in the name of her position, in classifying her
position as a form of physicalism, she accepts at least one form of reductionism.
She calls this limited class of reductionism 'ontological reductionism'.514 Simply
511 Non-reductive physicalism is, of course, a rather broad ideological camp of which Murphy is not
the founder—though she is one of its foremost recent apologists. Furthermore, she is unquestionably
the most prolific of the distinctively Christian non-reductive physicalists.
512 She concludes one of her most recent essays with the proviso: 'I acknowledge that this paper has
barely scratched the surface of the task I set for myself... For now, I look forward to your comments
on this small piece of the puzzle.' (Murphy 2002) p. 157
513 For a recent introduction to the concept of supervenience (in just under 400 pages), see (Kim
2002).
514 We must be very careful not to assume that Murphy and Hasker use this language in exactly the
same way. After all, we have seen that Flasker does not believe that 'ontological irreducibility'
implies substance dualism. Murphy, on the other hand, seems to think of 'ontological reductionism'
and 'substance dualism' as simple antonyms, such that the rejection of one implies the acceptance of
the other and vice versa.
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put, this means that she is rejecting substance dualism in favour of the idea that
creation is a fundamental unity. She defines 'ontological reductionism' as the view
that,
as one goes up the hierarchy of levels, no new kinds ofmetaphysical
'ingredients' need be added to produce higher-level entities from
lower-level ones. No additional 'vital force' or 'entelechy' is needed
to produce living beings from nonliving materials; no immaterial mind
or soul is needed to produce consciousness; no Zeitgest is needed to
form individuals into a society.515
In calling her position non-reductive, however, she is also committing herself to the
rejection of at least one specific form of reductionism. Murphy calls the kind of
reductionism that she rejects 'reductive materialism'. She defines 'reductive
materialism' as follows:
A still stronger claim ... is that the higher-level entities are nothing
but the sum of their parts but adds that only the entities at the lowest
level are really real; higher-level entities—molecules, cells,
organisms—are only composites of atoms.516
So far, the Comprehensive Realist is in full agreement with Murphy's position. After
all, as we have seen, MacKay spent his life fighting the logical fallacy he
affectionately dubbed 'nothing buttery' on the one hand, while, on the other hand, he
recognised that there are no valid biblical, philosophical, or scientific reasons to
believe the ontological claims of substance dualism. As we come to discuss
Murphy's explanation as to what is required of anyone wanting to negotiate the
narrow pass between dualism and reductionism, however, we will see our first
significant point of disagreement begin to emerge.
Whereas the Comprehensive Realist would point to the multiplicity of valid
perspectives on the ontologically unified chain of events consistently sustained by
our faithful Creator as the basis for his or her rejection of reductive materialism,
Murphy insists that the only way for physicalism to be truly non-reductive is if its
adherents reject a third kind of reductionism, which she calls 'causal reductionism'.
When the Comprehensive Realist is first confronted with the term 'causal reduction',
it may seem as if any position named by such a term would need to be rejected.
After all, ifwe were to deny any real causal powers to an entity, the entity itself
515
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could not truly be said to exist, for it would be a very strange kind of entity that made
absolutely no difference in the causal nexus. It would be difficult to understand what
anyone would even mean if they claimed that something existed, and yet had never
made, and never would make any difference in the world. Unfortunately, however,
Murphy appears to have more than this in mind when she says that causal
reductionism must be rejected.
Murphy seems to believe that the only way to avoid causal reductionism is to
demonstrate what she calls 'downward causation'—claiming that 'higher-order
entities' enter efficaciously into the causal nexus of 'lower-order entities'. And yet,
as we saw in chapter 4, this is precisely the kind of 'inter-level' causation that
MacKay was so keen to avoid. While MacKay certainly acknowledged the fact that
the activity of entities at one level of description (like minds) is necessarily
connected to the activity of entities at another level of description (like brains)—at
least to the extent that these descriptive levels apply to the very same multifaceted
event—he repeatedly insisted that this necessary connection is a relationship 'more
intimate than cause and effect'.517 On the other hand, to suggest, as does Murphy,
that something at one level of description (i.e. a 'higher-order' entity) causally
interacted with something at another level (like a Tower order entity') when those
descriptions refer to the very same multifaceted event is to suggest (albeit in a rather
strange way) that an event caused itself.
To be fair to Murphy, we must admit that she is not nearly as provocative in her
description of downward causation as some of her predecessors. Whereas MacKay's
great friend and philosophical adversary Roger Sperry used to speak of downward
causation as a process by which the causal features of lower-order entities were
518
'overpowered' by the causal features of higher-order entities, Murphy seems to
prefer Donald Campbell's understanding of the term. According to Campbell, (or at
least Murphy's interpretation of Campbell), downward causation is not overpowering
but selective activation of lower-level causal processes.519
517 See (MacKay 1985b) p. 59 and (MacKay 1966c). See also a parallel passage on p. 63 of (MacKay
1991b).
318 See (Sperry 1983) p. 117 and our discussion of inter-level causation in chapter 4.
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Even in this very limited sense, however, Murphy continues to insist that higher-
order entities enter efficaciously into the lower-order causal nexus. While this move
helps her to avoid reductive materialism, it does so only at the expense of introducing
more complex (if less severe) difficulties. For example, Murphy's system leaves her
with the pressing question (which forms the title of one of her most recent
publications), 'How does reason get its grip on the brain?'.520 The Comprehensive
Realist, on the other hand, is left with no such paradox. If faced with such a
question, MacKay would most likely have responded by saying that reason does not
need to get a grip on our brains any more than the words that make up this sentence
need to get a grip on the ink printed on this paper. We cannot deny the reality or
causal efficacy of the words that make up this argument any more than we can deny
the reality or causal efficacy of the ink on this paper—but that does not mean that we
are obliged to say that the words and the ink causally interact with each other! Nor
does it imply ontological dualism of any sort. It just means that reality (i.e. the
multifaceted causal nexus of creation) can be described on many different levels.
The very recognition of different levels of description, however, implies that care
must be taken to keep them indexed when more than one level of description is under
consideration. This careful indexing marks the difference between co-ordinated and
muddled causal descriptions. This is the very feature of our multifaceted existence
that necessitated MacKay's doctrine of complementary descriptions. We must
remember, therefore, (as we saw in chapter 4), that ifwe are to avoid serious
S91
confusion, we must practice good semantic hygiene.
D. Lynne Rudder Baker and the Constitution View
In a series of works published in the last ten years, Christian philosopher Lynne
Rudder Baker has argued for yet another version of holism. In one of her most




521 For a more detailed Comprehensive Realist response to Murphy's non-reductive physicalism, see
(Norman 2004).
'22 Her most complete exposition of the Constitution View was published as (Baker 2000). Of her
many shorter publications, five that relate specifically to our present project are (Baker 2001b; Baker
1995; Baker 2002; Baker 2001a; Baker 1997)
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Human persons are material beings, part of the natural order. As I
develop the idea of constitution, this view of human persons has the
consequence that although I am both a person and an animal, I am
most fundamentally a person. Hence, my persistence conditions are
the persistence conditions of a person (sameness of first-person
perspective), not the persistence conditions of an animal (sameness of
biological organism). I could continue to exist without being an
animal, but I could not continue to exist without being a person.52
In defining human persons in this way, she, like Murphy and MacKay before her, is
attempting to take our material existence seriously without falling into the
problematic assumption that human persons are entirely reducible to material bodies.
So her view is like Murphy's (and MacKay's) in that it denies any form of substance
dualism while simultaneously denying reductive materialism. Her view is different
from Murphy's, however, in that it does not resort to inter-level causation in the
effort to resist reductive materialism. Her work is especially important to the
Comprehensive Realist in that she elaborates on what it means to be ontologically
significant.
The first thing that we must explain in our attempt to exposit Baker's conception of
ontological significance is the difference between ontological significance and
ontological existence. While this distinction may seem unjustifiable at first glance,
and is probably not a distinction that is very widely recognised, it will be necessary
for our present purposes in that without such a distinction, it would be impossible to
compare and contrast Murphy's and Baker's positions without equivocation. After
all, whereas Murphy applies the title 'ontological reductionism' to any position that
would deny substance dualism, Baker simultaneously denies substance dualism and
claims that persons are 'ontologically significant'. Ifwe are to faithfully convey the
real points of difference between their respective views, we must carefully
investigate the extent to which this terminological discrepancy represents a deeper
rift between their positions.
In light of our discussion ofMurphy's position, we may attribute some of this
apparent terminological discrepancy to the fact that Murphy fails to consistently
distinguish between different types of entities as they correspond to different types of
descriptions. For if she had fully realised the kind of distinction that makes talk of
'downward causation' unhelpful, she may also have been more reserved than to label
523
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her own view 'ontological reductionism'. After all, in affirming the fact that 'higher-
order' entities posses real causal features, is she not thereby affirming their real
existence, denying the ontological reducibility of those entities to the 'lower-order'
entities that realise them? The answer to this question, of course, depends upon the
precise meanings of the terms 'ontological reduction' and 'real existence'.
Whatever we may decide with regard to Murphy's view, we should note that Lynne
Rudder Baker is careful not to say that persons have 'ontological existence' despite
her claim that they are 'ontologically significant'. This implicit distinction allows
her to avoid the dualistic assumption that a person and a body represent two things
(using the word 'things' in the same sense in both instances) while simultaneously
avoiding the reductionistic assumption that only one class of things (i.e. basic-level
bits ofmatter) are ultimately significant.
Perhaps an example would better highlight the distinction being made here. Let us
suppose that an answering machine has ten messages recorded on it. How many
answering machines do we have? One. How many messages do we have? Ten. So
when we talk about our answering machine with ten recorded messages, how many
things are we talking about? One? Ten? Eleven?
Surely the physicalist who is also an ontological reductionist would say that our
example presents only one thing that has any sort of ontological significance,
because there is only one physical thing involved in our example—the answering
machine.
But ifwe wanted to avoid reductive materialism in this case, we would obviously
want to recognise the reality of the ten messages as well as the answering machine.
After all, we would want to preserve the right to say, for example, that one of the
messages was garbled while the other nine were clear. In saying such a thing, we
would not be simply talking about the answering machine, because answering
machines are not the sort of things that can be garbled or clear. At most, we would
want to say that such statements refer to the activity of the answering machine,
saying that in nine cases it recorded the message properly while in one case its proper
function had been somehow frustrated. But before we begin to draw too many
conclusions, let us investigate this example a little further.
Suppose we were to copy the ten messages on to a tape recorder and then smash the
machine to bits. We would then no longer have the answering machine, though we
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would still have the messages. Likewise, we could have simply erased all the
messages and left the machine intact. In that case, we would be left with the
answering machine but no messages. The point is that the machine and the messages
have different persistence conditions.
The difference in persistence conditions between different kinds of things, which we
are attempting to highlight with this example, is precisely the distinction that Lynne
Rudder Baker seizes upon in her attempt to tread the thin line between reductionism
and dualism. To avoid tempting us into the kind of equivocation we saw in Foster's
argument between concepts and objects, she resists the urge to confer independent
ontological existence to higher-order entities. On the other hand, she recognises the
reality of these higher-order entities by attributing ontological significance to them.
In referring to the 'ontological significance' of things belonging to different natural
kinds rather than to the simple 'ontological existence' of undifferentiated 'things',
Baker is able to acknowledge the undeniable reality ofboth persons and bodies
without resorting to a dualistic metaphysical anthropology.
This brings us to the central difference between Baker's Constitution View and the
Comprehensive Realist position. Whereas MacKay simply stated the fact that mental
descriptions (qua mental descriptions) must include at least some entities that are
semantically unfit for physical descriptions (and visa versa), appealing to the radical
difference in linguistic standpoint required to make sense of different types of
descriptions, Baker attempts to offer more detail, explaining what it means for such
different kinds of entities to be constituted by the very same substance. In short, she
has taken up the challenge of explaining the precise nature of the relationship which
MacKay simply described as 'more intimate than cause and effect'.524 In a statement
that particularly highlights her contribution to our discussion of Comprehensive
Realism, Baker says:
The aim of my conception of constitution is to make sense of a
relation more intimate than separate existence, but still not identity. I
take identity to be necessary or strict identity: If (x = y), then
necessarily (x = y). Many philosophers think that if x and y are not
identical, then they are just two different things, like the sun and the
moon. The notion of Constitution offers a third position, a position
intermediate between identity and separate existence. (Say that x and
324 See (MacKay 1985b) p. 59 and (MacKay 1966c). See also a parallel passage on p. 63 of (MacKay
1991b).
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y have separate existence at t if and only if there is no property F such
that x and y are the same F at t.) For any x and y, there are three (not
two) possibilities: strict identity, constitution, and separate existence
. . . Thus, any criticism ofmy view that presupposes that non-identity
entails separate existence begs the question against my view.525
Those familiar with the history of the mind/body debate may recognise a certain
similarity between Baker's Constitution View and the kind of identity theory initially
suggested by U. T. Place in his influential paper, 'Is Consciousness a Brain
Process'.526 In that paper, Place attempted to distinguish between the 'is' of
definition, which indicates a necessary identity (as in the statement 'a bachelor is an
unmarried man'), and the 'is' of composition, which indicates an identity that is
logically contingent (as in the statement 'his table is an old packing case'). Though
the end results of their arguments are considerably different, this kind of contingent
identity is clearly what Baker has in mind when she speaks of the constitution
relation. Just as a table may be constituted by an old packing case, Baker says that a
person is constituted by a human animal. We do not have to say that our concept of
'table' must be reduced to our concept of 'packing case' in order to say that Place's
table and his old packing case are the same thing any more than we must reduce
persons to the bodies that constitute them in order to say that substance dualism has
been successfully avoided. This seems to be the idea that Baker has in mind when
she says:
Again, the opponents of constitution seem to think that ifx constitutes
y at t, then x and y are two things that remarkably happen to coincide
spatially—as if a constituted thing were separate from or independent
of what constitutes it. But that is not the idea of constitution-without-
identity at all. What stands before you when your spouse comes into
the room is not a pair consisting of a person and an 'associated'
animal; it is a person constituted by an animal. A person and the
constituting animal are not two separate beings. When your body
hurts, you hurt. It is a complete misinterpretation of the Constitution
View (at least my version of it) to treat a person and her body as
separate things. The constituting animal is no more separate from the
person than the constituting piece ofmarble is separate from David.521
And so we see that the position defended by Baker is very similar to the one
defended by MacKay. The biggest difference between Baker and MacKay with
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(Place 1956) see our brief discussion of the paper in chapter 2.
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regard to the issues that we have been discussing is that Baker attempts to provide
considerably more metaphysical detail. As our discussion moves beyond the process
of expositing and evaluating recently defended general theories of metaphysical
anthropology, however, we will see a bit more of the difference between Baker's and
MacKay's positions.
II. Holism and the Resurrection of the Body
As we saw in chapter 6, one of the most difficult questions faced by non-dualist
Christian philosophers interested in metaphysical anthropology is the question of
how we may reasonably hope for life beyond the grave. This is the kind of question
that, as we saw in chapter 1, led Thomas Aquinas to argue for the immortality of the
soul despite his conclusion from 1 Corinthians 15 that 'my soul is not I'. This is also
the question that led D. Z. Phillips, as we saw in chapter 6, to conclude that we need
to re-think our concept of eternal life. In this section, we will discuss a few of the
most recent non-dualist Christian responses to this vexing question.
A. Lynne Rudder Baker and the First-Person Perspective
We have just seen that Lynne Rudder Baker attempted to offer more metaphysical
detail than did MacKay regarding what it means for one kind of entity to be
constituted by another in such a way that they have independent ontological
significance without unduly multiplying the number of created substances. Another
point of agreement between Baker and MacKay is that they both believed that,
although substance dualism is logically possible, it is not a metaphysical
anthropology that is necessarily implied by Christianity. They both argued that since
Christianity does not directly imply substance dualism, and there are no absolutely
convincing scientific or philosophical arguments for substance dualism, Christians
ought not believe in substance dualism.
Also like MacKay, Baker gives the distinction between third-person and first-person
perspectives an important place in her overall metaphysical anthropology. Baker
defines a person as a thing with a first-person perspective. It is no surprise, therefore,
that the idea of the first-person perspective plays very heavily into her explanation of
personal identity through time. Though she admits that her criterion for personal
528 c.f. (Baker 1995)and (MacKay 1991a) (especially notes 1 and 3 to chapter 12)
The Next Generation 233
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
identity (sameness of first-person perspective) is somewhat circular, she also argues
that her definition is much more informative than many other non-dualist definitions.
In her recent article, 'Material Persons and the Doctrine ofResurrection', Baker says
that, 'Although no conditions for sameness of first-person perspective over time will
529
be forthcoming, if I exist at some future time, I shall know it.' Lest we be left
wanting after such a seemingly unsophisticated and dogmatic faith in our future
understanding, she goes on to explain how her first-person perspective criterion for
personal identity can help the materialist to deal with at least one notoriously difficult
thought experiment. She says:
Suppose that a mad scientist managed to duplicate me overnight using
a brain-state transfer device, and that he cleverly fashioned bodies, so
that now there are 100 physical and psychological replicas of me—
each sincerely claiming to be Lynne Baker, each reporting past events
that only I knew about before I was duplicated, each looking just like
me. Notice that the Constitution View, unlike other materialistic
views, does not have the untenable consequence that they are all
Lynne Baker. All 100 of the duplicates are psychologically
continuous with me when I went to bed, but the Constitution View
does not hold that psychological continuity is sufficient for personal
identity over time. What is required is sameness of first-person
perspective. The 100 duplicates all have different first-person
perspectives—even if each of the first-person perspectives is
"qualitatively indistinguishable" from mine . . . The fact that each
claims to be Lynne Baker, and the fact that each has apparent
memories qualitatively similar to Lynne Baker's, and the fact that
each looks like Lynne Baker are all irrelevant to whether any of them
is actually Lynne Baker. At most, one of them can have my first-
530
person perspective.
The first point that she draws from this example is that her view, unlike many other
materialist views, allows her to say that there is a fact of the matter as to which of the
imaginary 101 look a likes she is. Despite the fact that the 100 replicas are exactly
similar to her, from the point of separation, they all have different first-person
perspectives and are therefore different people. Furthermore, even in such a bizarre
situation, Baker would know for certain which of the look a likes is she—for she
cannot doubt the legitimacy of her own first-person perspective.
529 (Baker 2001a) p. 160
530
(Baker 2001a) p. 161
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The second point she draws from this thought experiment is that because each of the
look a likes has a different first-person perspective, there can be one and only one
look a like that is the same person as the pre-replicated Lynne Baker. Whether or not
it would be possible for anyone to know which look a like is the 'real' Lynne Baker
does not ultimately matter; either way there is one and only one Lynne Baker, and
there is a fact of the matter as to which of the different people who think they are
Lynne Baker is right and which are wrong.
These observations concerning this bizarre yet common thought experiment allow
Baker to demonstrate that the Constitution View is more compatible with traditional
Christian individual eschatology than either dualism or reductionism. Whereas
dualism's emphasis on the immortal soul makes the resurrection of the body more or
less irrelevant to personal survival, the Constitution View accounts for all the reasons
Christians may have for positing an immortal soul while simultaneously maintaining
a proper emphasis on bodily resurrection.531 On the other hand, by equating the
persistence conditions for personhood with the persistence conditions for any given
first-person perspective, the Constitution View also gets around the problems
associated with Christian Materialism regarding the material or biological continuity
between a person who dies and a person who is resurrected thousands of years later.
The only question that remains for the adherent to the Constitution View is how to
make sense of individual eschatology from the third-person perspective. After all, if
we abandon the apparently over-strict conditions for material or biological
continuity, how are we to explain what we mean when we say that our bodies will be
raised? More to the point, how are we to get around the seemingly unavoidable
spatio-temporal gap that separates our present embodiments from the embodiments
we will enjoy in the world to come?
We could attempt to bridge the temporal gap by positing an intermediate state
between death and resurrection. After all, Baker points out that her view is
compatible with belief in an intermediate state as long as some form of intermediate
embodiment is provided. But given the fact that every time a person dies, we can
observe that the body which is spatially continuous with the once-living body is
531 Not to mention the fact that the Constitution View achieves all of this without having to resort to
ghost stories.
532
(Baker 2001a) p. 162
The Next Generation 235
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
subject to intense corruption and even dissipation, how are we to explain away the
spatial gap between the dying body and the intermediate embodiment?
Baker also notes533 that her view is compatible with the positions of those thinkers
who would explain away the spatial gap by positing a temporal gap instead. One
could say, for example, that a rotting corpse signifies not that the person is off in
some other realm, perhaps inhabiting a new body, but the person is, in fact, dead.
Under this interpretation, the Christian would say that a dead person simply does not
exist between death and resurrection—in much the same way that a person does not
exist between the creation of the universe and that person's conception. Posting a
temporal rather than a spatial gap would mean that a dead person resumes his or her
existence when the relevant physical body is re-integrated and transformed at the
resurrection. The problem with this position, however, is that it would seem just as
impossible to maintain personal identity across a temporal gap as it would be across
a spatial one. After all, if an ancient bronze statue melted into a shapeless lump
during a fire, we could not merely re-shape it and tell everyone that we had preserved
the original, ancient statue. The ancient statue would have been destroyed in the fire.
All we would have done is to make a replica out of a very old piece of bronze.
Baker, like many before her, attempts to get around all these problems associated
with the spatio-temporal gap by simply stating that individual eschatology always
requires a miracle anyway, so we should simply say that it is God who spans the gap
in our personal existence. But is there not more that could be said concerning how
such a miracle would go? It may well be that the Comprehensive Realist position
has something more to offer here, but before we work out the finer points of such a
view, we need to say a little more about the nature ofpersonal identity. In particular,
we need to investigate the notion from a third-person perspective.
B. Kevin Corcoran and the Third-person Perspective
To understand the nature ofpersonal identity from a third-person perspective, we
need to look more closely at the concept of immanent causation. Of all the Christian
philosophers who have attempted in recent years to tackle the problem of personal
identity and individual eschatology, the one who takes the question of immanent
533
(Baker 2001a) p. 162
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causation most seriously is Kevin Corcoran.534 While Corcoran considers himself an
advocate of the Constitution View, he differs from Baker in that he thinks constituted
entities and the entities that constitute them are two different physical objects that
completely fill exactly the same physical space. Though this is not the proper venue
for a full exposition of his view, it may be interesting to note that his curious version
of the Constitution View also leads him to a very strange conception of death. He
explains this strange conception of death in the following way:
It seems possible that the causal paths traced by the simples caught up
in the life ofmy body just before death can be made by God to fission
such that the simples composing my body then are causally related to
two different, spatially segregated sets of simples. One of the two sets
of simples would immediately cease to constitute a life and come
instead to compose a corpse, while the other would either continue to
constitute a body in heaven or continue to constitute a body in some
intermediate state. In other words, the set of simples along one of the
branching paths at the instant after fission fails to perpetuate a life
while the other set of simples along the other branch does continue to
perpetuate a life. If this is at least possible, as it seems to be, then we
have a view of survival compatible with the joint theses that human
persons are essenti
enjoy gappy exister
The end result of all this, of course, is that Corcoran's Constitution View has at least
this much in common with substance dualism: under both views, human beings are
immortal. Whereas the substance dualist admits that human bodies die, however,
saying that it is the soul that is truly immortal, Corcoran is much more subtle. He
admits that it is possible for the fissionary partner of a living human body to die, but
suggests that in such cases it is safe to believe that for every human body that has
ever lived, there is at least one human body that has never died—and that every
human body that has ever lived can be identified with an immortal human body.
While these uncommon aspects of Corcoran's view are so radical that we need not
discuss them any further, one feature of his view that is very relevant to our present
study is his motivation for developing such a radical position.536 His motivation is
5j4
For a fuller discussion of the nature of immanent causation, see (Zimmerman 1997). In this
section, however, we will be concerned only with this idea as it relates to personal identity and




536 Even while calling Corcoran's position radical, however, it is important that we note the fact that
his views are not unprecedented. It should be clear from our discussion in chapter 6 that his position
ally^hysical objects and that such objects cannot
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simply that he appreciates the importance of the intricate relationship between our
physical and mental lives.
Though his reasoning is considerably different from MacKay's, his conclusion,
emphasising the importance of the precise causal properties of our present
embodiment for any future embodiment that can be identified as us, is very similar to
the conclusion MacKay came to at the close of his career (as we saw in chapter 6).
What Corcoran's work adds to Baker's contribution is a description of individual
eschatology from a third-person perspective. According to Baker, for a resurrected
person (RP) to be the same person as a person who died a thousand years earlier
(DP), RP must have one and the same first-person perspective as DP. But what is the
relationship between the body(s?) that constitute RP and DP? Whereas Baker does
not seem to place any value in such a third-person question, Corcoran (like the later
MacKay) points out that the relationship between RP's body and DP's body is not
trivial.
Lest we think that this observation is not important to Christian eschatology, we
should consider the importance of the empty tomb in the Gospel accounts of Jesus'
resurrection. After all, if it weren't for the nail scars in the hands of Jesus'
resurrected body, at least one of the apostles would not have believed that the
resurrected Jesus and the Jesus who died for our sins were one and the same
iro-7
person. As we saw in chapter 6, if our hope for eternal life lies in our union with
Christ in his death and bodily resurrection, then it is be safe to say that the
relationship between our present embodiments and our resurrection bodies will be
similar to the relationship between crucified body ofChrist and his resurrected body.
Similarly, as MacKay pointed out, if our present first-person perspectives are
intricately tied up with (in a relationship 'more intimate than cause and effect') what
we now (from a third-person perspective) call 'our bodies', we have no reason to
believe that such a relationship will not continue into the resurrection world. But as
Corcoran observes, ifwe are to say that our resurrected bodies will be the same
bodies as the ones that now embody us, they must be connected by chains of
immanent causation.
has strong similarities to those of both Peter van Inwagen and the early John Hick (cf. (Hick 1960)
and (Van Inwagen 1978)).
537 cf. John 20:25-28
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Corcoran emphasises the importance of this causal connection with the following
critique of the spatio-temporal criterion for identity:
What is absent in the simple spatiotemporal continuity criterion of
persistence is any mention of causation. Yet surely, if the mug on the
table in front ofme has persisted into the present, then its existence in
the immediate past must be causally relevant to its existence now. So
too with human bodies. If the human body sitting across the table
from me at 12:59 p.m. is not causally connected with the one across
from me at 11:58 a.m., then it is plausible to think that the human
body across the table from me at 12:59 p.m. is not a continuation of
the body that was there at 11:58 a.m., but rather is a replacement.
Causal considerations, therefore, seem especially pertinent to the
giving of persistence conditions for material objects of any sort.538
This kind of reasoning leads him to assert that the necessary and sufficient
persistence conditions for a human person can be stated as follows: 'A person
persists, therefore, just in case her physical organism persists and preserves a
capacity to subserve a range of intentional states.'539
The most obvious problem for Corcoran, then, is that for a resurrected person to be
the same as a person who once died, we must be able to explain how immanent
causation can be maintained across a spatio-temporal gap. This is the problem that
leads Corcoran to his radical conception of individual eschatology—saying that
dying bodies are fissioned and all of that. Unfortunately, however, the Gospel
accounts of Jesus' empty tomb present even more problems for Corcoran's radical
understanding of death than it would for a simple materialist. After all, if Jesus
really died, Corcoran would say that his body was fissioned. In this case, the empty
tomb would suggest not that the one and only Jesus Christ had died and subsequently
arisen, but that, if the body that was laid in the tomb now lives, there are now two
living Jesus Christs! The only other reasonable interpretation of the empty tomb
would be that either the irrelevant fissionary partner had been stolen or destroyed, or
that Jesus had never really died (and thus had never really been fissioned). As we
hinted at the close of our last section, however, it may well be that Comprehensive
Realism, with its strong grounding in the concept of logical complementarity, can
offer a simpler resolution to this admittedly difficult problem.
538
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C. Comprehensive Realism and the Second-person Perspective
Whereas Baker emphasised the importance of the first-person perspective as a
criterion for personal identity and Corcoran pointed out the need for us to take
seriously the third-person causal story linking our present embodiment to our
embodiment in the world to come, MacKay's unique contribution to this discussion
stems from his insistence that as Christians, we must treat the second-person
perspective as the perspective that commands ultimate epistemic authority. In saying
this, we are, of course, speaking somewhat metaphorically of the second-person
perspective, drawing on the 'I-Thou' distinction employed by Martin Buber and
others. As we saw in Chapter 6, MacKay was adamant about the fact that God's
sovereign will is the one and only ultimately objective epistemic ground. As he
related this fact to individual eschatology in his final Gifford Lecture:
. . . once you take seriously the claim of theism that there is nothing
in our space-time apart from the creative say-so of the Author who
gives being to the events in which it has its being, then I think it is
clear that it would be for the Author to stipulate the identity of a
resurrected body . . ,540
But MacKay's complementarity based worldview leaves us with much more to say
on this issue. For recognising the primacy of the second-person perspective allows
us to better understand the limitations of our first and third-person perspectives.
Up to this point, we have spoken of the first-person, second-person and third-person
perspectives for the sake of simplicity. Perhaps the metaphysical implications of our
present discussion would be better highlighted, however, ifwe were to adopt
terminology better suited to the scale of our subject. After all, we are not speaking of
the first-person, second-person and third-person perspectives in the easily
exchangeable sort ofway in which we normally use grammatical perspectives.
Nothing of very great metaphysical import, for example, hinges on the different
perspectives expressed in the sentences: 'I went to the store.', 'You went to the
store.', and 'We went to the store.'. Ifwe were to apply the predicate 'am the
ultimate authority in the Universe', rather than 'went to the store', however, things
would look quite different—and, as we shall soon see, this difference does not
merely consist in the difference between blasphemy (of the individual or coiporate
variety) and religious confession.
540
(MacKay 1991b) p. 269
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7. Distinguishing Between Temporal Perspectives
Since we are speaking of three different general perspectives rather than simply three
different perspectives on any given isolated event, it will, perhaps, be clearer to
speak of 'temporal perspectives' or 'versions of time' rather than simple first-person,
second-person and third-person perspectives. We will call these versions of time
'time-for-me', 'time-for-God', and 'time-for-us'.
Though this is not the proper place for a full discussion of the nature of time (as if
there could be such a thing as a 'full discussion of the nature of time'!), we do need
to make a few brief observations regarding the nature of 'time-for-me', 'time-for-
God' and 'time-for-us', as well as the relationships that obtain between them.
As we have seen, according to Christianity, God's sovereign will is the ultimate
arbiter of all truth. The ultimate temporal perspective, therefore, is time-for-God.
That is just to say that time-for-God represents the only truly objective reference-
point, completely untainted by any of the fallibility characteristic of human
subjectivity.
As we saw in chapter 6, MacKay was keen to point out that the only portion of time-
for-God that we as his creatures can ever know is that portion which God sees fit to
reveal to us. Because time-for-God is the ultimate standard, therefore, any genuine
creaturely knowledge can be understood as a revelatory overlap between time-for-
God and time-for-us or time-for-me. This is why Christian epistemologists often
describe our search for truth as the effort to 'think God's thoughts after him'.541
Time-for-us, on the other hand, is the shared, corporate experience (or 'inter-
subjectivity') we call 'objective history'. According to Christianity, there is no time-
for-us separate from time-for-God because all individuals participating in time-for-us
are utterly dependent creatures. Time-for-God, however, extends both qualitatively
and quantitatively beyond time-for-us.
Finally, time-for-me is the relationship between an individual and everything with
which that individual causally interacts. Since it does not appear to be possible for a
self to be maintained in the absence of any other, time-for-me is not independent
from time-for-us or time-for-God, though each individual has a unique time-for-me
341
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due (in part) to the fact that each of us has a unique pattern of interaction with time-
for-us and time-for-God.
When we say that time-for-me is simply the history of an individual's relationship
with the rest of the world, it may seem as if time-for-me is simply a unique
description of time-for-us. After all, time-for-us is the shared history of the entire
created causal nexus. On closer analysis, however, this is not revealed to be the case.
Though we cannot delve into too much detail here, we should note that this collapse
of time-for-me into time-for-us was more or less taken for granted in the history of
thought before Einstein pointed out the fact that there is an absolute maximum speed.
Because there is an absolute maximum speed, however, relationships between
creatures cannot be properly understood as instantaneous—thus our necessarily
distinct perspectives on public space require at least some differentiation from our
distinct perspectives on public time. The end result of all this is that not all
relationships between different time-for-me's and the shared time-for-us are exactly
similar. For example, if a person were to take a long, fast, round-trip journey, the
trip would take less of that person's time-for-me than our time-for-us.
Recognising these important though often overlooked distinctions between the
different ways in which it is common to talk about time allows us to dismiss several
of the most important pseudo-problems that often worry Christian philosophers.
Perhaps the most important of these pseudo-problems is the spatio-temporal gap.
2. Comprehensive Realism and the Spatio-temporal Gap
Of the many things we could say about how Comprehensive Realism explains the
spatio-temporal gap between death and resurrection, the most basic is that the very
idea of a literal spatio-temporal gap is misconceived. After all, as we have just
discussed, time is not a substance. Time is merely a way of talking about
relationships—a way of describing a causal nexus. When we speak of 'breaks' or
'holes' in time, therefore, we must remember that we can only be speaking
metaphorically. Though this is a relatively simple point, it is often overlooked. For
this reason it may be necessary to offer a little more in the way of explanation as to
what we mean when we say that time is not the sort of thing that can have gaps.
Perhaps this point will be best explained by clarifying what is meant when we say
that time is not a substance. Just as when I put the cap on my pen I have not created
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a third object (namely thefit between the cap and the pen), we must understand that
when a new subject enters our shared causal nexus (i.e. when a new time-for-me
begins to overlap with time-for-us) God did not have to create, in addition to the new
subject, a new time-for-me. Similarly, when God first created the universe, he did
not have to create, in addition to individual creatures, a space-time continuum. Just
as a 'fit' is nothing above and beyond the relation of one object to another, time is
nothing above and beyond the history of such relations. Furthermore, just as there is
no fit when we have only the pen or the cap in isolation, there is no relationship (no
time) without at least two distinct things to relate to one another.
Any objection on the basis of a supposed 'temporal gap' to the Christian assertion
that it is possible for a person to die at one point in time-for-us and be resurrected
thousands of years later (in time-for-us) would therefore rely on a crucial fallacy.
After all, where is the gap? The gap is not in that person's time-for-me, because
time-for-me is by definition the history of the relationship between a person and the
world. If there is no person between death and resurrection to relate to the world, we
can not say that there is a hole or a gap in that person's time-for-me.
Perhaps, however, we may be tempted to say that it is precisely this lack of a
person's time-for-me overlapping with the time-for-us that separates that person's
death and resurrection that constitutes the problem we are referring to when we speak
of 'a temporal gap'. This may be a reasonable way to think of the situation often
referred to as a 'temporal gap', but before we jump to any conclusions, we need to be
careful to consider what does and does not follow from such a view.
First of all, we must understand that calling this situation 'a temporal gap' is a
misnomer, for interpreting death and resurrection in the way we have just suggested
does not posit anything so contradictory as a gap or hole in the fabric of time. This
example does not, therefore, constitute the kind of absurdity that would indicate a
logical flaw. The apparent temporal gap implied by such an understanding results
from a sort of equivocation. Once we clear up this equivocation, we will see that,
contrary to many historically popular assertions, Christian individual eschatology
does not imply a hole, gap, 'limbo state' or anything of the sort within either time-
for-me or time-for-us.
As with any logical mistake, the simplest way to avoid the kind of equivocation to
which we are referring is to get clear on how the mistake is normally made in the
The Next Generation 243
Mind, Body, and the Philosophical Theology ofDonald M. MacKay
first place. With regard to death and resurrection, the easiest way for us to
mistakenly fall into believing that a genuine temporal gap has occurred is to think of
the situation as follows. We begin by thinking of a time-for-us with which a specific
time-for-me overlaps. We then come to recognise that this time-for-us ofwhich we
began thinking progresses to a point with which the time-for-me in question ceases to
overlap. Then, forgetting that we had been thinking strictly in terms of time-for-us,
we begin to assume that since we are now thinking of a time in which the person in
question does not exist, we must be thinking of a time-for-me in which the relevant
person does not exist. Once we remember that it can only be time-for-us that does
not include the relevant person, however, we can easily see that the scenario we have
been imagining does not include any gaps in either time-for-me or time-for-us. All
that our scenario implies is that there is not a one-to-one correlation between time-
for-me and time-for-us—and we have already secured the soundness of this
implication by our need to distinguish between time-for-us and time-for-me in the
first place.
Even ifwe properly sort our statements for proper temporal perspective, however,
avoiding the kind of equivocation that implies a temporal gap, some may argue that
there is still logical difficulty in the neighbourhood. Some would say, for example,
that one generally recognised feature of time-for-us is that an object can come into
being only once.542 Although this assertion has a great deal of intuitive appeal, the
degree to which it precludes the Comprehensive Realist interpretation of death and
resurrection is proportional to the degree in which it is interpreted in a question-
begging manner. After all, ifwe are to accept this assertion only in its most intuitive
form (i.e. 'an object can make its initial entry into time-for-us only once'), it presents
absolutely no problem to the Comprehensive Realist. If, on the other hand, we are to
interpret this assertion as a claim that if there exists some time-for-us which overlaps
with a given time-for-me, that specific time-for-me depends for its very existence on
a continuing one-to-one relationship with every subsequent time-for-us, the assertion
not only loses some of its intuitive appeal, but also begs the question against a
Comprehensive Realist (or, indeed, any post-Einstein) interpretation of time.
Doubtless, some would not be bothered by the fact that this second interpretation
begs the question against Comprehensive Realism. After all, it is clear that different
342
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philosophers often have different intuitions concerning such 'generally recognised'
features of the world. It is important for our present purposes to recognise, however,
that we are dealing (at least in this case) with slightly more than a mere difference in
intuitions—for this difference in intuitions is most likely grounded in a difference in
epistemic loyalty. After all, this counter-assertion to the Comprehensive Realist
position suggests that the identity of an individual depends on its being sustained in
the spatio-temporal community of our creaturely causal nexus. The Comprehensive
Realist, on the other hand, places ultimate epistemic loyalty in the will of God. For
the Comprehensive Realist, therefore, the inter-subjectivity of time-for-us is not the
ultimate source of hope for continued personal existence. The Comprehensive
Realist has a hope that extends beyond the day-to-day persistence of created objects,
for the Comprehensive Realist's ultimate epistemic loyalty is to time-for-God.
And so we see that differentiating between time-for-me, time-for-God and time-for-
us reveals what we have been calling 'the problem of the spatio-temporal gap' to be
nothing more than a pseudo-problem. There are, however, still several questions that
remain outstanding. Perhaps the most difficult of these questions is how a specific
time-for-me can become disentangled from one time-for-us and, without any
intervening time-for-me, come to overlap another time-for-us thousands of years in
the future-for-us. Though the implication of appeals to God's miraculous power
(such as we saw in Lynne Rudder Baker's account) is that whether or not we can
make sense of death and resurrection from the perspective of time-for-us, it is
ultimately only time-for-God and time-for-me that matter, it may still be that
Comprehensive Realism has something more to offer. As we attempt a fuller
explanation ofbodily resurrection and personal identity, integrating all three of the
temporal perspectives we have been taking special care to distinguish, we will need
to follow Corcoran's suggestion, paying special attention to the relationship between
identity through time and the need to sustain a unique, characteristic set causal
features.
3. Comprehensive Realism and the Nature ofCausal Descriptions
Another implication ofMacKay's assertion that the regularity of the created order is
best characterised as dynamic rather than static stability is that God must continually
sustain every relationship between the various particulars of creation. Ifwe are to
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take this implication seriously, we must recognise that God not only sustains every
created object, but he also structures every feature of the universal causal nexus.
Recognising this feature of creation allows us to view the nature of causation in a
distinctly theistic way. With particular regard to our present project, it allows us to
see that the distinctive causal features characterising our multifaceted physical,
mental, and spiritual lives are viewed most objectively not from the perspective of
time-for-us. After all, the closest thing to objectivity time-for-us has to offer is the
inter-subjectivity ofmajority opinion. However incomplete may be our best attempts
to understand our selves from the perspective of time-for-God, we must recognise
that this perspective offers the ultimate epistemic vantage point. For, as the ancients
said, 'In Him we live and move and have our being'.543 Once this point is
understood, we see that, unlike Baker and others, MacKay is not appealing to the
blind faith of Christian believers when he says that it is ultimately up to the Author
of creation whether or not any individual is to live again after their bodies see intense
corruption. He is, rather, appealing to the only standard that ultimately matters.
Perhaps this point will be better clarified ifwe relate it to the kind of causal account
of personal identity called for by Corcoran.
Though we have already said that Corcoran may be asking for us to believe too much
when he says that upon death God fissions our bodies in such a way that we continue
to exist in heaven or some intermediate state even as our fissionary partners see
corruption here on earth, his account is not altogether different from what the
Comprehensive Realist might say. Instead of appealing to fission and our continued
bodily existence throughout the time-for-us separating our death and our bodily
resurrection at the end of the present created order, however, the Comprehensive
Realist might say that God, as the ultimate structuring cause of all that exists, forms
each chain of immanent causation relating to time-for-me in such a way that each of
our time-for-me's flow seamlessly and immediately from our death at one point in
time-for-us to our resurrection at another (possibly much later) point in time-for-us.
As Corcoran rightly pointed out, saying that upon death God structures a causal
chain for me that is distinct from the normal causal nexus of the community I used to
live in does not necessary imply that I exist outside of time-for-all-living-human-
543 Acts 17:28a
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beings. The primary difference between Corcoran's radical suggestion and the
Comprehensive Realist position, however, is that whereas Corcoran suggests a
somewhat counter-intuitive personal history in an effort to preserve as close to a one-
to-one relationship as possible between time-for-me and time-for-us, the
Comprehensive Realist makes no such effort to force a relationship that does not
appear to obtain on its own. While both positions hold causal histories in high
regard, the Comprehensive Realist looks to time-for-God rather than time-for-us as
the ground of our immanent causal histories.
The Comprehensive Realist understanding of complementary temporal descriptions,
therefore, allows us to understand death and bodily resurrection as literal, historical
events—-just as we are led to believe by the example of Christ's death and
resurrection. Furthermore, it does not require us to believe in any sort ofwaiting
period (from the perspective of time-for-me) between our death and resurrection,
allowing us to understand Christ's statement to the thief on the cross ('Today you
will be with me in Paradise')544 without positing any heavenly existence beyond the
heavenly existence promised to us in Scripture (i.e. the New Earth in which heaven
and earth are intertwined).545
Though this way of understanding the intermittent overlap between time-for-us and
time-for-me may seem radical in its own right, it is important for us to remember that
our bodily resurrection will not be the first occurrence of this phenomenon. After all,
as we have already suggested, post-Einsteinian physicists have demonstrated that
something very similar would happen ifwe were ever to go on a long, round-trip
journey on which we travelled very fast. In fact, something like this (but on a much
smaller scale) happens every time we travel at all.
But the case of our death and bodily resurrection still presents us with at least one
unique feature. For after a human being dies, the causal community with which that
person's immanent-causal chain had been intertwined throughout life continues to
include a physical object—a corpse—which, up until that person's death, had been
the objective complement of all subject-oriented descriptions of that person. Yet that
object no longer has any valid I-story to tell. The I-story that used to be valid for it
has been grafted into the future.
544 Luke 23:43
545 cf. (Wright 1999)
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Yet this is not the only feature of the Comprehensive Realist individual eschatology
that is unprecedented at the present time-for-us. After all, whereas the O-story
complement of all valid I-stories we have encountered up until this point in time-for-
us have related to mortal bodies made of the cursed dust of this fallen world, the O-
story complements of our I-stories once they have been grafted into the future will
(according to Scripture) relate to imperishable bodies. Furthermore, as John Baillie
commented in the selection we quoted in chapter 6, the imperishable bodies with
which our future I-stories will be correlated must be suited to the wonderful life God
has promised us in the New Earth. So, presumably, these incorruptible bodies will
be made not of the cursed dust of the present cosmos, but of the redeemed matter
characteristic of the New Earth, intricately bound up in the New Heaven and full of
the radiance of our Saviour's glory.
While it may be true that such a literally conceived individual eschatology suggests
the occurrence ofmany events that will be, up until the time-for-us in which they
occur, wholly unprecedented, that does not put it beyond the reach of a
philosophically sound Christian hope. After all, our Christian hope is not grounded
in the precedents established in time-for-us. As MacKay would have us remember,
the only perspective from which ultimate stability can be comprehended is time-for-
God. And we as Christians are heirs to the hope that God will preserve us for
himself—mind, body, and soul—up until that final, glorious day. May it come
quickly!
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Conclusion
In this thesis we have attempted to explain the philosophical and theological
contributions of Donald M. MacKay as they relate to the mind/body problem—
especially as this problem relates to the contemporary evangelical Christian Church.
After introducing the mind/body problem as it relates to the contemporary
evangelical Christian Church in chapter 1 and the career of Donald MacKay as it
relates to the mind/body problem in chapter 2, we proceeded to explain MacKay's
metaphysical anthropology.
The key to understanding MacKay's metaphysical anthropology is his understanding
of logical complementarity. Accordingly, we devoted chapter 3 to the task of
expositing his work in that area before proceeding, in chapter 4, to explain in more
detail how this understanding related to the mind/body problem. We saw in chapter
4 that MacKay's understanding of logical complementarity allowed him to say that
human beings are multi-faceted creatures—creatures that may be meaningfully
described in many different kinds ofways. Most significantly, MacKay argued that
although mental descriptions and physical descriptions necessitate radically different
standpoints, they do not necessitate substantially different subjects.
In saying that mental descriptions and physical descriptions can apply to human
beings with equal validity, however, he raised the following objections from other
evangelicals: 1) If physical descriptions really apply to me in the same way that
mental descriptions do, and the subjects of physical descriptions must always obey
the mechanical laws of cause and effect, how can / be said to be free? And 2) If
mental descriptions and physical descriptions really apply to the same 'me', how can
I reasonably hope for mental life after my body dies?
Since MacKay dealt with this first objection rather extensively and consistently
throughout his academic life, Chapter 5 was devoted to explaining and evaluating his
response.
With regard to the second objection, however, MacKay seems to have altered his
position somewhat in the final years of his career. Since this alteration in his
position may have been at least partly due to the complexity of related theological
issues, we spent the first half of chapter 6 explaining these complex issues by
investigating the related controversies in biblical, philosophical, and systematic
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theology during MacKay's lifetime. In the second half of chapter 6, we explained
the shift in MacKay's position relative to this second objection as it relates to these
theological controversies.
Unfortunately, MacKay's career came to an early end. In the years since his death,
several Christian philosophers have begun to address the relationship between
metaphysical anthropology and individual eschatology in much greater detail. In our
seventh and final chapter, therefore, we have examined and evaluated the work of
some of these Christian philosophers in the light ofMacKay's unique contribution.
Since MacKay is no longer around to address these issues in person, it was in this
final chapter that it has been necessary for us to move beyond a mere exposition of
MacKay's writings, into a fuller Comprehensive Realist response than he was able to
give. It is hoped that our attempt at applying the logic of complementary
descriptions to the unique problems presented by a detailed individual eschatology
will form an additional contribution to the substantial project begun by MacKay to
form a complete metaphysical anthropology that is consistent with the central
teachings of the contemporary evangelical Christian church.
Although we have attempted in this thesis to systematically exposit all of the most
important features ofMacKay's Comprehensive Realism, there is much more work
that needs to be done. Not only could considerably more space be profitably devoted
to the further exposition of the specific issues raised in each of our chapters, but
more work is also called for along tangential lines.
For example, biblical theologians might profitably follow up the present work with a
fuller exposition of the relevant biblical texts. While several prominent biblical
theologians546 have already been immensely successful in developing fuller and
richer holistic readings of biblical texts that have been traditionally thought to
support anthropological dualism, it is considered highly probable that MacKay's
contributions to philosophical theology will add further momentum to this already
1 547
growing trend.
546 N. T. Wright and Joel Green, most notably
347 It may be of interest to note in this context that in the concluding paragraph of Joel Green's most
recent publication expositing the biblical basis for anthropological holism, he remarks, 'Questions
remain, of course. One of the more important has to do with the nature of space and time, and
specifically with the relation of time and eternity. A further, perhaps more urgent issue concerns the
bridge by which human identity crosses from this life into the next. (Green 2002) p. 50
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On the other hand, Comprehensive Realism also presents Christian ethicists with a
clear, biblical perspective from which to address the legion of questions that have
arisen in the field ofmedical ethics in recent years. Questions over the ethical status
of abortion, euthanasia, human cloning, and genome patents, and even older
questions regarding the ethical grounds for cremation and the rejection of
cannibalism all cry out for a well-grounded metaphysical anthropology. After all,
Christian Ethicists have struggled for years with the tension between a metaphysical
anthropology that says that it is only our rational, immaterial souls that bear the
divine image on the one hand, and the intuitive knowledge that even the very young,
old, and mentally handicapped (and even dead) of our species deserve more respect
than other, lesser, life-forms. Once we begin to understand that Comprehensive
Realism offers a more biblically and philosophically sound metaphysical
anthropology than the substance dualism to which the evangelical church has been
wedded since the early scientific revolution, we may begin to understand why so
many of our ethical intuitions, steeped in right religious fervour as they are, so often
run counter to the philosophical implications of our mistakenly dualistic
anthropology.
These are but a few of the many directions the research presented in this thesis may
be taken in the future. Although it seems fitting to recite MacKay's favourite motto
in this context ('When short of data, keep mind open and mouth shut.'),548 it may
also be that the time has come to assert its converse. After all, when the open mind
reflects upon a rising tide of data, there comes a time when silence is no longer
appropriate. And so we close with another familiar motto: Semper Reformanda.
548
(MacKay 1980a) p. 65
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